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Zusammenfassung
Die Sicherheit von Informationssystemen ist in der heutigen Zeit von zentra-
ler Bedeutung. Die große Anzahl aufgedeckter Sicherheitslücken zeigt, dass
neue Methoden zur Entwicklung sicherer Systeme notwendig sind. Um sol-
che Methoden auf eine formale Basis zu stellen, wird geeignete Theorie zur
Spezifikation von Sicherheit in Systemen benötigt. Ein weitverbreiteter An-
satz ist, die Begriffe Nichtinterferenz und Informationsflusssicherheit in den
Mittelpunkt einer solchen Theorie zu stellen. Mit diesen lässt sich die Abwe-
senheit unerlaubter Informationsflüsse und verdeckter Informationskanäle
beschreiben und analysieren. In dieser Arbeit wird die bestehende Theorie
der Nichtinterferenz für zustandsbasierte, asynchrone Systeme erweitert
und mit neuen Techniken angereichert, um sowohl ein tieferes Verständnis
und eine breitere Anwendbarkeit zu erlangen, als auch eine formale Basis
für die Entwicklung sicherer Informationssysteme zur Verfügung zu stellen.
Einen Schwerpunkt dieser Dissertation bilden neue Resultate zu dem
Begriff der intransitiven Nichtinterferenz. Eines davon ist eine vollständige
Charakterisierung durch Abwicklungsrelationen, durch die erst einen Poly-
nomzeitalgorithmus zu deren Verifikation ermöglicht wird, der ebenfalls
Teil dieser Arbeit ist.
Ein zweiter Schwerpunkt ist die Erweiterung der bisherigen Nichtin-
terferenzdefinitionen um sich während der Laufzeit ändernde Sicherheits-
richtlinien. Um den sich daraus ergebenden Sicherheitsanforderungen ge-
recht zu werden, wird eine neue Theorie der sogenannten dynamischen
Nichtinterferenz entwickelt und mit bisherigen Ansätzen verglichen. Deren
Anwendbarkeit wird durch verschiedene Beispiele und eine aufwändigere
Sicherheitsanalyse eines verteilten, dynamischen Zugriffskontollsystems
demonstriert.
Einen dritten Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit bilden algorithmische Frage-
stellungen, insbesondere die Frage der Entscheidbarkeit und Komplexität
der analysierten Sicherheitsbegriffe. Dies führt sowohl zu neuen Unent-
v
scheidbarkeitsresultaten für die Verifikation bisheriger Sicherheitsbegriffe,
als auch zu neuen effizienten Algorithmen für die Analyse von sowohl
existierenden, als auch in dieser Arbeit entwickelten unterschiedlichen
Varianten von Nichtinterferenz.
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Abstract
Nowadays, the security of information systems is of crucial importance.
The large number of detected security vulnerabilities in many systems
indicates that new methods for developing secure systems are necessary.
These require an appropriate formal foundation. A widely used approach
revolves around the notions noninterference and information flow. They
allow to express and analyze the absence of illegal information flows and
covert channels. In this thesis, the framework of noninterference for state-
based asynchronous systems is extended and enriched with new techniques
in order to gain a deeper understanding and a broader applicability. As a
result, a formal foundation for developing secure systems is obtained.
First, new results for the notion of intransitive noninterference are
obtained. In particular, a complete characterization by unwinding relations
makes the development of a polynomial-time verification algorithm possible
in the first place.
Second, the previous noninterference definitions are extended with
support for policies changing during execution. To capture all resulting
security requirements, a new theory of so-called dynamic noninterference
is developed and compared to previous approaches. The applicability of
this framework is demonstrated by several examples and a complex case
study of a distributed dynamic access control system.
Third, algorithmic problems are examined, in particular with regard
to the question of decidability and complexity of the analyzed security
definitions. New undecidability results for some of the present security
definitions are obtained, and new efficient algorithms for the verification of
both the previously existing and in this thesis developed different notions
of noninterference are established.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The security of computer systems is crucial in today’s connected world.
Nevertheless, for the year 2012, the Norton Cybercrime Report [Cor12]
calculates the annual costs associated with global consumer cybercrime at
US $110 billion. One reason for these costs is the high amount of attacks
against several computer systems. The success of these attacks is often due
to security vulnerabilities which stem from implementation or conceptual
flaws in the affected systems. This illustrates the enormous importance of
developing secure systems, however, the large number of detected security
issues let one imagine the difficulty to do this successfully.
While attackers need to find only one vulnerability of a system to
compromise it, developers must secure the system against all possible
attacks—even those the developers themselves are not aware of. To rule
out as many security flaws as possible in different systems, one needs a
very general approach. Such an approach should enable the developer, as
automatically as possible, to verify security and find potential vulnerabilities
before deploying the system. In order to address this problem, we take a
mathematical and formal approach for expressing the analyzed system and
the security requirements.
On a very general and abstract level, one can formulate insecurity as a
property that certain security sensitive information can get into places which
it should not reach or that it can be manipulated in a prohibited manner.
Therefore, one needs a certain understanding where information belongs
and where it should not end up. This is expressed by a security specification,
also called a policy, which has to capture all relevant security requirements
of the system. For this purpose, the system is partitioned into so-called
security domains. These form units depending on their confidentiality
1
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and integrity of information. A policy states from which security domain
information may reach another security domain. When information reaches
another security domain, we speak of an information flow. For the security
of a system, the absence of those information flows that are not allowed by
the policy are relevant. The property that there is no information flow from
one security domain to another is called noninterference.
This very general idea forms the basis of all security definitions in the
field of information flow security and noninterference. It leads to many
different interpretations. On the one hand, these differences are due to
diverse types of systems and semantic models. To mention only a few of
them, information flow security has been successfully adopted to state-
based transition systems, process algebras, program languages, and reactive
systems. On the other hand, the policy can also be interpreted in multiple
ways. The interpretation of a policy in which a certain flow of information
is either never or always allowed is usually either too restrictive to represent
real systems or too coarse to capture all security related restrictions. This
results in less restrictive but more expressive policies. These multifaceted
directions explain why such a huge amount of research on information flow
and noninterference has been carried out in the last decades.
Originally, noninterference was designed to uncover forbidden infor-
mation flows in access control systems. Goguen and Meseguer [GM82]
did the first work on this subject and used simple but very general de-
terministic state-based systems. This system model is specific enough to
express real systems and sufficiently general to capture a large number of
possible systems. Their definition is not limited to access control systems,
and it also has been applied to various systems, for example to verify the
security of small operating systems. Over time, their original definition has
turned out to be too restrictive for expressing the security requirements of
many systems. Several weakenings and generalizations of this initial idea
have been proposed. One of the first and until today probably the most
important generalization, introduced by Haigh and Young [HY87], is the
notion of intransitive noninterference. While Goguen and Meseguer’s defi-
nition only allowed to specify direct information flows between particular
security domains, Haigh and Young’s definition allowed information flows
across multiple security domains. This led to a significant generalization
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and better applicability of this concept. Rushby [Rus92] and afterwards van
der Meyden [vdM07] formalized and extended the notion of intransitive
noninterference, and the latter corrected it with regard to the application in
completely asynchronous systems. In this thesis, we take up this previous
theory of noninterference and contribute to a deeper understanding by
providing new characterizations and extend them in particular with regard
to the development of efficient algorithms for the verification of security.
Based on the developed framework, in this thesis, the previous notions
of noninterference are extended to support policies that change during
execution of the system. In the previously mentioned works on noninterfer-
ence, it was basically assumed that the policy is a relation between security
domains which does not change during a system run. But especially in
discretionary access control systems, it is common that access rights can be
changed during the system run. In the formalism used in this thesis, this
will be expressed by dynamic policies. However, there is only little research
on this subject—the only work that uses a similar system model as we do
is [Les06]. In their definitions, we found inconsistencies which motivated us
to develop new definitions for dynamic noninterference. In this thesis, we
provide an extension of the previous theory that supports dynamic policies
and reveals new kinds of undesired information flows which results from
changes in the policy. We show the strength and flexibility of our theory by
successfully applying it to a dynamic distributed access control system.
We also show the applicability of several of the analyzed and developed
notions of noninterference by providing efficient algorithms for the detection
of security flaws. According to the acceptance and practicability of security
definitions, it is crucial that systems can be verified automatically. A focus
of this work is to investigate this property and to examine the decidability
and complexity of the considered noninterference properties. We provide
efficient algorithms for those noninterference definitions, and we could
show that the verification problem is in polynomial time.
3
1. Introduction
1.1 Computer Security
In this section, we establish the context where information flow security and
noninterference belong, and we introduce fundamental ideas and concepts
of computer security.
Computer security is about the design and analysis of computer systems
with respect to security properties. Due to the high number of attacks on
computer systems and their news coverage, most people have an intuition
of what computer security means or how a secure system should behave.
However, for formal reasoning about security, a more precise definition
about what security is and which security properties are relevant, is needed.
Very generally, computer security is about the protection and the security
of computer systems, while information security is about the protection
of information, mainly within some computer system. Since, at least in
a computer system, none of these two can reasonably be considered in
isolation, we do not make any distinction between them and use them
interchangeably.
First, we will clarify which security properties this work addresses—we
call this a security model. A security model is a formal statement about a
system’s confidentiality, integrity, or availability requirement. According to
[usl11],
“the term information security means protecting information and
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide—
(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper infor-
mation modification or destruction, and includes ensuring
information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restric-
tions on access and disclosure, including means for protect-
ing personal privacy and proprietary information; and
(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable ac-
cess to and use of information.”
4
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In this thesis, we focus mainly on the property of confidentiality, and due
to its duality, on the property of integrity. Availability is essentially not
considered in this work.
Confidentiality is about concealing data, information, or resources from
someone who should not have access to it. In the next sections, we will
detail this very informal statement by providing a clear description of what
is protected and from whom. Keeping information secret is fundamental for
governments and industry but also in every modern computer system which
is connected to a network or users have access to. Several mechanisms have
been established in the design of secure systems to achieve confidentiality
properties. Here, we will mention only a few of them. One of the most
general mechanism is an access control system which restricts the access to
particular data. However, in general, data should not be kept secret from
everyone nor at any time, since otherwise such a system would be useless.
This requires discretionary access control systems, where the access rights
may change during time. We will discuss access control systems in a later
chapter in detail. Another very general way to enforce confidentiality of
data is to encrypt it. Roughly speaking, encryption scrambles data into a
cipher-text, which is incomprehensible for anyone that does not have the
key to decrypt it. However, this mechanism shifts the problem of keeping
data secret to the problem of keeping the key secret. Besides protecting
data, hiding the use of system resources is also an aspect of confidentiality.
If the use of system resources leaks information about confidential data, we
call it a covert channel.
Integrity is about the trustworthiness of data, information, or resources,
and one usually understands by that preventing unauthorized manipulation
or changing of data. For integrity mechanisms, one distinguishes between
prevention and detection mechanisms. Prevention mechanisms are used to
enforce that data cannot be manipulated. This can be achieved by an access
control mechanism which denies unauthorized altering of data. In contrast,
a detection mechanism is used to reveal that data has been modified. A
common mechanism are cryptographic hash functions which compute a
5
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short value from a large amount of data and it is assumed that this value
changes if the data has been changed or manipulated.
Availability is about the ability to use data, information, or resources.
Availability depends highly on the used system and there are no standard
mechanisms to achieve it. The attempt to block the availability of a system
is generally denoted as a denial of service attack.
1.1.1 Security Policies
When dealing with security, it is required to have an understanding what
is allowed and what is not allowed in a system to distinguish the desired
system functionality from a security breach. This is usually achieved by
setting up a security policy—a specification which states exactly what is
allowed and what is forbidden. Such a specification can range from an
informal description to a precise formal statement and may be given for
different levels of abstraction and formalisms. Generally, we say that a
system is “secure” if it satisfies the policy. Note that security has always
been seen as a property relative to a policy and is never an absolute property
of a system.
One of the earliest works defining security polices is Lampson’s notion
of confinement [Lam73], stating that a confined program cannot leak any
information to any other program except its caller.
In the literature, several definitions of a security policy exist. One of the
simplest is Bishop’s [Bis03]:
“A security policy is a statement of what is, and what is not,
allowed.”
In this work, we focus on security policies which are used to specify
confidentiality or integrity requirements of a system. Later, we will provide
a formalism for specifying policies used in this thesis to define allowed and
forbidden information flows, and we will also provide precise semantics
for formal reasoning about security.
6
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1.1.2 Formal Analysis of Security
Most security flaws in modern IT systems stem from implementation or
conceptual errors. To detect these flaws automatically or with the support of
tools, formal methods are required which should be applicable at different
states of the development process of a system and also afterwards. The
use of formal methods helps one to have a better understanding of the
designed system. In a large system, tool-based verification is desirable
when a manual analysis becomes unfeasible.
For a formal specification of a system’s security, a formal description of
the system, which could be a transition system or a code of a program, and
a formal security model is needed. In a formal analysis, one verifies that
the system satisfies the security policy. The correctness of the policy itself,
in the sense that it captures the desired security properties, is out of the
scope of a formal analysis.
Due to this limitation, it is important to keep the policy simple and
understandable for both the one who specifies the security properties and
also a possible system designer who implements the policy in the system.
Also a clear separation between the policy and the system is desirable
to avoid that flaws in the system design influence the policy or that an
unintended property of the policy is directly implemented into the system.
Nevertheless, a clear separation of the policy and the system is often not
possible—at least if a policy depends on the states of the system. However,
in this case, it is difficult to overview the overall properties of such changing
and state depending policies. Formal methods and automatic tools can
then also provide a useful tool to tackle complex policies that are hard to
understand.
Over time, several systematic criteria for the evaluation of security have
been developed. One of the earliest handbooks for formal evaluation of
computer systems is the Orange Book [US 85]. A more recent approach for
security evaluations is the Common Criteria [com12]. A formal modeling
of the system and a formal analysis are required on its highest evaluation
assurance level.
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1.1.3 Covert Channels
The nature of a computer system is to communicate with its environment,
which could be a user interacting with a system locally, another device
attached to the system, or another computer connected by a network.
Therefore, every system has a communication interface necessary to provide
some intended service in order to be a useful system. These kinds of
communication channels are built in by the designer of the system.
From a security point of view, one can optimistically assume that the de-
signer overviews the properties of the build-in communication channels and
has carefully implemented mechanism to prevent any abuse or unintended
use of these channels.
These communication channels can be seen as overt channels, as they are
designed for communication and the system designer and any environment
communicating with the system is aware of these channels.
Any communication channel which is not intended to be used for
communication is a covert channel. Such a covert channel is relevant for
security if it transmits secure information to some user that is not allowed
to receive it, with respect to some security policy or at least the intended
design of the system.
Bishop [Bis03] briefly defines a covert channel as:
“A covert channel is a path of communication that was not
designed to be used for communication.”
The difficulty of detecting covert channels is that usually neither the designer
of a system nor a security analyst is aware of all possible covert channels
that might exist in a system.
Covert channels might exist in many different types, including the
following.
Causal channels are covert channels that arise from the control structure of a
system or from dependencies within a system. If some part of a system,
considered to be non-confidential, has some causal dependencies on
a part of system that is considered to be confidential. These causal
channels may arise if different parts of a system share a common state
space. This is the kind of covert channels this thesis addresses.
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Timing channels are covert channels that leak information about confidential
computations by the amount of time that a system needs to perform a
particular task. A common example is the standard algorithm for mod-
ular exponentiation, whose run-time strongly depends on the number
of ones in the exponent [Koc96]. Counter measures to rule out timing
channels are introducing dummy actions or statements in programs
that have the same running times independent of the values of some
confidential data [ZAM12].
Termination channels may leak confidential information if the termination
behavior of a system depends on it. However, in general one cannot
decide, based on the observation, whether a run is non-terminating
,or it might need very long time and will terminate eventually. Hence
since non-termination is not observable, one has to fix some bounded
time interval and can observe if a system terminates within this interval.
However, then this communication channel is a timing channel, rather a
termination channel.
Resource exhaustion channels may leak information by exhausting some
common resource such as memory or disk space or by consuming a
great deal of computing power. In the latter case, it is again closely
related to timing channels.
Physical channels are a vast number of possible communication channels,
including all channels based on a physical level of a real system, rather
than on the program or firmware running on a device. Such communi-
cation channels include the power consumption or the produced heat of
a device depending on confidential computations. Other examples in-
clude the noises produced by printing on a dot matrix printer [BDG+10]
or vibrations emitted by typing on a keyboard, measured by a mobile
phone accelerometer [MVCT11].
1.2 Information Flow Security
Information flow security follows a very general approach to achieve confi-
dentiality and integrity properties. The main idea is to partition the system
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into security domains and to define in a policy between which security do-
mains information may flow. Historically, the intuition was that the security
domains are processes running on an operating system. Even though we
do not want to restrict ourselves to the modeling of processes, this intuition
fits best to the used framework. In our modeling, the security domains are
active and can perform actions and that is why we call them agents. In gen-
eral, it is possible that the agents share some system resources. In terms of
processes, this could be the sharing of computing power as they run on the
same CPU or sharing the system’s memory. In our abstraction, we express
this as a global state space. These shared resources can enable agents to
communicate in an unintended way through a covert channel. If an agent
can communicate with another agent, we say there is an information flow
from one agent to another. Communication means the transmission of any
information which can only be just a single bit. The opposite of an informa-
tion flow is noninterference which is the security relevant property, since
we are interested in the absence of illegal information flows. The concept of
noninterference was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] to pro-
vide a formal framework for reasoning about information flow properties
and for specifying security policies in this context. Informally, they defined
noninterference as:
“one group of users, using a certain set of commands, is nonin-
terfering with another group of users if what the first group does
with those commands has no effect on what the second group
of users can see.”
This is essentially the main idea of all works about noninterference. Our
interpretation of noninterference follows Rushby’s [Rus92] more precise,
but still informal definition of noninterference:
“A security domain u is noninterfering with domain v if no
action performed by u can influence subsequent outputs seen
by v.”
When considering security, it is essential to have a policy. In the context
of information flow and noninterference, such a policy specifies from where
to where information may flow, or conversely, which agent is not allowed to
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interfere with another agent. An information flow policy, hereafter referred
to as a policy, is a relation between the agents and describes from which
agent to which other agent information is allowed to flow. That means that
we have for agents u and v, the pair (u, v) is in the policy if and only if
information may flow from u to v. Noninterference is then required by
the absence of such a pair, i. e., if (u, v) is not in the policy, then u should
be noninterfering with v. Since these kinds of information flow policies
can only restrict the information flow between security domains, but not
within a security domain, it is required that this relation is reflexive, i. e., it
is always allowed that information flows from a security domain to itself.
The information flow within a security domain has to be analyzed with
either other techniques like model checking or with a more finely graded
information flow analysis.
The simplest non-trivial policy consists of two security domains. They
are usually denoted with H for high and L for low and the policy allows
information flow from low to high but not in the other direction. A lot of
the noninterference literature deals with this simple policy.
In early works, it was required that the policy is transitive. The under-
pinning argument for this requirement was that if information is allowed
to flow from a domain u to a domain v and if it is allowed to flow from a
domain v to a domain w, then it is necessary that it is also allowed to flow
from u to w. However, for many situations, the restriction that a particular
domain is always noninterfering with another domain is too restrictive. Both
Goguen and Meseguer in [GM84] and Haigh and Young [HY87] recognized
this and proposed weakenings to have more applicable definitions. The
suggestion of Haigh and Young [HY87] was intransitive noninterference.
This definition takes information flows through several security domain
into account.
In its pure form, noninterference does not provide any restriction on
which or how much information may flow if information flow is permitted.
It only provides a coarse formulation whether information flow is permitted
or not. In the case that information flow is allowed, there are no further
restrictions which information is allowed to be transmitted—it can be seen
as opening the flood doors.
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Red
Bypass
Crypto
Black
Figure 1.1. Information flow in an encryption controller
A classic example [Rus81] shows the limitations of this approach in an
abstraction of an end-to-end encryption controller, depicted in Figure 1.1.
Plain-text messages arrive at the Red interface. Then the body of the
message is split from its header information and is passed to the Crypto
part of the controller which encrypts it and forwards it to the Black output
interface. The header information will not be encrypted and is passed
through the Bypass device. In the Black part the information from the
Bypass and from the Crypto part are reassembled and sent to the desired
destination.
Such an abstract policy only guarantees that any information received
by Black went through Bypass or Crypto. But it does neither guarantee that
the whole body of a message is passed through the Crypto part nor that
this part indeed encrypts the data. This needs a further security analysis of
the Red part to make sure that splitting is done correctly and an analysis of
the Crypto part to guarantee the desired functionality.
1.2.1 Enforcement of Noninterference
Despite the question of how to define and verify noninterference, in many
practical systems it is required that a noninterference property is enforced.
12
1.2. Information Flow Security
The standard technique to prevent different parts of a system from communi-
cating or interfering with each other is the use of a separation kernel [Rus81].
A separation kernel is a small piece of software and usually a part of the
system’s kernel. It supervises and enforces all processes running on the
system to obey a particular policy and separates them to avoid any direct
or indirect communication between them.
1.2.2 Attack Model
The security problem we address in this work relates to design or imple-
mentation flaws in systems. In our modeling and analyzing of systems and
their security properties, we do not model an attacker explicitly. Implicitly,
we assume that any agent can take the role of an attacker. We do not
distinguish between an attacker and an ordinary user of a system. Hence,
an attacker has the same possibilities that any user has. In our systems,
these are to interact with the system by performing actions and to make
observations during a run or about the output of the system. We do not
take into account any attacks which modify or manipulate the system or its
behavior. Following Kerckhoffs’s principle [Ker83], we always assume that
every user exactly knows the precise description and functionality of the
system with which it interacts.
The attacks of interest are those in which the attack brings the system
into a state in which the attacker gains information that is forbidden by the
policy, about the behavior and the interaction of other agents with the sys-
tem. However, we do not explicitly consider coalitions of different attackers
which could possibly share their information or may have communication
channels lying outside of the analyzed system.
1.2.3 Applications of Noninterference
Noninterference is a very general way to specify and analyze confidential
and integrity properties and to uncover previously covert channels. At least
historically, the main application of this theory relates to the detection of
undesired information flows in access control systems. Besides this area,
noninterference has been successfully adapted to other applications.
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One classic area is the detection of information flows in (small) op-
erating systems. Successfully analyzed systems include the seL4 micro-
kernel [MMB+12], a separation kernel used by Motorola [MWTG00], the
Infineon SLE66 smart card processor [vO04], and an operating system for
multiapplicative smart cards [SRS+00].
Lafrance and Mullins [LM03] used information flow methods to detect
denial of service attacks, which address the security property of availability,
rather than confidentiality and integrity which are the properties usually
addressed by information flow. There are also applications of applying
noninterference techniques to the formalization of intrusion detections
systems [KR02].
1.3 Contribution and Structure of this Thesis
After this introductory chapter, we give a systematic introduction to the
used framework and to noninterference in Chapter 2. After having provided
some prerequisites, we introduce the used system model formally. In the
remainder of the chapter, we present general techniques for expressing
information flow as we will apply them later to different noninterference
definitions.
In Chapter 3, we review and characterize different notions of nonin-
terference for systems with a static policy. These notions are Goguen and
Meseguer’s transitive noninterference, Haigh and Young’s extension to
intransitive noninterference, and van der Meyden’s corrections of that. This
thesis contributes especially to intransitive noninterference with several new
characterizations, including sound and complete unwindings. Some of these
results were published in [EvdMSW11] or are submitted for publication
in [EvdMSW13].
In Chapter 4, we extend the results of the previous chapter to systems
with dynamically changing policies. We introduce notions of transitive
and intransitive noninterference for systems with dynamic policies. We
also work out a notion which lies in-between these two definitions and
also provide an alternative definition to our previously given intransitive
notion of dynamic noninterference, which fits better with asynchronous
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systems and to applications on dynamic access control systems. At the end
of the chapter, we compare our new definition to the only previous one for
state-based system we have found in the literature. Some of these results
were published in [ESW13] and some appear in a technical report [ESW12].
In Chapter 5, we analyze the decidability and the complexity of the
verification problem for our security notions on finite-state systems. For the
cases where we have a characterization by a polynomial-size unwinding, we
present efficient algorithms and analyze their running times. In particular,
we present the first polynomial-time algorithm for verifying intransitive
noninterference. For the notion of dynamic intransitive noninterference, we
provide an NP-completeness result. For some other noninterference defi-
nition, where the allowed information depends on the observations of the
agents, we show that the verification problem is undecidable. Additionally,
for some of the noninterference definitions for static policies, we also show
how to detect information flows and how to compute minimal policies. We
also provide a very general construction idea for analyzing the complexity
of the verification problem for noninterference in automata-like system
models. Some of these result are published in [EvdMSW11] and [ESW13]
or submitted for publication in [EvdMSW13]
In Chapter 6, we give an introduction to access control systems and
strengthen our security definitions for systems with dynamic policies by
applying it to a distributed access control system. A large part of the chapter
is the modeling and the transformation of this access control system in our
system model, which enables us to analyze its security.
Chapter 7 provides an overview about noninterference and information
flow models, other then ours. This includes nondeterministic state-based
systems, process algebras, computational models, and program language-
based systems.
We conclude in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Systematic Introduction to
Noninterference
In this chapter, we introduce the system and policy model used throughout
this thesis and fundamental techniques for characterizing and expressing
noninterference, needed in the next chapters for analyzing the different
definitions for noninterference. In Section 2.1, the used system model is
presented, and in Section 2.2, we provide the syntax of information flow
policies. In Section 2.4, we present the syntax and semantics of the system
diagrams, which we will use to depict the examples of systems in this
thesis. The semantics of system runs and the observations of the agents are
explained in Section 2.5. General techniques for expressing noninterference
based on trace equivalence are introduced in Section 2.6. In the remainder
of this chapter, we present the general idea of information flow in Section 2.7
and noninterference in Section 2.8, for the used system and policy model.
2.1 System Model
Throughout this thesis we use a deterministic state-based system model.
This is the same formal framework as used in [vdM07], which is only a
slight modification of that in [Rus92].
Formally, deterministic systems are labeled transition system with a
unique initial state. To keep the results general, we do not restrict ourselves
to finite-state systems. However, when we consider the verification problem
and analyze its complexity, we will need a finite state space. The transitions
are labeled with actions of some finite set (or alphabet) A. We explicitly
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require that every state is reachable from the initial state. This will be
important in several results in this thesis. Each action is assigned to a
specific agent by the dom function, which assigns each action an agent. We
say that the agent dom(a) owns the action a. The transition function is a
function step : S× A→ S and assigns each possible state and each action
the follow-up state. Instead of step(s, a), we also write s · a and say the
action a is performed in (the state) s. We stress that the system is input
enabled, which means that every action can be performed in every state. A
run of a system is a sequence of consecutively performed actions. Often
runs are written as an alternating sequence of actions and states. However,
since the system is deterministic, the reached states are uniquely defined by
the sequence of actions. Thus, we denote a sequence of actions as runs or
alternatively as traces.
In addition, these transition systems are equipped with an observation
function obs which assigns every agent u and every state s the observation
of agent u when the system is in the state s.
A deterministic state-based systems consist of
. a set of states S,
. an initial state sI ∈ S,
. a finite set of actions A,
. a finite set of agents or security domains D,
. an action assignment dom: A→ D,
. a transition function step : S× A→ S,
. a set of observations O,
. an observation function obs : D× S→ O.
If not otherwise specified, we will call these deterministic state-based
systems just systems. We denote the elements of the set D mostly as agents,
but also as security domains without any further semantic distinctions.
Throughout this thesis, when we do not give a specific description of a
system, we mean any arbitrary system and do not mention it explicitly.
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2.2 Policies
A policy describes the allowed and forbidden information flow between
agents. The precise semantics follows with the security definitions in the
next chapters. In this section we will only give the syntax of information
flow policies as they are used in this thesis.
A policy is a reflexive binary relation on the set of agents D. For every
u, v ∈ D, we write u v if (u, v) ∈ and u 6 v otherwise. Since are
the edges of a directed graph with vertex set D, we often adapt terminology
from graph theory when we describe properties of a policy. For example,
we denote u v as an edge of the policy.
From Chapter 4 on, we will also consider families of policies (s)s∈S,
wheres is a policy in the previous sense. We name (s)s∈S a dynamic
policy, and if a clear distinction is needed, we denote a single policy, if
it holds for a whole system, as a static or global policy. A single policys
of (s)s∈S is denoted as a local policy (of the state s). If it is clear from the
context to what kind of policy we refer, then we just call it a policy.
H
L
Figure 2.1. The HL policy
2.2.1 Example. The standard policy and probably the most common policy
in the literature is the HL policy. This policy contains an agent H and
and agent L. The agent L is allowed to interfere with H, but the policy
prohibits any information flow from H to L. This is the simplest setting of
a non-trivial noninterference policy. In our graphical notation, this policy is
depicted in Figure 2.1. Since the agent H is not allowed to interfere with L,
we call H the high agent and L the low agent.
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2.3 Preliminaries and Notations
In this section, we introduce some notation we will use throughout this
thesis. For any alphabet A, we denote with A∗ the set of all finite sequences
(or strings) of elements from A and with e the empty sequence. We do
not make a formal distinction between the elements of A and the words
of length one in A∗. If A is the set of all actions of the system, we call
the elements of A∗ traces or (action) sequences. With e, we denote the
empty trace. For a trace α, α(i) denotes the ith entry of α, starting with 0.
For any sequence of numbers i1, . . . , ik with 0 ≤ ij < |α| and ij < ij+1, by
α(i1) · · · α(ik) we denote a subsequence of α.
Concatenation of strings is not written explicitly: For strings α and β,
the concatenation of α and β is written as αβ. For sets of strings B and C,
we write BC for the set {βγ | β ∈ B and γ ∈ C}. For singleton sets, we omit
the curly brackets and write for example aB for {a}B. Due to associativity
of concatenation, parentheses are usually not used.
For any subset X ⊆ A, we denote for any string α with αX the restriction
of α to elements from X, i. e., all symbols not in X are deleted in α. More
precisely, the restriction operator can be defined inductively as
eX = e
(aα)X =
{
a(αX) if a ∈ X
αX otherwise .
For any set of agents Y ⊆ D, we abuse this notation and write αY for
α{a∈A|dom(a)∈Y}, i. e., restricting a trace to some set of agent means restrict-
ing the trace to the actions that can be performed by any of the agents from
this set. For a singleton set of agents {u}, we may also write αu instead
of α{u}. For simplifying the notation, we write a dot for the transition
function and its generalization to words. We define inductively s · e = s
and s · αa = step(s · α, a) for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗. The set of all
symbols occurring in a trace α is denoted as alph(α). For any agent u ∈ D,
we denote with Au the set of all actions a from A with dom(a) = u. Since
we usually apply the obs function to different states for the same agent,
we put the name of the agent in subscript and write obsu(s) rather then
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obs(u, s).
For policies, we extend the interference relation to sets of agents and
write for U, V ⊆ D: U V iff there are u ∈ U and v ∈ V with u v. For
singleton sets, we omit the curly brackets and mix the notations. For a given
policy, with u, we denote the set of all successors of u according to,
i. e., u = {v ∈ D | u v} and with u = {v ∈ D | v u} the set of all
predecessors of u. For a local policys, we write us = {v ∈ D | vs u}.
Note that due to reflexivity of, we always have u in any of these sets u,
u, and us .
For any tuple t, pii(t) denotes the projection to the ith component of
t and for tuples indexed by agents, piu(t) is the component that refers to
agent u.
For any binary relation →, we define =→ as the reflexive closure of →
and ∗→ as the reflexive, transitive closure of→.
2.4 Syntax and Semantics of System Diagrams
s0
A H
L
obsL : 0
s1
A H
L
obsL : 1
A H
L
h
global/static policyobservation states
transition
local policy state name
initial state
Figure 2.2. Explanation of a system diagram
Throughout this thesis, we will present several examples containing
systems. To avoid a formal description of each example, we will provide
syntax and semantics of our graphical representation of the systems. An
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overview about the parts of the state diagrams is in Figure 2.2. The states of
a system are represented by rectangles. Exactly one is well-marked as the
initial state by an incoming edge from outside. The edges between the states
denote the transitions of the system and are labeled with such an action
that results in this transition. Transitions, which loop on states, are omitted
from this representation. Since the system is input-enabled, i. e., for every
state s and every action a, there is a state s · a, we implicitly assume that
s · a = s if there is no outgoing edge from the state representing s labeled
with a. As a standard convention, we usually denote the agents with capital
letters, e. g., A, B, . . . or H, D, L and the actions with lower letters a, b, . . . or
h, d, l, and we always assume that any action is owned by the agent with
the same letter, e. g., dom(a) = A. If an agent has more than one action
then we enumerate them by an index, e. g., h1, h2 are actions of agent H.
If no action of an agent appears in the diagram, then we assume that the
agent has no actions. This is often the case if an agent is only an observer.
In the representation of each state, additional information is provided,
separated by horizontal lines. In the upper part, there is a unique identifier
or name of the state, usually s0, s1, . . .. If we do not refer to a particular state
in an example, this part may be omitted. In the lower part, the observations
of the agents at this state are depicted. For example obsL : 0 means that
agent L observes 0 in this state. For any agent, its observations are either
provided in all states or in no state. We assume implicitly that all agents not
mentioned in this part have constant observation on all states and hence,
the particular value of the observation function is not of interest. If there is
only a single agent with non-constant observation, we just denote it as the
observer or the observing agent.
Policies are depicted as a directed graph between the agents. Also in
the representation of the policies, we omit self-loops since due to reflexivity,
they would appear at each node. For systems with a static policy, the
policy is usually depicted next to the system in a dashed box. In the case
of a dynamic policy, the local policy that applies in the state appears as
a third part within the state between the two previously mentioned parts.
(However, we will never have both a dynamic policy in the states and a
global policy next to the system as Figure 2.2 might suggest.)
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2.5 Observations of System Runs
The observation of an agent of a run relies only on changes of the observa-
tions it obtains from the visited states. In general, an agent has only partial
information about the current state, since in different states the observations
may be the same. Formally, the observation that an agent makes from a
system run α is the sequence of its observations in every state:
obsu(sI) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · α(0)) ◦ˆ · · · ◦ˆ obsu(sI · α(|α| − 1)) .
Here ◦ˆ denotes the stutter-invariant concatenation. The general assumption
is that the system is completely asynchronous and no agent has access
to a global clock. If an agent makes the same observation twice without
any other observation in-between, it does not know that these were two
observations instead of a single observation. Sequences that only differ
from each other in repetitions of a single observation are not distinguishable
by an agent. Hence, in this sequence of observations, consecutive entries
are different, since consecutive equal entries are canceled out. In fact, if the
observation of an agent does not change, then it does not know whether
any other agent has performed some action or not.
We generally assume that agents have perfect recall which means that
they never forget anything they have seen. That is why we allow an agent
to distinguish runs by the whole sequence of observations rather than by a
part of it. However, we will see that for the security in deterministic systems
it is sufficient to distinguish runs by the last observation of an agent.
Nonetheless, it is very restrictive that the sequence of observations is the
only information that an agent has about a system run. It is reasonable that
an agent is also aware of the actions that it has performed itself and also
about the interleaving of these actions and the observations made during
the run. For an agent u, the interleaving sequence of u’s actions and its
observation is denoted as u’s view of a trace and is formally defined for
every a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ by
viewu(e) = obsu(sI)
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viewu(αa) =
{
viewu(α) a obsu(sI · αa) if dom(a) = u
viewu(α) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · αa) otherwise .
The view of a trace is the maximal information that an agent can get
from a run of a system in an asynchronous system.
2.6 Trace-based Noninterference
Noninterference is about the absence of particular information flows during
a run of a system. These runs are abstracted to sequences of actions,
which we call traces. For the security in our framework, the importance
of the actions is twofold. The performing of actions includes information
that possibly has to be concealed from other agents, and actions are the
parts of the system which transmit information by changing of the agents’
observations.
In this section, we will introduce different techniques and formalisms for
describing and analyzing trace-based information flow properties. Here, we
will present the fundamental ideas of them on some abstract level and we
will instantiate them in the next chapters with precise security definitions.
We will do this at this point without reasoning about a precise definition of
information flow, noninterference, or a semantics for the policy.
The security of systems with respect to a notion of noninterference
strongly depends on the uncertainty that an agent has about a current run.
If some action should be concealed from some agent, then this agent has
to consider possible both the trace where the action appears and the one
where the action does not appear.
The basic idea of describing trace-based information flow properties is
that there are two equivalence relations on the set of all possible traces A∗.
One of these equivalence relations ∼u specifies which traces should
be equivalent for the agent u, given an instantiation with a policy and a
noninterference definition. This relation may also depend on the underlying
system. The other equivalence relation ≈u specifies which traces effectively
are indistinguishable for the agent u. The latter relation only depends on
the underlying system and the ability of the agent to make observations
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of the system behavior and is independent of any policy and any security
definition.
Given these two equivalence relations for every agent u, the security of
a system is defined as follows.
A system is secure if and only if for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗,
we have:
if α ∼u β then α ≈u β .
This security definition captures the idea that if traces are not allowed
to be distinguished by some agent, then it is not possible for this agent to
distinguish these traces.
We assume that the equivalence relation ≈u is given by the analyzed
or specified system. Throughout this work, we assume that the system is
given and fixed. We will not analyze how to modify or synthesize systems
for a given security specification. Modification of systems is considered
in [YLBHA09], synthetization is considered in [CMR07].
On the other hand, the relation ∼u is induced by a policy and a security
definition for a particular notion of noninterference. In this work, different
notions of noninterference are developed and analyzed. Some of these
notions are independent of the underlying system, while others depend on
the state space or on the observations of agents.
Note that insecurity of a system can only be shown by two traces α, β
with α ∼u β, but α 6≈u β and not by a single trace. Already McLean [McL94]
mentioned that noninterference is not a trace-property. However, it is a
trace-property of a product system of two modified copies of the original
systems what is called a 2-trace property. The construction of these two
systems follows the construction pattern in Section 5.6. More generally,
noninterference is a property of a set of traces which is generalized to
so-called hyperproperties [CS10].
2.6.1 Observational Equivalence
In the state-based system model used throughout this thesis, every agent
makes observations during a run of the system. From these observations,
25
2. Systematic Introduction to Noninterference
an agent can possibly distinguish different runs from each other and hence
can gain information about things that have or have not happened during
the run.
The two, possibly most intuitive ways of defining an observational
equivalence are the equality of the observation in the reached state and
the equivalence of the view of an agent as defined in Section 2.5. More
precisely, the observational equivalence ≈u ⊆ A∗ × A∗ is either defined as
α ≈u β iff obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β) ,
or as
α ≈u β iff viewu(α) = viewu(β) .
We will focus on the former approach, due to its simplicity. In the next
paragraph, we will see that for deterministic systems as used here, for all
security properties considered in this thesis, these two ways of defining
observational equivalence result in equivalent definitions of security. Note
that this does not hold if one moves to nondeterministic systems, as pointed
out in [EvdMZ12].
2.6.2 Inductively Defined Trace-Operators
The classic way of defining trace-based noninterference properties is by
operators on traces. Such an operator f : A∗ × D → X is usually defined
for any trace and any agent. For a particular agent, it transforms a trace
into some object that encodes everything that the agent is allowed to know
about the trace. In other words, the operator removes all the information
from the trace that should be concealed from the agent. Any two traces
should be indistinguishable for an agent if they contain the same allowed
information for the agent. Hence, the indistinguishability relation on the
trace is defined by
α ∼u β iff f (α, u) = f (β, u) .
In this and the following chapters, we will present several instantiations
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for the operator f , depending on the security requirements and the security
definition. All the security operators we use in this thesis are defined
inductively.
We will show that with inductively defined operators and some side-
conditions, security definitions based on observational equivalence, which
are defined on just the observation function, are equivalent to those that
are defined on the view function.
We express the function f : A∗ × D → X inductively, combined with a
function g : f (A∗, D)× A∗ × A× D → Y, with the following dependencies
between them:
f (e, u) = c
f (αa, u) = g( f (α, u), α, a, u) ,
where X and Y are some appropriate sets and c denotes some fixed value
in X.
To show the equivalence of the observational equivalence based on obs
and view, we need to restrict the structure of the functions f and g by the
following two influence conditions:
1. For every u ∈ D and a ∈ A with dom(a) = u and every α ∈ A∗, we have
f (αa, u) 6= f (α, u).
2. For every u ∈ D, a, b ∈ A, α, β ∈ A∗ and x, x′ ∈ f (A∗, D) with
g(x, α, a, u) = g(x′, β, b, u), we have either x = g(x′, β, b, u), or x = x′
and a = b.
The first condition says that the own actions of an agent are encoded into
the value of f . The function g is the previously collected information plus
some new information from the last action. The second condition says that
if two values of g are the same, after some action then either no information
was added in the last step or in both cases the same information was added.
The next lemma summarizes the claimed equivalence.
2.6.1 Lemma. Suppose that the two influence conditions above hold. Then for
every u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗ the following two implications are equivalent:
1. If f (α, u) = f (β, u), then viewu(α) = viewu(β).
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2. If f (α, u) = f (β, u), then obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
Proof. The implication from 1. to 2. follows directly from the definition of
the view function.
For the other direction, let u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗ of minimal combined
length with f (α, u) = f (β, u) and viewu(α) 6= viewu(β). Since at least one
of α and β is not the empty trace, suppose that it is α and let α = α′a for
some α′ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A.
Case 1: f (α′a, u) = f (α′, u).
From the minimality of α and β it follows viewu(α′) = viewu(β) and
hence viewu(α′a) 6= viewu(α′). From the first influence condition it follows
u 6= dom(a) and hence viewu(α′a) = viewu(α′) obsu(sI · α′a). Therefore,
we have obsu(sI · α′a) 6= obsu(sI · β).
Case 2: f (α′a, u) 6= f (α′, u).
We can assume that β = β′b and that f (β′b, u) 6= f (β′, u) since otherwise,
we proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped. From the
second influence condition it follows a = b and f (α′, u) = f (β′, u). By
the minimality of α and β, we have viewu(α′) = viewu(β′). With d = e if
dom(a) 6= u and d = a if dom(a) = u, we have
viewu(α′) d obsu(sI · α′a) = viewu(α)
6= viewu(β)
= viewu(β′) d obsu(sI · β′b) .
It follows obsu(sI · α′a) 6= obsu(sI · β′b).
One can easily see that all noninterference operators presented in this
thesis can be expressed as an instantiation of the functions f and g and that
they satisfy the influence-conditions above.
2.6.3 Unwinding
An unwinding is a famous way for defining or characterizing information
flow properties. An unwinding is a combination of a family of unwinding
relations and unwinding conditions. Unwinding relations are usually
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equivalence relation on the elements of the analyzed structure. In this
thesis, unwinding relations are relations either on the set of states or the set
of traces of the system. In the first case, we call them state-based unwinding
and in the latter case trace-based unwinding.
Unwinding relations are defined or characterized by a number of condi-
tions, called unwinding conditions. Every equivalence relation that satisfies
these conditions is then called an unwinding relation. An unwinding de-
fines for every agent at least one unwinding relation. Usually, one considers
the smallest relation that satisfies the unwinding conditions.
In a trace-based unwinding, an unwinding relation ∼u for each agent u
is a relation on the set of traces. We say that such a relation is observation
consistent for u if for every every α, β ∈ A∗ the implication
if α ∼u β, then obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β)
holds. The equality of the observation is just the instantiation of the ≈u
relation with the observational equivalence as described before.
In a state-based unwinding, an unwinding relation ∼ is a relation on
the set of states of the system, parameterized with one or more agents. We
call exactly one of these agents the observing agent u. We say that such a
relation is observation consistent for u if for every s, t ∈ S with s ∼ t it holds:
obsu(s) = obsu(t).
As we will see in this thesis, unwinding relations are an elegant way of
characterizing noninterference properties. More importantly, on finite-state
systems, state-based unwinding relations can directly be translated into a
verification algorithm as we can see in Chapter 5.
2.6.4 Information Sets
Information sets are used in game theory to describe the set of all possible
moves that could have taken place in a game so far, given what a particular
player has observed. Here, we adopt this concept and understand an
information set as a set of all traces that an agent considers possible from
its maximal allowed knowledge. In other words, an information set of an
agent is a set of all traces that an agent is not allow to distinguish. It will
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turn out that information sets are exactly the equivalence classes of the
corresponding operator-based or unwinding-based definition. However, in
some cases, this set-based definition leads to a more elegant and possibly
more intuitive way of describing the equivalence between traces than the
previous approaches.
2.6.5 Securely Constructed Systems
The covert channels analyzed in this thesis stem from a global state space,
i. e., a state space shared by all agents. Hence if every agent would have its
own state space, all possible covert channels would be eliminated. However,
it is necessary to make the desired interaction between the agents possible,
as long as they obey the given policy. That is exactly the idea of a securely
constructed system. Every agent has its own local state space, but any
transition may also depend on the state space of other agents according
to a given policy and a given security definition. This can be seen as
the transition function is constructed from a given policy and hence, by
construction, such a system is then secure. One benefit of this approach
is that it gives the designer of a system a construction pattern, detailing
how to implement a system that obeys a given security policy. Moreover, as
we will see later for particular security definitions, this system structure is
complete in the sense that any secure system is observationally equivalent
to a securely constructed system.
We provide at this point the general structure of a securely constructed
system. Only the local and the global transition functions depend on the
security definition which should be satisfied by the construction of the
system.
The common structure is that every agent u has its own local state
space Su and that the global state space is the product of the local state
spaces. For each agent u the local transition function ·u describes the
transition on u’s local state space. This function may also depend on some
other agent v’s state space, depending on whether the security definition
allows to transmit information about v to u. The global transition function
is then defined by the local transition functions and defines whether a
particular local transition function is triggered or not. A more precise
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definition depends on a given policy from which the system is constructed
and on the security definition which should be satisfied by the construction.
To prevent any covert channels, the observation function obsu then only
depends on u’s local state space. Note that the security of a securely
constructed system does not depend on the choice of the observation
function, except the property that the observation function for each agent
only depends on the agents’ local states.
As long as the transition function only transmits information which is
allowed by a given policy, each local state space can only contain allowed
information. Since the transition of each agent only depends on its local
states and hence only on allowed information, this construction rules out
any forbidden information flows and therefore, the constructed system is a
secure system.
2.6.6 Knowledge-based Characterization
Secrecy and hence noninterference have a strong connection to epistemic
logic—the logic of knowledge. When one says that something is kept secret
from someone, then this means that this person does not know the secret.
More generally, we consider a system as secure in the sense that it preserves
secrecy. If an agent is not allowed to know some particular property about
some system, then the agent, indeed, does not know this property.
We can express this general description of security in the formal frame-
work of epistemic logic. We will only provide the most necessary definitions.
A more elaborate introduction to the topic of epistemic logic is [FHMV95].
Epistemic logic is used to reason about the knowledge of agents. In our
case, it extends propositional logic by a modal operator Ku for every agent u.
Semantically, Kuϕ should usually be read as “agent u knows ϕ”.
Since we deal with two different kinds of knowledge, the knowledge
coming from the observations and the allowed knowledge, we introduce
two different modal operators K∼u and K≈u for every agent u.
Let Φ be a set of atomic propositions. Then every p ∈ Φ is a formula
and, inductively, if ϕ and ψ are formulas then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ and for every
u ∈ D: K∼u ϕ and K≈u ϕ are formulas.
The semantics follows those defined in [vdM07]. The atomic propo-
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sitions express properties of traces given by an interpretation function
pi : Φ → P(A∗). An atomic proposition p holds in a system M after a
trace α if and only if α ∈ pi(p) and we write M,pi, α |= p. The semantics of
formulas of the form ¬ϕ and ϕ∨ψ is defined in a straightforward way—the
semantics for formulas defined by the epistemic operators is defined for
every agent u by
M,pi, α |= K∼u ϕ iff M,pi, β |= ϕ for all traces β with α ∼u β ,
M,pi, α |= K≈u ϕ iff M,pi, β |= ϕ for all traces β with α ≈u β .
With these two modal operators, the security of a system can be summarized
with a family of short formulas. A system is secure if, and only if for every
agent u and every formula ϕ, the following formula holds:
K≈u ϕ→ K∼u ϕ .
Intuitively, this formula says that if agent u actually knows ϕ then u is
allowed to know ϕ, where “actually knows ϕ” means that u can conclude
whether ϕ holds from its observations under the assumption that u has
perfect recall, which is generally assumed throughout this thesis.
In this thesis, we will not use this epistemic approach further, but
at some point we will reason about the knowledge of agents on a more
intuitive level. However, this formalism underpins the correctness of such
reasoning by providing precise semantics.
2.7 Information Flow
In this section, we will explain what information flow is in a system.
With information flow, we denote the event that performing some action
by some agent v is observable by some agent u. In this case, we say that
there is an information flow from v to u.
We distinguish between direct and indirect information flows. By a
direct information flow, we understand an information flow that is directly
observable by some observer from performing a single action. For example,
in the system in Figure 2.3 there is a direct information flow from the
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agent H, which performs the action h, to the agent L, since L observes
immediately that H performed an action by having an immediate change
of its observation.
s0
obsL : 0
s1
obsL : 1
h
Figure 2.3. A direct information flow
An indirect information flow is an information flow that is not directly
observable. The performed action will be revealed after a sequence of
actions, but the observations lead to deductions about the not immediately
observable event.
The system in Figure 2.4 has an action h that is not directly observable,
but after a following action l the information that the action has been
performed is revealed. Note that in this system there is a direct information
flow from L to itself, since the action l performed in state s1 changes L’s
observation. However, if the same action is performed in the state s0 it does
not change L’s observation. If, in two runs of a system, L performs the same
action l, then its observation depends on H’s behavior. That is the reason
why we say that H changes L’s observations, or that there is an information
flow from H to L.
s0
obsL : 0
s1
obsL : 0
s2
obsL : 1
h l
Figure 2.4. An indirect information flow
A policy and a security definition define which actions in a trace may
be observable by some particular agent u. This gives then the maximal
information about the performed actions in the trace that the agent u is
allowed to observe. If this maximal information is the same in two traces,
then these traces are required to be indistinguishable in the sense of the
relation ∼u of the previous section.
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2.8 Noninterference
Noninterference denotes the absence of an information flow. We say that an
agent u is noninterfering with some other agent v if there is no information
flow from u to v. It depends on a particular definition of noninterference
if we refer to indirect or only to direct information flows. Often, with
noninterference, we mean the requirement of an absence of an information
flow from some agent to some other. This requirement is expressed by
a policy, and a security definition provides the semantics and essentially
defines the equivalence relation that states which traces are not allowed to
be distinguished.
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Static Noninterference
In this chapter, we develop characterizations and methods for analyzing
noninterference properties of systems with a static policy. A static policy is
a policy which does not change during the run of a system and is required
to hold for all runs. We recall the classical notion of noninterference intro-
duced by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] and its extensions of Haigh and
Young [HY87], Rushby [Rus92], and van der Meyden [vdM07]. We apply
new techniques to the previous definitions which give new insights in this
theory, and our new characterizations make it possible to develop new
efficient algorithms. This chapter does not only provide the theoretical back-
ground for our algorithms, it also leads to a deeper understanding of the
security definition that is needed for further extensions and generalizations
to a more complex setting in the next chapter.
After an introduction to transitive noninterference in Section 3.1, we
enrich Goguen and Meseguer’s definition of t-security by new characteri-
zations in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we present the notion of intransitive
noninterference. New characterizations for Haigh and Young’s i-security
are presented in Section 3.4. Van der Meyden’s ta-security is analyzed
in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 provides a closer look at the notions of
to-security and ito-security. In the remaining Section 3.7, we summarize
the relation between all security definitions of this chapter.
Several results in this chapter were published in [EvdMSW11] or are
submitted for publication in [EvdMSW13].
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3.1 Transitive Noninterference
The definition of transitive noninterference, in the literature mostly just
called noninterference, was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82,
GM84]. Their works and definitions are the basis of most publications on
the topic of noninterference. While our presentation and definitions are
very close to theirs, we will see in Chapter 7 that a lot of work has been
done, which is still only inspired by the work of Goguen and Meseguer, but
also has major semantical differences.
A general assumption in most of the early work on this topic was that a
security policy had to be a transitive relation. The argument for a transitive
policy was that if an agent u is allowed to interfere with some agent v, and
v is allowed to interfere with some agent w, then consequently, there is a
possible interference from u to w and hence, this interference can not be
restricted or prohibited. As we will see in the section about intransitive
noninterference, this argument is too simple and a different interpretation
of policies is more than reasonable. However, since noninterference policies
were defined as transitive, a new name for policies that did not have this
requirement was needed. Hence these policies without the transitivity
requirement were called intransitive policies. However, the term transitive
relates to the allowed interference relation, rather than to noninterference.
However, we follow the denotation in the literature and call it transitive
noninterference.
To have a clear distinction between these two interpretations we call
Goguen and Meseguer’s approach transitive noninterference. However, we
do not require that the policy has to be transitive. Hence, syntactically, there
is no distinction between an intransitive and a transitive policy, and we just
call it a policy. However, the semantics differs: In transitive noninterference,
an agent is only allowed to interfere with an agent u if there is an edge
from this agent to u. This means that u is not allowed to observe or deduce
anything regarding the actions of any agent that does not have an edge in
the policy to u.
However, for every single agent u, the policy restricted to u’s incoming
edges is a transitive relation. At least from the point of view of each agent,
it is reasonable to call the policy transitive, and therefore, we call this notion
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of noninterference transitive noninterference.
From now on, we always consider a system together with a policy. The
policy states from which agent to which other agent information may flow
and where an information flow is forbidden. The interpretation of a policy
is quite simple. If there is an edge from some agent u to v in the policy,
then v is allowed to observe everything that u does. If there is no edge from
u to v, the agent v is not allowed to observe or deduce anything u does or
has done, including, whether u has done any action at all in a run of the
system.
This idea is formalized as follows: Given a run α ∈ A∗, if all actions v is
not allowed to get any information about are removed from the trace α then
this trace has to lead to the same observation for v as α. Since otherwise,
v would notice that there are some actions missing and hence would get
information about actions from agents from which it is not allowed to get
information.
3.2 t-security
For formalizing transitive noninterference, Goguen and Meseguer [GM82]
introduced a function which parameterized with an agent u, removes all
actions of agents that not allowed to interfere with u from a trace. In the
literature, this function is often called the purge function. To indicate that it
relates to transitive noninterference, we call this function tpurge.
3.2.1 Definition (tpurge operator). For every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗
define
tpurgeu(e) = e,
tpurgeu(aα) =
{
a tpurgeu(α) if dom(a) u
tpurgeu(α) otherwise .
Instead of using an inductive definition, tpurge can be equivalently
defined with the restriction operator on traces:
tpurgeu(α) = α{v∈D|vu} .
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Intuitively, the tpurge function removes all information from the trace
that u is not allowed to observe. Therefore, if two traces have the same
allowed information—in our definition the same tpurge-value—then these
traces should be indistinguishable for the observing agent. We denote this
property, if it holds for all agents and all traces, as t-security: The security
definition which we use for transitive noninterference.
3.2.2 Definition (t-security). A system is t-secure iff for every u ∈ D, every
α, β ∈ A∗ with tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β), we have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI ·
β).
Equivalently, this definition can be characterized by: A system is t-
secure if for every u ∈ D and every α ∈ A∗, we have obsu(sI · α) =
obsu(sI · tpurgeu(α)).
This means that the observations of an agent are only allowed to depend
on the actions of agents that are allowed to interfere with this agent.
s0
obsL : 0
s1
obsL : 0
s2
obsL : 1
s3
obsL : 0
H
L
h l
l
Figure 3.1. A not t-secure system
3.2.3 Example. To illustrate the idea of t-security, we consider the system in
Figure 3.1. In this system, we have two agents H and L that are not allowed
to interfere with each other, which is stated by the policy on the right-hand
side next to the system. That means, what L observes should not depend
on what H has done. This is clearly not the case in this system, since L only
observes a 1 if H has performed the action h in the initial state. Formally,
38
3.2. t-security
this is expressed by
tpurgeL(hl) = l = tpurgeL(h) ,
but
obsL(sI · hl) = 1 6= 0 = obsL(sI · l) .
It is not necessary to consider all possible traces α and β. If a system is
not t-secure, then this is due to a single action a of an agent dom(a) which
is not allowed to interfere with u. Hence it is sufficient to compare the
observations after a trace αβ with those after αaβ. This is captured by the
next lemma.
3.2.4 Lemma. A system is t-secure iff for every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S and β ∈ A∗
with dom(a) 6 u, we have
obsu(s · aβ) = obsu(s · β) .
Proof. We will prove the contrapositive of this claim. Suppose there are
u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6 u and obsu(s · aα) 6=
obsu(s · α). By the general assumption that every state of the system is
reachable from the initial state, there is some α ∈ A∗ with s = sI · α. Then
we have tpurgeu(αaβ) = tpurgeu(αβ). Hence the system is not t-secure.
For the other direction of the proof assume that the system is not t-secure.
Then there are α, β ∈ A∗ with tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and obsu(sI · α) 6=
obsu(sI · β) for some agent u. Assume that α and β are of minimal length
for all possible choices satisfying this property. Let α′ and β′ be the longest
prefix of α and β, respectively, such that α′ = β′. W.l.o.g. α′ 6= α and
therefore there is some a ∈ A and α′′ ∈ A∗ with α = α′aα′′. If dom(a) 6 u,
we have obsu(sI · α′aα′′) 6= obsu(sI · α′α′′), due to the minimality of the
length of α. Hence the claim holds for s = sI · α′ and β = α′′. In the case of
dom(a) u, we can apply the mentioned argumentation to β instead of α,
since the suffix of β after β′ has to start with an action of an agent that is
not allowed to interfere with u.
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3.2.1 Unwinding for t-security
One way to characterize noninterference is by an unwinding. An unwind-
ing relation is an equivalence relation that defines an indistinguishability
relation on some set. In our case this will be either the set of states or the set
of traces. Unwinding relations will be defined by rules called unwinding
conditions, which have to be satisfied by the unwinding relation. Usually,
one is interested in the smallest equivalence relation that satisfies the given
conditions. Intuitively, the unwinding conditions are local conditions which
define which state or trace are indistinguishable after performing a single
action. Due to symmetry and transitivity of the unwinding relation, this
relation then captures all states or traces that are required to be indistin-
guishable. These unwinding conditions strongly depend on the notion of
security that is aimed to be expressed with the unwinding relations. How-
ever, the unwinding conditions and relations characterize which states or
traces should be indistinguishable for some agent. When defining security,
it is also required that they are in fact indistinguishable by the agent’s
observation, what we call observation consistency for the respective agent.
The first characterizations in the context of unwinding relations are
trace-based unwinding relations. A trace-based unwinding relation is an
unwinding relation on the set of traces and defines an indistinguishability
relation that is required to hold for the corresponding security definition.
3.2.5 Definition (trace-based transitive unwinding). A trace-based transitive
unwinding relation for u ∈ D is an equivalence relation ∼ttu ⊆ A∗ × A∗ that
for every a ∈ A and α, β ∈ A∗ satisfies the following two conditions:
(LRtt): If dom(a) 6 u, then α ∼ttu αa.
(SCtt): If α ∼ttu β, then αa ∼ttu βa.
The unwinding condition (LRtt) is denoted as local respect. It states that
if an agent dom(a) performs some action a and the policy requires that
dom(a) is not allowed to interfere with u, then after some arbitrary trace α,
this trace and the trace αa have to be indistinguishable for u. The second
condition (SCtt) is denoted as step consistency. It says that if two traces are
indistinguishable for u, then after some agent dom(a) has performed the
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same action after each of these traces, the resulting traces again have to be
indistinguishable for u. Note that this is required regardless of whether
dom(a) is allowed to interfere with u or not. However, if dom(a) is not
allowed to interfere with u, then this condition already follows from (LRtt)
and the symmetry and transitivity of an equivalence relation.
Usually one considers the smallest unwinding relation which satisfies
the two conditions. This smallest relation can be obtained by applying
repeatedly the two conditions, starting with the identity relation. Clearly, a
smallest unwinding relation exists and is unique.
The claimed characterization of the previous security definition follows
from the next result.
3.2.6 Theorem. A system is t-secure iff for every u ∈ D there is a trace-based
transitive unwinding relation ∼ttu that is observation consistent for u.
Proof. Let u ∈ D. We will show that for every agent u, for every α, β ∈ A∗,
and for the smallest trace-based transitive unwinding relation ∼ttu it holds:
tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) iff α ∼ttu β .
We prove the implication from left to right by an induction on the combined
length of α and β. Since the base case is clear, we proceed with the inductive
step and assume that tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and that the implication
holds for all pairs of traces with smaller combined length. W.l.o.g., we can
assume that α 6= e. Hence there is some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗ with α = α′a.
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u.
In this case, we have tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(α′) = tpurgeu(β) and by
induction hypothesis, α′ ∼ttu β. By the condition (LRtt), we obtain α′ ∼ttu α′a
and hence, we have α ∼ttu β.
Case 2: dom(a) u.
In this case, we have that β 6= e and hence, there is some b ∈ A and β′ ∈ A∗
with β = β′b. If dom(b) 6 u, then we can apply Case 1 with the roles
of α and β swapped. Hence, suppose dom(b) u. This gives a = b and
tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(β′). By applying the induction hypothesis, we get
α′ ∼ttu β′ and by applying the (SCtt) condition, the result is α ∼ttu β.
We prove the other implication of this result by an induction on the
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applications of the unwinding conditions (LRtt) and (SCtt). This is possi-
ble, since if an unwinding relation exists that satisfies (LRtt), (SCtt), and
observation consistency, then also the smallest unwinding relation that
satisfies (LRtt) and (SCtt) is observation consistent. We can assume that the
unwinding condition is iteratively constructed by applying the (LRtt) and
(SCtt) conditions.
Let u ∈ D and let α, β ∈ A∗ with α ∼ttu β. In the first case, suppose that
α ∼ttu β holds from the application of the (LRtt) condition. Hence, due to
symmetry, we can assume β = αa for some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6 u. By
the definition of tpurge, we get tpurgeu(β) = tpurgeu(αa) = tpurgeu(α).
In the second case, assume that α ∼ttu β holds from the application of the
(SCtt) condition. Hence, α = α′a and β = β′a for some a ∈ A with α′ ∼ttu β′.
By induction hypothesis, we have tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(β′) and hence
tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β).
Another way of characterizing the indistinguishability requirement on a
noninterference definition are information sets. Intuitively, an information
set describes the allowed knowledge about the actual trace of an agent after
this trace. If the actual run of a system in described by a trace α, then the
agent u is only allowed to know that the actual trace was one of the traces in
Itu(α), but u is neither allowed to know which element of this set it actually
was, nor to rule out any element of this set.
3.2.7 Definition (transitive information sets). For any agent u ∈ D, any
a ∈ A, and any α ∈ A∗ the transitive information sets are inductively defined
by
Itu(e) = {b ∈ A | dom(b) 6 u}∗
Itu(αa) =
{
Itu(α) a Itu(e) if dom(a) u
Itu(α) otherwise
.
Information sets are strongly related to the trace-based unwinding
relations defined above. In fact, information sets are exactly the equivalence
classes of the smallest trace-based transitive unwinding relation.
3.2.8 Lemma. Let u ∈ D and α ∈ A∗. For the smallest trace-based transitive
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unwinding relation ∼ttu , we have Itu(α) = [α]∼ttu .
Proof. We will show that we have for every α, β ∈ A∗:
α ∈ Itu(β) iff α ∼ttu β .
We prove the direction from left to right of this equivalence by an induction
on the combined length of α and β. Assume that α ∈ Itu(β). For the base
case α = β = e, the claim holds trivially. For the inductive step, let α = α′a
with α′ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A.
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u.
Then we have Itu(α′a) = Itu(α′) and by applying the induction hypothesis
α′ ∼ttu β. From the (LRtt) condition it follows α′ ∼ttu α′a and therefore, by
transitivity and symmetry of an equivalence relation, we have α ∼u β.
Case 2: dom(a) u.
We assume that β = β′b with β′ ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A, since otherwise we may
proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped. Also assume
that dom(b) 6 u. Then we have α ∈ Itu(β′b) = Itu(β′). By applying the
induction hypothesis, we obtain α ∼u β with the same argument as before.
As the remaining case, we assume that also dom(b) u. Then we have
α′a ∈ Itu(β′b) = Itu(β′) b Itu(e) .
Since a is not in Itu(e), it follows a = b and α′ ∈ Itu(β′). By applying the
induction hypothesis, we have α′ ∼ttu β′ and from the (LRtt) condition it
follows α ∼ttu β.
We will prove the other direction by an induction on the inductive
definition of the ∼ttu relation.
Case 1: Suppose α ∼ttu β holds from an application of the (LRtt) condition.
Hence we have α = βa for some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6 u. Then we have
α ∈ Itu(βa) = Itu(β) and β ∈ Itu(βa).
Case 2: Suppose α ∼ttu β holds from an application of the (SCtt) condition.
Then we have α = α′a and β = β′a for some a ∈ A∗. Therefore, we have
α′ ∈ Itu(β′) and hence α′a ∈ Itu(β′) a ⊆ Itu(β′a).
Note that the definitions of trace-based transitive unwinding relations
and of information sets are characterizations of the tpurge function, or
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more precisely of the indistinguishability induced by the equality of the
values of the tpurge function on traces. Therefore, these characterizations
are completely independent of the underlying machine model.
However, these characterizations are not helpful for verifying security.
The verification problem for deterministic finite-state systems can be solved
efficiently with the help of state-based unwinding relations. These are
equivalence relations on the states of the systems rather than on traces.
Similar to the trace-based unwinding relation, these unwinding relations
are also defined by unwinding conditions. These conditions define which
states of the system have to be undistinguishable for the observing agent.
3.2.9 Definition (state-based transitive unwinding). A state-based transitive
unwinding relation for u ∈ D is an equivalence relation ∼stu ⊆ S× S that
satisfies the following conditions for every a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S:
(LRst): If dom(a) 6 u, then s ∼stu s · a.
(SCst): If s ∼stu t, then s · a ∼stu t · a.
The existence of observation consistent unwinding relations is equivalent
to the security of the system.
3.2.10 Theorem ([GM82]). A system is t-secure iff for every u ∈ D there exists a
state-based transitive unwinding relation ∼stu that is observation consistent for u.
These unwinding conditions provide both a useful proof technique and
a tool for efficient verification algorithms, as we will see later in Chapter 5.
3.2.2 Transitively Securely Constructed Systems
A structural approach of characterizing t-security is to express it as a
securely constructed system. For a given policy, a securely constructed
system implements the policy in a way that the system is t-secure by
construction. The idea is that the global state space is partitioned into local
state spaces for every single agent and that the (global) transition function
is assembled by local transitions functions, each for every agent. These local
transition functions are only applied if the policy allows an information
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flow from the corresponding agent. This construction enforces that no
information can be transmitted that is not allowed by the policy.
Suppose that we have some arbitrary, but fixed enumeration D =
{0, . . . , n− 1} of the agents, and that we have some policy as a relation
between these agents. We say a system is transitively securely constructed
(w.r.t. t-security and a given policy) if it satisfies the following construc-
tion pattern. For every agent i, the set Si is the local state space for agent i
and the (global) state space S is the product of the local state space, i. e.,
S = S0 × · · · × Sn−1. Every local state space has a local initial state sIi and
the (global) initial state is then sI = (sI0, . . . , s
I
n−1). For every agent i, we
suppose that a transition function ·i exists. This transition function ·i is
defined on all local states of Si and for all actions a with dom(a) i.
The transition function is then defined as
(s0, . . . , sn−1) · a = (s′0, . . . , s′n−1)
with s′i =
{
si ·i a if dom(a) i
si otherwise .
Note that the transition function is only used for agents where an edge
between them exists in the policy.
For the observation function, we require that the observations of each
agent only depend on its local state. Hence for every agent i and every state
s, t ∈ S with pii(s) = pii(t), we have obsi(s) = obsi(t). Alternatively, one
can define the observation functions for every agent i as a function defined
on its local state space Si.
From this construction it is obvious that a securely constructed system
is t-secure, and we can skip a proof of the following result.
3.2.11 Lemma. Every transitively securely constructed system is t-secure w.r.t.
the policy from which it is constructed.
The completeness of this construction is provided with the next result.
From every t-secure system, we can construct a t-secure securely constructed
system by taking the purged traces as states. Indeed, we can show a stronger
result: The constructed system is observation equivalent for every agent,
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i. e., for every agent i and every trace α, the agent i has the same observation
after α in both systems.
3.2.12 Lemma. For every t-secure system, there exists an observation equivalent
system which is transitively securely constructed from the same policy.
Proof. As mentioned above, we take the purged traces as the local states.
For a given system M with agents D = {0, . . . , n− 1} and policy , the
system M′ is defined by
. the local states of each agent i is Si = {tpurgei(α) | α ∈ A∗},
. the local initial state of each agent i is sIi = e,
. the local transition function of each agent i is defined for every s ∈ Si
and every a ∈ {b ∈ A | dom(b) i} by s ·i a = sa,
. for any agent i, the observation function obs′i(s) is defined as obsi(sI ·
pii(s)).
From the construction of the state space, we have for every i ∈ D and
every α, β ∈ A∗ with tpurgei(α) = tpurgei(β) that obs′i(s˜I · α) = obs′i(s˜I · β),
where s˜I is the initial state of the constructed system. By applying the
definition of t-security to the original system, we have for every trace α
that both α and tpurgei(α) lead to the same observation for i. Hence, the
securely constructed system is observation equivalent to the system from
which it is constructed.
Summarizing the previous two results gives:
3.2.13 Theorem. A system is t-secure iff there exists an observation equivalent,
transitively securely constructed system.
3.3 Intransitive Noninterference
While transitive noninterference is too restrictive for the security require-
ments of many systems, Haigh and Young [HY87] introduced a relaxed
version of noninterference called intransitive noninterference. The basic
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idea is that a particular agent, which one trusts assumably, is allowed to
downgrade or declassify some information. Previously high or confidential
information is then allowed to get to some other agent with a lower security
level only if it passes the downgrading agent and in the following is released
or declassified by it. Inspired by a military context, Figure 3.2 illustrates this
idea. The edges in this diagram depict the allowed information flows. The
downgrader is allowed to transmit any information from a higher context
to a lower one.
top secret
secret
confidential
unclassified
downgrader
Figure 3.2. Trusted downgrader
For intransitive noninterference, we use the same kind of static policies
as for transitive noninterference. However, the semantics of the policy
differs. Intransitive noninterference relies on an interpretation of policies
where paths of consecutive actions are considered. The simplest non-trivial
intransitive policy which does not collapse to the transitive case, is the HDL
policy depicted in Figure 3.3.
Intuitively, the interpretation of the HDL policy is that H is allowed
to interfere with D and D is allowed to interfere with L, but a direct
interference from H to L is prohibited. However, an indirect interference
through D is allowed. This means that L is only allowed to observe anything
about H’s actions if D performed an action after H’s actions. Hence, if there
is no interaction of D, then L is not allowed to observe anything about H’s
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H
D
L
Figure 3.3. The HDL policy
behavior.
One intuition is that D’s behavior is influenced by H’s interaction,
and since L can observe D’s behavior, it can make conclusions about H’s
behavior.
Another intuition in the sense of information flow is that each action of
an agent transmits information about all performed actions of those agents
that are allowed to interfere with the agent. Since the security notions define
the maximal allowed information flow, one is interested in the maximal
information that a particular action can transmit. If the security notion
allows it to transmit the performed actions of agents that are allowed to
interfere, one can say that an action transmits all the previously performed
actions that have reached the agent that performs the action. In a system
with the policy in Figure 3.3, if there is an action h performed by H and an
action d performed by D, then we say in the trace hd, the action d transmits
the action h to L, since D is allowed to receive h from H and L is allowed to
receive d from D.
3.3.1 Example. The system in Figure 3.4 has three agents H, D, and L and is
considered in combination with the HDL policy of Figure 3.3.
s0
obsL : 0
s1
obsL : 0
s2
obsL : 1
h d
Figure 3.4. An i-secure, but not t-secure system
When the agent L observes 1, then it knows that there was an action h
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performed in state s0. Otherwise, the system would remain in s0 and the
observation of L remains 0. However, L can make this observation only if
D performs an action after H’s action. Otherwise the system would remain
in state s1 and L cannot make any conclusions about H’s actions.
In the interpretation of intransitive noninterference, this system should
be considered secure (w.r.t. the HDL policy), since L can only make conclu-
sions about H if the information is transmitted by an action D.
However, according to the t-security definition of the previous sec-
tion, this system is insecure. We have tpurgeL(hd) = d = tpurgeL(d) but
obsL(s0 · hd) = 1 6= 0 = obsL(s0 · d).
We will formalize this intuitive description of intransitive noninterfer-
ence and we will give formal semantics to downgrading and transmission
of actions.
3.3.1 Downgrading
The concept of downgrading is fundamental in the context of intransitive
noninterference. The idea of downgrading is that an action is transmitted
by a sequence of other actions. One intuition of this process is that with
performing an action, an agent transmits all actions that it has received so
far to all agents the agent is allowed to interfere.
Given a set of agents D, a policy ⊆ D× D, a set of actions A, and
a dom function that maps actions to agents, the action-labeled policy is a
labeled graph with vertex set D. For every agent and each of its actions,
there is an edge, labeled with this action, to every successor according to
the policy. Formally, the edges of this labeled graph are given, by
{(u, v, a) | dom(a) = u and u v} .
We say an action a is downgraded by a sequence of actions α to an
agent v if there is a subsequence β of aα such that β is the sequence of labels
of a path in the corresponding labeled policy graph from dom(a) to v.
Intuitively, α contains a subsequence of actions that transmits the action a
from one agent to another, starting with dom(a), to the observing agent v.
This might also be seen as a casual chain of consecutive actions. In this
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chain each action may depend on its previous action and therefore, by
intransitivity, the end of the chain may depend on its first action.
3.3.2 Example. The action labeled policy of the HDL-policy in Figure 3.3 is
depicted in Figure 3.5.
H
D
L
h
d
Figure 3.5. The action labeled HDL policy
To analyze whether the action h is downgraded to L in a trace hd, one
has to verify that there is a path from dom(h) = H to L, labeled with hd. In
this simple policy this is obviously the case. In contrast, if the trace is only
h, then there is no path from H to L, labeled with h.
The next example shows why it is necessary to consider subsequences
rather than the whole sequence as in the previous example
3.3.3 Example. The following policy consists of five agents H1, H2, D1, D2
and L, where each agent has exactly one action, except L. If we consider
H1
D1
H2
D2
L
h1
d1
h2
d2
Figure 3.6. The action labeled H1H2D1D2L policy
the trace h1h2d1d2 w.r.t. the policy in Figure 3.6, then there is no path from
H1 to L labeled with h1h2d1d2. However, there is a subsequence, namely
h1d1 which labels such a path.
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3.4 i-security
To formalize the idea of downgrading, Rushby [Rus92] introduced a func-
tion sources that collects all agents allowed to have influence on the observ-
ing agent. This means, an agent dom(a) is in the set sourcesu(α) if there
is an action a in α that is downgraded by the remaining actions after the
appearance of a in the trace to u, i. e., dom(a) = v and α = βaγ with a is
downgraded by γ to u. Additionally, it is required that u ∈ sourcesu(α).
3.4.1 Definition (sources). Define for every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗
sourcesu(e) = {u}
sourcesu(aα) =
{
sourcesu(α) ∪ {dom(a)} if dom(a) sourcesu(α)
sourcesu(α) otherwise .
Note that the function sourcesu(α) is monotonically increasing in the
parameter α, i. e., we have sourcesu(α) ⊆ sourcesu(aα).
Originally, the intransitive purge function has be formulated by Haigh
and Young [HY87], but instead, we use Rushby’s simplified definition,
based on the sources function [Rus92]. The intransitive purge function is
defined next.
3.4.2 Definition (ipurge operator). For every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗
define
ipurgeu(e) = e
ipurgeu(aα) =
{
a ipurgeu(α) if dom(a) ∈ sourcesu(aα)
ipurgeu(α) otherwise .
The ipurge function removes all actions from a trace that are not down-
graded to u. Hence, applied to a trace α, the resulting ipurge values consists
of that subsequence of α, which exactly contains those actions that are
allowed to influence u’s observation.
Since sourcesu(α) is exactly the set of agents that have an action in the
trace ipurgeu(α) and the agent u itself, we can express the ipurge operator
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directly without the sources function by
ipurgeu(aα) =

a ipurgeu(α) if dom(a) dom(alph(ipurgeu(α)))
or dom(a) u
ipurgeu(α) otherwise .
Alternatively, the ipurge operator can also be defined on αa instead of aα
by collecting the agents of the sources in a parameter, as defined as follows.
For every set of agents X ⊆ D, a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ we “overload” the
ipurge operator and define it for sets of agents by
ipurgeX(e) = e
ipurgeX(αa) =
{
ipurgeX∪{dom(a)}(α) a if dom(a) X
ipurgeX(α) otherwise .
This new ipurge operator relates to the previous one by ipurgeu(α) =
ipurge{u}(α).
Analog to the previous security definition, i-security is defined as fol-
lows.
3.4.3 Definition (i-security). A system is i-secure iff for every u ∈ D and
every α, β ∈ A∗ the following implication holds:
If ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(β), then obsu(s
I · α) = obsu(sI · β) .
As in the transitive case, this definition can be rephrased. For every
u ∈ D and every α ∈ A∗, we have
obsu(sI · ipurgeu(α)) = obsu(sI · α) .
Another way to understand intransitive noninterference is that if there
is an action that is not downgraded by some sequence of actions, then this
single action should not have any visible influence on the observer.
3.4.4 Lemma. A system is i-secure iff for every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗,
we have: if dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα), then obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
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Proof. First, we show the direction from left to right of the equivalence. Let
s ∈ S, a ∈ A, u ∈ D, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(α). We show by
an induction on the length of β ∈ A∗ that we have for every β:
ipurgeu(βaα) = ipurgeu(βα) and sourcesu(βaα) = sourcesu(βα) .
For the base case, let β = e. From the assumption dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα)
it follows sourcesu(aα) = sourcesu(α) and hence ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α).
For the inductive step, let β = bβ′ with b ∈ A and β′ ∈ A∗ with sourcesu(β′aα) =
sourcesu(β′α) and ipurgeu(β′aα) = ipurgeu(β′α).
Therefore, we have
dom(b) sourcesu(β′aα) iff dom(b) sourcesu(β′α) .
By the definition of sources, we have
dom(b) ∈ sourcesu(β′aα) iff dom(b) sourcesu(β′α) .
From the definition of ipurge, it follows ipurgeu(bβ
′aα) = ipurgeu(bβ′α).
The claim follows by choosing some β with s = sI · β.
We show the other implication of the claim by an induction on the
combined length of α and β. Since the base case α = β = e is obvious,
we proceed with the inductive step. As induction hypothesis, we suppose
that we have for all states s ∈ S and all traces of shorter combined length
α′, β′ ∈ A∗ it holds:
ipurgeu(α
′) = ipurgeu(β
′) implies obsu(s · α′) = obsu(s · β′) .
Let α and β in A∗ with ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(β). Let α = aα′ for some
a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗.
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα′).
In this case, we have ipurgeu(aα
′) = ipurgeu(α′) = ipurgeu(β). By apply-
ing the induction hypothesis, we have for every state s that obsu(s · α′) =
obsu(s · β). And by the assumption that the left-hand side of the lemma
holds, we have obsu(s · α′a) = obsu(s · α′). Hence, we have obsu(s · α) =
obsu(s · β).
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Case 2: dom(a) ∈ sourcesu(aα′).
We assume that β = bβ′ with b ∈ A and β′ ∈ A∗ and dom(b) ∈ sourcesu(bβ′),
since otherwise we proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped.
Hence, we have ipurgeu(aα
′) = a ipurgeu(α′) and ipurgeu(bβ′) = b ipurgeu(β′).
Thus, we have a = b and ipurgeu(α
′) = ipurgeu(β′). Let s be an arbitrary
state. Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis to the state s · a and
obtain obsu(s · aα′) = obsu(s · bβ′).
The previous lemma states that for i-security, it is sufficient to consider a
single action and determine if this action is downgraded. Therefore, for the
definition of i-security with the ipurge operator, it is sufficient to consider
traces that differ only in a single action. The next lemma is analogue to
Lemma 3.2.4 in the transitive case.
3.4.5 Lemma. A system is i-secure iff for every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, and α, β ∈ A∗, we
have if ipurgeu(αaβ) = ipurgeu(αβ), then obsu(s
I · αaβ) = obsu(sI · αβ).
Proof. We prove this lemma by contraposition. Assume that the right-hand
side of the lemma does not hold. Then there are u ∈ D, a ∈ A, α, β ∈ A∗
with ipurgeu(αaβ) = ipurgeu(αβ) and obsu(s
I · αaβ) 6= obsu(sI · αβ). From
ipurgeu(αaβ) = ipurgeu(αβ), it follows that dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aβ). Set
s = sI · α. Then we have obsu(s · aβ) 6= obsu(s · β). By applying Lemma 3.4.4,
we obtain that the system is not i-secure.
For the other direction, assume that the system is not i-secure. By
Lemma 3.4.4, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and β ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈
sourcesu(aβ) and obsu(s · aβ) 6= obsu(s · β). Due to reachability of every
state, there is some α ∈ A∗ with s = sI · α. Then we have ipurgeu(αβ) =
ipurgeu(αaβ), which concludes the proof.
3.4.1 Rushby’s Unwinding
Rushby [Rus92] proposed the first unwinding for intransitive noninter-
ference. However, his unwinding conditions are only sufficient but not
necessary for i-security. Nonetheless, these conditions are of interest since
if they are adopted to a trace-based unwinding then they are both a sound
and complete characterization for ta-security as we will see later. Here, we
name it after its inventor and call it a Rushby unwinding.
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3.4.6 Definition (Rushby unwinding [Rus92]). An equivalence relation
∼rushbyu ⊆ S× S is a state-based Rushby unwinding relation for u ∈ D if for
every a ∈ A, s, t ∈ S the following conditions are satisfied:
(LRrushby): If dom(a) 6 u, then s ∼rushbyu s · a.
(SCrushby): If s ∼rushbyu t and s ∼rushbydom(a) t, then s · a ∼
rushby
u t · a.
Rushby [Rus92] has shown that the existence of an observation consistent
unwinding relation is sufficient for i-security.
3.4.7 Theorem ([Rus92]). If for every u ∈ D there is a state-based Rushby
unwinding relation ∼rushbyu that is observation consistent for u, then the system is
i-secure.
However, the state-based Rushby unwinding is not complete for i-secu-
rity. The reason is that the unwinding relations on the states do not contain
enough information about why the states are equivalent.
3.4.8 Example. The system depicted in Figure 3.7 is inspired by an example
from [vdM07]. We will explain why for this system, it does not exist an
observation-consistent state-based Rushby unwinding for L. Since D2 6
D1, we have s0 ∼rushbyD1 s1 and since H 6 L, we have s0 ∼
rushby
L s1, both
by applying the (LRrushby) condition. Now, by applying (SCrushby) with the
action d1, we obtain s0 ∼rushbyL s2 and hence this relation is not observation
consistent for L. However, since H cannot change L’s observation without
any interaction of D1, this system is i-secure.
s0
obsL : 0
s1
obsL : 0
s2
obsL : 1
H
D1 D2
L
h, d2 d1
Figure 3.7. An i-secure system without an observation consistent Rushby unwinding
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3.4.2 Policy Cuts
The basic idea of policy cuts can be described as follows. Given an intran-
sitive policy and agents v and u such that there is a path from v to u in
the policy, but u is not a direct successor of v. Then a necessary condition
for security is that there is no information flow from v to u if the agents
forming a cut (in a graph-theoretic sense) between v and u in the policy are
removed from the system.
In [BP03], Backes and Pfitzmann have a definition of intransitive nonin-
terference based on cuts in the policy called blocking non-interference. The
main difference to our technique is that they use a completely different
semantic model than ours and that they require to consider all possible cuts
between every pair of agents. We will see that the latter is not necessary in
our setting.
The following theorem shows that it is both necessary and sufficient to
only take all successors of v as a cut if it is done for all possible pairs of
agents u and v. Recall that v is the set of all successors of v in the policy
graph, including v itself.
3.4.9 Theorem. A system is i-secure iff for every u ∈ D, all s ∈ S, all a ∈ A, and
all α ∈ A∗ such that
ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α) and dom(a)
 ∩ dom(alph(α)) = ∅ ,
we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contraposition. Assume first that there
are u ∈ D, a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗, and s ∈ S with ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α),
dom(a) ∩dom(alph(α)) = ∅, and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Then clearly,
dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα) and hence, the system is not i-secure.
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the system is not i-
secure. By Lemma 3.4.4, we have that there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα), but obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). We
choose α of minimal length for all possible choices of a and s with this
property.
Assume that there are some b ∈ A and β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ and
dom(a)  dom(b). We will show that the existence of such an action b
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would contradict the minimality of the length of α.
Case 1: obsu(s · βbγ) 6= obsu(s · βγ).
In this case, we could choose s′ = s · β, a′ = b, and α′ = γ instead of s, a,
and α. This contradicts the minimal length of α.
Case 2: obsu(s · aβbγ) 6= obsu(s · aβγ).
With the same argument as in the previous case, we have s′ = s · aβ.
Case 3: This is the remaining case, i. e., obsu(s · βbγ) = obsu(s · βγ) and
obsu(s · aβbγ) = obsu(s · aβγ). Hence, we have
obsu(s · βbγ) = obsu(s · βγ) 6= obsu(s · aβbγ) = obsu(s · aβγ) .
Here, we can choose s′ = s, a′ = b, and α′ = βγ. Then, the condition
ipurgeu(βγ) = ipurgeu(aβγ) is satisfied, and again we have a contradiction
to the minimality of the length of α.
For a pair of agents v = dom(a) and u as in Theorem 3.4.9, the agent v
is isolated from all other agents (if we ignore v’s incoming edges). Since
this is universally quantified over all agents v 6 u, we can allow that all
agents, except v itself and the removed agents {w ∈ D | v w, v 6= w}, are
allowed to interfere with u directly. Since the resulting policy is transitive,
we can apply the simpler definition of t-security rather than i-security on
this modified system.
We formalize the described construction by introducing a system C(v, u)
for agents v and u with v 6 u, which has the same states as the original
system. Let C = {w ∈ D | v  w, v 6= w} be the already mentioned cut
in the policy, i. e., the set of all proper successors of v. The set of agents of
C(v, u) is the set D \ C. The actions of the agents from C are removed from
the action set of C(v, u) and the transitions corresponding to these actions
are deleted. The observations of u in C(v, u) are the same as in the original
system and all other agents have constant observations. The policy that
applies to C(v, u) is the policy that has the edges w u for all w ∈ D \ C
with w 6= v.
3.4.10 Theorem. A system is i-secure iff for every v, u ∈ D with v 6 u the
system C(v, u) is t-secure.
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Proof. We prove this result by contraposition. Suppose first that the right-
hand side does not hold. Hence, there are v, u ∈ D with v 6 u such that
C(v, u) is not t-secure. By Lemma 3.2.4, there are w ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and
β ∈ {a ∈ A | v 6 dom(a)}∗ with dom(a) 6 w and obsw(s · aβ) 6= obsw(s ·
β). We also assume that β is of minimal length for all possible choices of
w, a, and s. This guarantees that β does not contain any action of dom(a).
Since u is the only agent that has non-constant observations, we have u = w,
and since v is the only agent that is not allowed to interfere with u, we have
v = dom(a). From v 6 dom(alph(β)), it follows v /∈ sourcesu(aβ). By
Lemma 3.4.4, the system is not i-secure.
For proving the other direction of this result, suppose that the system
is not i-secure. By Theorem 3.4.9, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ with ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α), dom(a) ∩ dom(alph(α)) = ∅,
and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). From ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α), it follows
dom(a) 6 u, and from dom(a) ∩ dom(alph(α)) = ∅, it follows α ∈
{a ∈ A | v 6 dom(a)}∗. By Lemma 3.2.4, the system C(dom(a), u) is not
t-secure.
This is some kind of reduction from i-security to t-security. Instead
of analyzing a single system with respect to i-security, it is sufficient to
analyze several systems with respect to t-security. However, this number of
systems is quadratic in the number of agents in the original system.
3.4.3 State-based Unwinding for i-security
We use the technique of policy cuts to obtain a sound and complete state-
based unwinding for i-security. Each unwinding relation is defined for a
pair of agents v and u. The agent u has the role of an observer. The role
of the agent v is to perform actions that should not be revealed to u. Since
the transition relating to v’s action should be hidden, the corresponding
states are treated to be equivalent for u. To guarantee that v’s actions
are not downgraded, only agents w with v 6 w are allowed to perform
actions. These actions are performed synchronously in equivalent states.
This is essentially the same as the state-based transitive unwinding from
Definition 3.2.9 applied to each of the systems C(v, u) as defined above.
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3.4.11 Definition (state-based intransitive unwinding). A state-based intran-
sitive unwinding relation for v, u ∈ D is an equivalence relation ∼siv,u ⊆ S× S
such that for every s, t ∈ S, a ∈ A the following conditions hold
(LRsi): If v 6 u and dom(a) = v, then s ∼siv,u s · a.
(SCsi): If s ∼siv,u t and v 6 dom(a) then s · a ∼siv,u t · a.
The soundness and completeness of this unwinding-based definition is
established in the next result.
3.4.12 Theorem. A system is i-secure iff for every u, v ∈ D there is a state-based
intransitive unwinding relation ∼siv,u that is observation consistent for u.
Proof. First, we prove the direction from left to right. Assume that the
system is i-secure. For every u, v ∈ D define a relation ∼siv,u for every
s, t ∈ S by
s ∼siv,u t iff for every α ∈ {a ∈ A | v 6 dom(a)}∗ it holds:
obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
We will show that ∼siv,u is a state-based intransitive unwinding relation for
v and u. Clearly, ∼siv,u is an equivalence relation on S. Define X = {a ∈ A |
v 6 dom(a)}∗. Since e ∈ X, we have that ∼siv,u is observation consistent
for u.
For showing (LRsi), suppose that v 6 u and let a ∈ A with dom(a) = v.
Then for every α ∈ X, we have dom(a) 6 dom(alph(α)) and hence
dom(a) /∈ sourcesu(aα). From i-security and Lemma 3.4.4, it follows
obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α). Therefore, we have s · a ∼siv,u s.
For showing (SCsi), let s, t ∈ S with s ∼siv,u t and a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a).
From s ∼siv,u t, it follows that for every α ∈ X it holds obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α).
But also aα is in X and hence, we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα) and
therefore s · a ∼siv,u t · a.
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the system is not i-secure.
By Theorem 3.4.9, there are a ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with ipurgeu(aα) =
ipurgeu(α), dom(a)
 ∩ dom(alph(α)) = ∅, and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α).
Set v = dom(a) and assume that ∼siv,u satisfies (LRsi) and (SCsi). By (LRsi),
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we have s · a ∼siv,u s and by (SCsi) it follows s · aα ∼siv,u s · α. But, since
obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α), the relation ∼siv,u is not observation consistent
for u.
We will see in Chapter 5 that this result can be used to obtain an efficient
algorithm for verifying i-security.
3.5 ta-security
Van der Meyden [vdM07] pointed out some drawbacks of the definition
of i-security. The main concern is that the definition of i-security allows
the observer to observe the interleaving of actions which should not be
observable by any single agent under the general assumption that the
system is completely asynchronous. We illustrate and discuss this property
with the next example.
3.5.1 Example. In Figure 3.8 is the policy from Figure 3.6 (but without the
labels on the edges). Again, we suppose that there is some system with
actions h1, h2, d1, and d2 of the agent H1, H2, D1, and D2, respectively. If
we consider the trace h1h2d1d2 and the trace h2h1d1d2, then we see that in
both traces, every action is downgraded to L. Hence, applying ipurgeL to
any of these traces does not remove any action from these traces. That
means that L is allowed to distinguish these two traces by its observations.
However, no agent is allowed to observe which of the two actions h1 and
h2 has been performed first. For instance, agent D1 only observes that
h1 has been performed but does not know if there was some action h2
before of after this action h1. An analogue argument holds for D2. Hence,
neither D1 nor D2 can transmit information about the ordering of h1 and
h2. Therefore, L cannot reconstruct the ordering of h1 and h2 from the
received information. Therefore, we need to require that L is not allowed
to distinguish the traces h1h2d1d2 and h2h1d1d2. However, the ordering of
the action d1 and d2 should be allowed to be distinguished by L, since L
immediately gets the action when it is performed and hence learns which
of these actions was first.
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H1
D1
H2
D2
L
Figure 3.8. The H1H2D1D2L policy
To capture this issue, van der Meyden [vdM07] introduced the ta oper-
ator1 that transforms traces into trees. These trees have the property that
the information about the unobservable ordering of the actions has been
removed. Therefore, two traces which differ only in the ordering of those
actions that are not allowed to be observed directly by any single agent
have the same trees.
Formally, the ta operator is defined as follows.
3.5.2 Definition (ta operator). Define for every u ∈ D, every a ∈ A, and
every α ∈ A∗
tau(e) = e
tau(αa) =
{
(tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) if dom(a) u
tau(α) otherwise .
The value tau(α) is also called the tau-tree of α.
The function ta transforms a trace into a binary tree. The expression
(tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) should be read as a binary tree with the root ver-
tex a and a left subtree encoded by tau(α) and a right subtree encoded by
tadom(a)(α). Hence, the inner vertices of such a tree are labeled by actions
of the trace, all leaves are labeled with e. The labeling of the leaves with e
is not essential for this definition and may be omitted, however, we want to
stay consistent with the definition in the literature.
1ta stands for transmission of information about actions
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3.5.3 Example. The taL value of the trace h1h2d1d2 w.r.t. the policy in Fig-
ure 3.8 is
taL(h1h2d1d2) =
(
taL(h1h2d1), taD2(h1h2d1), d2
)
=
((
taL(h1h2), taD1(h1h2), d1
)
, taD2(h1h2), d2
)
=
((
taL(h1), taD1(h1), d1
)
,
(
taD2(h1), taH2(h1), h2
)
, d2
)
= ((e, (e, e, h1), d1) , (e, e, h2) , d2) .
Similarly, computing the taL value of the trace with h1 and h2 swapped,
gives
taL(h2h1d1d2) =
(
taL(h2h1d1), taD2(h2h1d1), d2
)
=
((
taL(h2h1), taD1(h2h1), d1
)
, taD2(h2h1), d2
)
=
((
taL(h2),
(
taD1(h2), taH1(h2), h1
)
, d1
)
, taD2(h2), d2
)
= ((e, (e, e, h1), d1) , (e, e, h2) , d2) .
As we see, both traces have the same taL value. The information about
the ordering of h1 and h2 is removed from this representation of the traces.
Figure 3.9 gives a graphical representation of the taL-tree constructed from
any of these two traces.
d2
h2
ee
d1
h1
ee
e
Figure 3.9. The taL-tree of Example 3.5.3
Instead of defining the ta operator from right to left, it is also possible
to define it from left to right. However, this requires one to get through
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the ta-tree from the root to the leafs for adding an action at a leaf. This is
performed by the att function (att is the abbreviation for add-to-tree), which
takes an action a, an agent u, and a ta-tree as argument.
3.5.4 Definition (att function). For every u ∈ D, a, b ∈ A and t, t′ ta-trees,
define
att(a, u, e) =
{
(e, e, a) if dom(a) u
e otherwise
att(a, u, (t, t′, b)) =
(
att(a, u, t), att(a, dom(b), t′), b
)
With this function, it is possible to give a definition of tau(aα) instead of
tau(αa).
3.5.5 Lemma. For every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗, we have
tau(aα) = att(a, u, tau(α)) .
Proof. We prove this lemma by an induction on α. For the base case α = e,
we have
tau(a) =
{
(e, e, a) if dom(a) u
e otherwise ,
which is exactly the definition of att(a, u, e).
For the inductive step, let α = βb with β ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A and assume as
induction hypothesis that for every v ∈ D it holds:
tav(aβ) = att(a, v, tav(β)) . (I.H.)
Let u ∈ D. There are two cases.
Case 1: dom(b) 6 u.
In this case, we have
att(a, u, tau(βb)) = att(a, u, tau(β))
(I.H.)
= tau(aβ) .
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Case 2: dom(b) u.
This gives
att(a, u, tau(βb)) = att(a, u, (tau(β), tadom(b)(β), b))
= (att(a, u, tau(β)), att(a, dom(b), tadom(b)(β)), b)
(I.H.)
= (tau(aβ), tadom(b)(aβ), b)
= tau(aβb) .
Analogue to the previous security definitions, ta-security is defined in
the usual way.
3.5.6 Definition (ta-security). A system is ta-secure iff for every u ∈ D
and every α, β ∈ A∗ such that tau(α) = tau(β), we have obsu(sI · α) =
obsu(sI · β).
The next example illustrates the difference between i-security and ta-
security.
3.5.7 Example. We will see that a minimal example of an i-secure but not
ta-secure system only requires three agents. Note that for systems with
only two agents, both i-security and ta-security are equivalent to t-security.
As agents, we take H, D, and L and the policy that, except the self-loops,
only contains the edges H  D and D  L. We consider the traces hld
and lhd from the point of view of L. These two traces have different ipurgeL
values since ipurge does not remove anything from these traces. However,
the taL values are the same, since we have
taL(hld) = (taL(hl), taD(hl), d)
= ((e, e, l), (e, e, h), d) ,
and
taL(lhd) = (taL(lh), taD(lh), d)
= ((e, e, l), (e, e, h), d) .
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Intuitively, L does not know if it has performed its l action before or after
the action h since no agent has this information. The action d only transmits
the information that the action h has been performed before the action d.
An example for an i-secure but not ta-secure system with this policy is
depicted in Figure 3.10.
obsL : 0 obsL : 0 obsL : 0 obsL : 1
obsL : 0 obsL : 0 obsL : 2
H
D
L
l h d
h
l d
Figure 3.10. An i-secure, but not ta-secure system
The relation between i-security and ta-security is that ta-security im-
plies i-security. The reason is that the ta operator possibly removes more
information from a trace than the ipurge operator.
3.5.8 Lemma ([vdM07]). For every agent u ∈ D and all traces α, β ∈ A∗ with
ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(β), we have tau(α) = tau(β). Moreover, every ta-secure
system is i-secure.
3.5.1 Trace-based Unwinding for ta-security
Alternatively to the definition of ta-security by the use of the ta operator,
ta-security has a very elegant representation by a trace-based unwinding.
3.5.9 Definition (trace-based intransitive unwinding). A trace-based intransi-
tive unwinding relation for u ∈ D is an equivalence relation ∼tiu ⊆ A∗ × A∗
that satisfies for every a ∈ A and every α, β ∈ A∗:
(LRti): If dom(a) 6 u, then α ∼tiu αa.
(SCti): If α ∼tiu β and α ∼tidom(a) β, then αa ∼tiu βa.
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The unwinding conditions of this trace-based unwinding look very
similar to the unwinding conditions of Rushby’s state-based unwinding.
However, van der Meyden [vdM07] has shown that it is complete and sound
for ta-security.
3.5.10 Theorem ([vdM07]). A system is ta-secure iff for every agent u, there is a
trace-based intransitive unwinding ∼tiu which is observation consistent for u.
The relation between the trace-based intransitive unwinding and the
ta operator can be stated more precisely than in the previous result: The
equivalence between traces with respect to a smallest ∼tiu is the same as
with respect to the equality of the tau values.
3.5.11 Lemma ([vdM07]). Let u ∈ D and let ∼tiu be the smallest trace-based
intransitive unwinding relation for u. Then for every α, β ∈ A∗, we have
α ∼tiu β iff tau(α) = tau(β) .
3.5.2 Information Sets for ta-security
Again it is possible to give a characterization in terms of information sets.
3.5.12 Definition (information sets for intransitive noninterference). Infor-
mation sets for intransitive noninterference are defined for every u ∈ D by
Iiu(e) = {b ∈ A | dom(b) 6 u}
Iiu(αa) =
{
(Iiu(α) ∩ Iidom(a)(α)) a Iiu(e) if dom(a) u
Iiu(α) otherwise .
As we will show with the next theorem, Iiu(α) is the set of all traces,
which u is not allowed to distinguish from α. This can be seen as u’s allowed
knowledge after the trace α. The expression
(Iiu(α) ∩ Iidom(a)(α)) a Iiu(e)
should be read as follows: if dom(a) is allowed to interfere with u, then with
performing the action a, dom(a) transmits its whole knowledge, namely
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Iidom(a)(α), to u. The agent u combines its previous knowledge I
i
u(α) with
the new knowledge received from dom(a). Additionally, u knows that the
action a has been performed, hence the a is appended to every trace. But
there is also some uncertainty about actions possibly performed after the
action a of agents that are not allowed to interfere with u. These are the
traces in Iiu(e), which are appended to all traces.
3.5.13 Theorem. For every u ∈ D and all α, β ∈ A∗, we have α ∈ Iiu(β) iff
tau(α) = tau(β).
Proof. Let u ∈ D. We prove the implication from left to right by an induction
on the combined length of α and β. Let α, β ∈ A∗ such that α ∈ Iiu(β). The
claim holds trivially for the base case α = β = e. In the case of α = α′a with
dom(a) 6 u, we have α′ ∈ Iu(β) and by induction hypothesis, it follows
tau(α) = tau(α′a) = tau(α′). In the case of β = β′b with dom(b) 6 u,
we have α ∈ Iiu(β) = Iiu(β′). Again by induction hypothesis, we have
tau(α) = tau(β′) = tau(β). Now consider the case that α = α′a and β = β′b
with dom(a) u and dom(b) u. Since
α′a ∈ Iiu(β′b) = (Iiu(β′) ∩ Iidom(b)(β′)) b Iiu(e) ,
we have a = b and α′ ∈ Iu(β′) and α′ ∈ Idom(a)(β′). Applying the induction
hypothesis, we have tau(α′) = tau(β′) and tadom(a)(α′) = tadom(a)(β′). This
gives tau(α′a) = tau(β′b).
For the other implication, we consider α, β with tau(α) = tau(β). If
α = α′a or β = β′b′ with dom(a) 6 u or dom(b) 6 u, then we can apply
the induction hypothesis directly with the same arguments as above. For
the rest of the proof, consider α = α′a and β = β′b with dom(a)  u
and dom(b)  u and tau(α′a) = tau(β′b). From the definition of ta, we
have a = b and tau(α′) = tab(β′) and tadom(a)(α′) = tadom(b)(β′). By
induction hypothesis, we have α′ ∈ Iiu(β′) and α′ ∈ Iidom(a)(β′). Therefore,
βa ∈ (Iiu(β′) ∩ Iidom(a)(β′)) a Iiu(e).
Information sets provide a clear and intuitive way how the allowed
knowledge of agent evolves during a run of the system. But they do not
provide a tool for verifying security, since every information set is an infinite
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set. For that, a state-based unwinding is an appropriate tool in the case of
finite-state systems.
3.5.3 State-based Unwinding for ta-security
Before defining a state-based unwinding, some further notation is necessary
for describing the effects showing the difference between traces purged by
the ipurge operator and ta-trees.
3.5.14 Definition (swappable actions). Let α, α′ ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A and
u ∈ D. The actions a and b are swappable in αabα′ (w.r.t. the agent u), written
as αabα′ ↔swapu αbaα′ iff
dom(a) ∩ dom(b) ∩ ({u} ∪ {dom(c)|c ∈ alph(abα′)}) = ∅ .
Intuitively, two actions are swappable if no successor of their correspond-
ing agents performs any action after these two actions that are downgraded
to the observing agent.
Traces are defined to be order indistinguishable if one can be trans-
formed into the other by a sequence of swap operations.
3.5.15 Definition (order indistinguishable traces). Traces α, α′ ∈ A∗ are
order indistinguishable for u, written as α ≡oiu α′, if α ∗↔
swap
u α
′.
The following lemma shows that if traces can be transformed into each
other by only swap operations of swappable actions, then these traces have
the same ta value.
3.5.16 Lemma. Let u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗. If we have α↔swapu β, then tau(α) =
tau(β).
Proof. Due to Lemma 3.5.11, it is sufficient to show that if α↔swapu β, then
α ∼tiu β. By the definition of ↔swapu , there are γ, δ ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A with
α = γabδ and β = γbaδ. Let v ∈ {u} ∪ dom(alph(abδ)).
We prove this lemma by an induction on the length of δ. For the base
case, we have that dom(a) or dom(b) does not interfere with v. Due to
symmetry, we consider just the case that dom(a) 6 v. By (LRti), we have
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γa ∼tiv γ and from dom(a) 6 dom(b) it follows γa ∼tidom(b) γ. By (SCti),
we have then γab ∼tiv γb and again by (LRti), we have γab ∼tiv γba.
For the inductive step, consider a trace δc and assume that for every
v ∈ {u} ∪ dom(alph(abδ)) it holds γabδ ∼tiv γbaδ. Moreover, we have
γabδ ∼tidom(c) γbaδ. By (SCti), we have γabδc ∼tiv γbaδc.
If the ipurge values of two traces are order indistinguishable, then the
ta-values of these traces are the same.
3.5.17 Corollary. Let u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗. If we have ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu
ipurgeu(β), then tau(α) = tau(β) holds.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.5.8 and Lemma 3.5.16.
This can be summarized as follows: The ta operator removes the same
actions from a trace as the ipurge operator. Additionally it removes the
information about the order of swappable actions from the trace. The
resulting information is exactly the information encoded in the ta-tree.
3.5.18 Lemma. Let u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗. Then
tau(α) = tau(β) iff ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu ipurgeu(β) .
Proof. For the proof from left to right, assume that tau(α) = tau(β) holds.
Since ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(β) implies tau(α) = tau(β), without loss of
generality, we can assume that the traces α and β are already purged, i. e.,
α = ipurgeu(α) and β = ipurgeu(β).
Assume that α 6≡oiu β. Since α and β have the same tau-trees, the same
actions are contained in α and β. Let γ ∈ A∗ with γ ≡oiu β such that γ has
a common prefix with α of maximal length for all possible choices of γ.
Hence, there are α′, α′′,γ′ ∈ A∗, and a ∈ A with α = α′aα′′, γ = α′γ′, and
aα′′ 6= γ′.
We assume that the position of a in γ′ is the left-most position among
all possible choices for γ′. Then γ′ is of the form δbaδ′ with δbaδ′ 6↔swapu
δabδ′. Therefore, there is some v ∈ sourcesu(δ′) with dom(a)  v and
dom(b)  v. Hence, tav(α′δba) is a subtree of tau(α). Because of the
corresponding number of occurrences of a in α, the corresponding subtree
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would be tav(α′a). But the numbers of corresponding bs in this two trees do
not match. Hence, we have a contradiction to the assumption that α 6≡oiu β.
The other direction of the proof directly follows from Corollary 3.5.17.
These two properties, namely, i-security and the property that it is
allowed to swap swappable actions in a trace, are exactly the properties that
characterize ta-security.
3.5.19 Theorem. A system is ta-secure iff
1. it is i-secure, and
2. for every s ∈ S, every u ∈ D, every α ∈ A∗, and every a, b ∈ A such that a
and b are swappable in abα w.r.t. u, we have obsu(s · abα) = obsu(s · baα).
Proof. For the proof of the implication from left to right, assume that the
system is ta-secure. Since ta-security implies i-security, condition 1. is
satisfied. Assume that the condition 2. is not satisfied. Then there exist
s ∈ S, u ∈ D, α ∈ A∗, and a, b ∈ A such that a and b are swappable in abα
and obsu(s · abα) 6= obsu(s · baα). Since Lemma 3.5.18 implies tau(abα) =
tau(baα), we have that the system is not ta-secure which contradicts our
assumption.
For proving the other direction by contraposition, we assume that the
system is not ta-secure. Additionally, suppose that the system is i-secure.
Since the system is not ta-secure, there are u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗ with
tau(α) = tau(β) and obsu(sI · α) 6= obsu(sI · β). By Lemma 3.5.18, we have
ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu ipurgeu(β). Hence, α arose from β by removing actions
according to ipurgeu and by swapping of swappable actions. More precisely,
there is a finite sequence of traces α0, . . . , αn−1 with
ipurgeu(α) = α0 ↔swapu · · · ↔swapu αn−1 = ipurgeu(β) .
From i-security it follows obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · ipurgeu(α)) and obsu(sI ·
β) = obsu(sI · ipurgeu(β)). Hence, there is some 0 ≤ i < n − 1 with
obsu(sI · αi) 6= obsu(sI · αi+1). Due to the definition of the ↔swapu relation,
we have αi = γabδ and αi+1 = γbaδ for some a, b ∈ A and γ, δ ∈ A∗ with a
and b are swappable in abδ w.r.t. u. The claim follows with s = sI · γ.
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The previous lemma showed that ta-security is characterized as a con-
junction of two properties. We will exploit this property for a character-
ization in terms of a state-based unwinding. For the first condition, a
state-based unwinding was already provided in Definition 3.4.11. Therefore,
it is sufficient to formulate unwinding conditions for the second property.
The state-based unwinding relations ∼stav,w,u are defined for any triple of
agents v, w, and u. The agent u takes the role of an observer. The agents v
and w may perform actions that are guaranteed to be swappable w.r.t. u,
since no agent that is allowed to receive both v’s and w’s actions is involved
in any considered trace.
3.5.20 Definition (state-based unwinding for ta-security). A state-based un-
winding relation for ta-security for agents u, v, w ∈ D with v 6= w is an
equivalence relation ∼stav,w,u ⊆ S× S such that for every s, t ∈ S and a ∈ A
the following conditions hold:
(SWAPsta): If dom(a) = v and dom(b) = w and v 6 w and w 6 v, and
v 6 u or w 6 u, then s · ab ∼stav,w,u s · ba.
(SCsta): If s ∼stav,w,u t and a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a), then
s · a ∼stav,w,u t · a.
The next theorem shows the soundness and completeness of the state-
based unwinding for ta-security if it is applied to an i-secure system. Hence
for checking ta-security, it is necessary to verify both i-security and the exis-
tence of a state-based unwinding relation for ta-security that is observation
consistent for the observing agent.
3.5.21 Theorem. A system is ta-secure if and only if it is i-secure, and for every
agent u, v, and w there exists a state-based unwinding relation for ta-security
∼stav,w,u that is observation consistent for u.
Proof. First, we proof the implication from left to right. Suppose that the
system is ta-secure. This directly implies that it is i-secure. Let u ∈ D.
We will show the existence of a state-based unwinding relation ∼stav,w,u for
ta-security for agents u, v 6= w that is observation consistent for u. Define
for all states s, t ∈ S
s ∼stav,w,u t iff for all α ∈ {a ∈ A | v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a)}∗ it holds:
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obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
The observation consistency for u is immediate from the choice of α = e.
For showing the condition (SWAPsta), let s ∈ S, a, b ∈ A, and v, w ∈ D with
dom(a) = v, dom(b) = w, v 6 w, w 6 v, and v 6 u or w 6 u. Let
α ∈ {a ∈ A | v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a)}∗. Then the actions a and b are
swappable in abα. By Theorem 3.5.19, we have obsu(s · abα) = obsu(s · baα).
To show (SCsta), let s, t ∈ S with s ∼stav,w,u t. Then we have for every
α ∈ {b ∈ A | v 6 dom(b) or w 6 dom(b)}∗ that obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α).
Let a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a). Hence aα ∈ {b ∈ A | v 6
dom(b) or w 6 dom(b)}∗. Therefore obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα) and hence
s · a ∼stav,w,u t · a.
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the system is not
ta-secure, but i-secure. We will show that every state-based unwinding
relation for ta-security satisfying the conditions (SWAPsta) and (SCsta) is
not observation consistent.
Since the system is not ta-secure, by Theorem 3.5.19, there are u ∈
D, s ∈ S, a, b ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with a and b swappable in abα, but
obsu(s · abα) 6= obsu(s · baα). Set v = dom(a) and w = dom(b). By the
condition (SWAPsta), we have s · ab ∼stav,w,u s · ba. Since a and b are swappable
in abα, for every c ∈ alph(α), we have v 6 dom(c) or w 6 dom(c).
Hence, by applying the condition (SCsta) on all actions of α, we obtain
s · abα ∼stav,w,u s · baα. From obsu(s · abα) 6= obsu(s · baα), it follows that the
relation ∼stav,w,u is not observation consistent for u.
We will use this result in our algorithms, since we have a characterization
for i-security in terms of a state-based unwinding. Together with the state-
based unwinding for ta-security, it is possible to verify ta-security on
finite-state systems.
3.5.4 Intransitively Securely Constructed Systems
As in the transitive case, in the intransitive case as well, we can characterize
noninterference by a structural description of a secure system or, more
precisely, of an observational equivalent system.
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The main difference between transitively and intransitively securely
constructed systems are the local transition functions. In the transitive case,
the local transition function ·i only depends on the local states of ui. In the
intransitive case, it depends on both, the local state space of ui and of the
local state space of the agent that performs the action. More precisely, each
local transition function is of the form
·i : {(sj, si, a) | sj ∈ Sj, si ∈ Si, a ∈ A with dom(a) = uj and uj  ui} → Si.
Suppose again, the agents denoted as numbers 0, . . . , n− 1 and a policy
is given. For any state (s0, . . . , sn−1) ∈ S = S0 × · · · × Sn−1, the transition
function is defined as
(s0, . . . , sn−1) · a = (s′0, . . . , s′n−1)
with s′i =
{
(sj, si) ·i a if dom(a) i
si otherwise .
This global transition function ensures two properties.
First, if an action a is performed, then only those local transitions are
triggered that perform changes on the local state spaces of the agents with
which dom(a) is allowed to interfere.
Second, if a local transition is performed then this transition only de-
pends on the local state of the agent who performs the action and on the
local state of the agent who receives the action. If we assume inductively
that the local state space of each agent only contains information that the
agent is allowed to own, then any agent that receives any information is
allowed to get it, since the sender is allowed to own this information and by
the construction of the transition function, the receiver is allowed to receive
it.
As usual the observations of each agent only depend on its local state
space and hence all possible forbidden information flows are ruled out in
this system. This informal argumentation is stated more precisely in the
next lemma, which shows that this construction builds ta-secure systems.
3.5.22 Lemma. In every intransitively securely constructed system, it holds for
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every i ∈ D and for every α, β ∈ A∗ with tai(α) = tai(β) that pii(sI · α) =
pii(sI · β).
Proof. Let i ∈ D. We prove this lemma by an induction on the combined
length of α and β. Since the base case is clear, we proceed with the inductive
step. Let α, β ∈ A∗ with tai(α) = tai(β) and assume that for all traces with
smaller combined length, the claim holds. Since at least one of α and β is
not equal to e, we can assume that α = α′a for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗.
Case 1: dom(a) 6 i.
In this case, we have pii(sI · αa) = pii(sI · α), and since tai(β) = tai(αa) =
tai(α), we have, by applying the induction hypothesis, that pii(sI · α) =
pii(sI · β).
Case 2: dom(a) i.
In this case, we can assume that β = β′b with dom(b) i, since otherwise
we could proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped. From
tai(β′b) = tai(α′a), it follows a = b, tai(α′) = tai(β′), and tadom(a)(α′) =
tadom(a)(β
′). By applying the induction hypothesis, we have pii(sI · α′) =
pii(sI · β′) and pidom(a)(sI · α′) = pidom(a)(sI · β′). Hence, we have
pii(sI · α′a) = (pidom(a)(sI · α′),pii(sI · α′)) ·i a
= (pidom(a)(s
I · β′),piu(sI · β′)) ·i b
= pii(sI · β′b) .
The following corollary follows immediately from the previous result,
since the observations of each agent depend only on its local states.
3.5.23 Corollary. Every intransitively securely constructed system is ta-secure
w.r.t. the policy from which it is constructed.
The completeness of intransitively securely constructed systems is es-
tablished by the next lemma. The constructed system takes the ta values of
each agent as the states of its local state space.
3.5.24 Lemma. For every ta-secure system, there exists an observation equivalent
system which is intransitively securely constructed from the same policy.
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Proof. As mentioned above, we take the ta values as the local states. For a
given system M with agents D = {0, . . . , n− 1} and policy construct a
system M′ where
. the local state space of each agent i is Si = {tai(α) | α ∈ A∗},
. the local initial state for every agent i is sIi = e,
. the local transition functions are for every i, j ∈ D, every a ∈ A, and every
si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj defined by (sj, si) ·i a = (sj, si, a),
. for any agent i, the observation function is defined by obs′i(s) = obsi(sI ·
α) for some α ∈ A∗ with s = tai(α). Since the system M is ta-secure,
every α with tai(α) = s leads to the same observation for i, and hence,
the observation function is well-defined.
From the construction of the state space, we have for every i ∈ D and every
α, β ∈ A∗ with tai(α) = tai(β) that obs′i(s˜I · α) = obs′i(s˜I · β), where s˜I is the
initial state of the constructed system. Since the ta values are the states of the
constructed system, and since in the original system the observations only
depend on the ta values, the constructed system is observation equivalent
to the system from which it is constructed.
Summarizing the previous two results give:
3.5.25 Theorem. A system is ta-secure iff there exists an observation-equivalent,
intransitively securely constructed system.
This result shows again that ta-security captures the intuition of intran-
sitive noninterference much better than i-security. A similar pattern of
securely constructed systems for i-security is not possible in this way, except
that there is a global clock or at least a global order of the actions, which is
transmitted along with the actions.
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3.6 Noninterference with Transmission of Obser-
vations
The definitions of i-security and ta-security allow the transmission of previ-
ously performed actions according to some restriction given by the policy.
However, this transmitted information is the maximal allowed information
that an agent may have and this is generally more information then the
agent actually has. This was one of the criticisms of Roscoe and Gold-
smith [RG99] about previous security definitions. They proposed that
agents are only allowed to transmit information that they actually have and
not information that they are allowed to have. Van der Meyden [vdM07]
formalized their ideas and adapted them to state-based systems that we use
here. He proposed two trace-based operators and corresponding security
definitions: to-security and ito-security. The abbreviation to stands for
transmission of observation and ito for immediate transmission of observation.
Both operators allow the transmission of previously made observations
instead of the collected actions. The difference between these definitions is
how fast information is transmitted.
3.6.1 to-security
The first of these two security definitions is to-security. This notion is
defined by the to operator which builds a tree which contains the views of
those agents that are allowed to interfere with the observing agent.
3.6.1 Definition (to operator). For every agent u ∈ D, every action a ∈ A,
and every α ∈ A∗ define
tou(e) = obsu(sI)
tou(αa) =
{
(tou(α), viewdom(a)(α), a) if dom(a) u
tou(α) otherwise .
Intuitively, with this operator, the maximal information that is allowed
to be transmitted is the observed information of those agents that perform
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an action and are allowed to interfere with the observing agent u. The
corresponding security definition is:
3.6.2 Definition (to-security). A system is to-secure iff for every u ∈ D,
α, β ∈ A∗ with tou(α) = tou(β), we have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
The next example illustrates the differences between to-security and
ta-security.
obsD : 0
obsL : 0
obsD : 0
obsL : 0
obsD : 0
obsL : 1
H
D
L
h d
Figure 3.11. A ta-secure, but not to-secure system
3.6.3 Example. For analyzing to-security, we do not only need the observa-
tions of the observing agent, we also need the observations of the down-
grading agent. Hence, in the system in Figure 3.11, also the observations of
agent D are specified. Intuitively, in this system, L observes whether H has
performed an action h because agent D performs an action afterwards. With
respect to ta-security, the policy allows it and hence, this system is ta-secure.
However, agent D has constant observations and does not observe whether
H has performed any action. According to to-security, L is not allowed to
observe any information about H, since D does not observe anything about
H and hence, cannot transmit any information about H to L. More formally,
the traces hd and d have the same to value:
toL(hd) = (toL(h), viewD(h), d)
= (0, 0, d)
= toL(d) .
Since the to values of the traces hd and d are the same, but L’s observations
after these two traces are different, the system is not to-secure.
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obsD : 0
obsL : 0
obsD : 1
obsL : 0
obsD : 1
obsL : 1
H
D
L
h d
Figure 3.12. A to-secure system
In contrast, if D actually observes whether H has performed an action
in the initial state, then the system would be to-secure. In the system
in Figure 3.12, the action h, performed in the initial state, changes D’s
observations and hence, this information can be downgraded by D. Now,
the to values of the traces hd and d are different:
toL(hd) = (toL(h), viewD(h), d)
= (0, 0 h 1, d) ,
but
toL(d) = (0, 0, d) .
This modified system, shown in Figure 3.12, is to-secure.
It is possible to express to-security without the tree-like structure of the
to operator. Moreover, this tree structure may contain some redundancies,
since if an agent v that is allowed to interfere with the agent u performs
several actions, the corresponding views of v in u’s to value are all prefixes of
the last one. Therefore, it is sufficient to have the value of the view function
of the largest prefix which ends with an action of the corresponding agent.
In this sense, let tviewu(α) be the largest prefix of viewu(α) that ends in an
action a with dom(a) = u. With this definition of tview, it is sufficient to
consider the tpurgeu value and the tviewv values of all agents v interfering
with u but other than u itself.
3.6.4 Lemma ([vdM07]). A system is to-secure iff for every u ∈ D, every α, β ∈
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D with tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and tviewv(α) = tviewv(β) for all v 6= u
with v u, we have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
3.6.2 ito-security
Similar to the idea of to-security is the idea of ito-security. This notion of se-
curity was also introduced by van der Meyden [vdM07] in order to compare
his other notions of security with those of Roscoe and Goldsmith [RG99].
Compared to the to operator, the ito operator transmits information com-
ing from other agents faster. If an agent, other than the observing agent,
performs an actions, then the ito operator allows the receiver to obtain
the corresponding view including the observation stemming from the last
action in the trace. This last observation was not transmitted by the to
operator. This last observation is not transmitted if the last action is one
of the observing agent, since otherwise the following security definition
would not make any sense—every system would be secure.
3.6.5 Definition (ito operator). For every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ define
itou(e) = obsu(sI)
itou(αa) =

itou(α) if dom(a) 6 u
(itou(α), viewdom(a)(α), a) if dom(a) = u
(itou(α), viewdom(a)(αa), a) otherwise .
The security definition based on the ito operator follows the pattern of
the previous definitions.
3.6.6 Definition (ito-security). A system is ito-secure iff for every u ∈ D and
every α, β ∈ A∗ with itou(α) = itou(β), we have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
The next example shows the differences between to-security and ito-
security.
3.6.7 Example. The system in Figure 3.13 is only a slight modification of the
previous example. Essentially with the same arguments as for the system
in Figure 3.11, this system is not to-secure. However, the ito values differ
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obsD : 0
obsL : 0
obsD : 0
obsL : 0
obsD : 1
obsL : 1
H
D
L
h d
Figure 3.13. An ito-secure, but not to-secure system
for the traces hd and d:
itoL(hd) = (itoL(h), viewD(hd), d)
= (0, 0 d 1, d) ,
but
itoL(d) = (itoL(e), viewD(d), d)
= (0, 0 d 0, d) .
Since these values are different, the system is ito-secure.
Similar to the characterization of to-security, we give a characterization
of ito-security that does not need the tree-like structure of the ito operator.
Instead, it is based on tpurge and a modification of the view function. This
modification of the view function, called ftviewu, gives the longest prefix of
the viewu value that ends after the first observation of u right after u’s last
action.
First, define a function lpreu : A
∗ → A∗, which gives the largest prefix
of a string that ends in an action a with dom(a) = u. That is
lpreu(e) = e
lpreu(αa) =
{
αa if dom(a) = u
lpreu(α) otherwise .
80
3.6. Noninterference with Transmission of Observations
Now, ftviewu is defined for all u ∈ D and all α ∈ A∗ by
ftviewu(α) = viewu(lpreu(α)) .
The value of ftviewu may contain more information than the value of
tviewu, since tviewu ends after the last action of u and ftviewu also contains
u’s observation obtained from its last action.
Similar to Lemma 3.6.4, we show that ito-security can be characterized
by a flatter representation.
3.6.8 Lemma. A system is ito-secure iff for every u ∈ D, every α, β ∈ A with
tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β) for every v 6= u with
v u, we have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
Proof. From left to right. Suppose that the system is ito-secure. Let u be in D
and define V = {v ∈ D | v u and v 6= u}. We will prove by an induction
on the combined length of α and β that if tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and if
for every v ∈ V it holds ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β), then itou(α) = itou(β).
As induction hypothesis, we assume that this claim holds for all traces of
smaller combined length. Since the claim clearly holds for the base case, we
proceed with the inductive step. Let α = α′a for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u.
Then we have
tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(β) .
Since dom(a) /∈ V, we have for every v ∈ V:
ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β) .
By applying the induction hypothesis, we get itou(α′) = itou(β) and from
the definition of the ito operator it follows itou(α′a) = itou(α′).
Case 2: dom(a) = u.
We can assume that β = β′b for some β ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A with dom(b) u,
since otherwise we can proceed with Case 1. From
tpurgeu(α
′) a = tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(β
′b) = tpurgeu(β
′) b
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it follows a = b and tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(β′). Since dom(a) /∈ V, we
have for every v ∈ V
ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β′b) = ftviewv(β′) .
By induction hypothesis, we have itou(α′) = itou(β′) and by ito-security
and Lemma 2.6.1, we have viewu(α′) = viewu(β′). Hence,
itou(α′a) = (itou(α′), viewu(α′), a)
= (itou(β′), viewu(β′), b)
= itou(β′b) .
Case 3: dom(a) u and dom(a) 6= u.
With the same argument as in the previous case, we have that β = β′b. Then
for the tpurge values, we have
tpurgeu(α
′) a = tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(β
′b) = tpurgeu(β
′) b .
This immediately gives a = b and tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(β′). For every
v ∈ V with v 6= dom(a), we have
ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β′b) = ftviewv(β′) ,
and for the agent dom(a), the ftview value of these two traces are
viewdom(a)(α
′) a obsdom(a)(sI · α′a) = viewdom(a)(α′a)
= ftviewdom(a)(α
′a)
= ftviewdom(a)(β
′a)
= viewdom(a)(β
′a)
= viewdom(a)(β
′) b obsdom(a)(sI · β′a) .
This shows both viewdom(a)(α
′) = viewdom(a)(β′) and viewdom(a)(α′a) =
viewdom(a)(β
′b). By induction hypothesis, we have itou(α′) = itou(β′) and
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hence,
itou(α′a) = (itou(α′), viewdom(a)(α′a), a)
= (itou(β′), viewdom(a)(β′b), b)
= itou(β′b) .
For the other direction of the proof, as induction hypothesis, we assume
that if itou(α) = itou(β), then tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(β) and for every v ∈ V
it holds ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β).
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u.
We have
itou(β) = itou(α′a) = itou(α′) ,
and hence by induction hypothesis
tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(α
′) = tpurgeu(β) .
Since dom(a) /∈ V, we have for every v ∈ V:
ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(β) .
Case 2: dom(a) u.
With the same argument as in the other direction of the proof, we can
suppose β = β′b with dom(b) u. From itou(α′a) = itou(β′b) it follows
a = b and itou(α′) = itou(β′). It also follows
viewdom(a)(α
′) = viewdom(a)(β′) if dom(a) = u ,
and
viewdom(a)(α
′a) = viewdom(a)(β′a) if dom(a) u and dom(a) 6= u .
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Hence, by applying the induction hypothesis, we have
tpurgeu(α
′a) = tpurgeu(α
′) a = tpurgeu(β
′) b = tpurgeu(β
′b) .
For every v ∈ V with v 6= dom(a), we have
ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(β′) = ftviewv(β′b) ,
and for the agent dom(a), we have
ftviewdom(a)(α
′a) = viewdom(a)(α′a)
= viewdom(a)(β
′b)
= ftviewdom(a)(β
′b) .
3.7 Relations between the Definitions for Static
Noninterference
Van der Meyden has already worked out the relations between these nonin-
terference definitions in [vdM07]. We will just recall them for providing an
outline. All the security definitions of this chapter are in a linear order and
all of these implications are strict. However, we do not recall the separating
examples here.
t-security⇒ to-security⇒ ito-security⇒ ta-security⇒ i-security .
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Dynamic Noninterference
In this section, we introduce and discuss the notion of dynamic noninter-
ference. This includes an extension of transitive noninterference and two
different extensions of intransitive noninterference to systems with dynamic
policies.
After an introduction to the general idea of dynamic noninterference
in Section 4.1, we introduce our first dynamic noninterference definition
dt-security, an adaption of t-security to the dynamic setting, in Section 4.2.
Before presenting the idea of dynamic intransitive noninterference in Sec-
tion 4.4, we introduce the intermediate notion of dot-secure in Section 4.3.
Our security definitions for intransitive noninterference are di-security, a
generalization of i-security, in Section 4.5, and dta-security, an adaption of
ta-security, in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, we compare all these security defi-
nitions with each other and in Section 4.8, we explain how our definitions
relate to Leslie’s definition [Les06] of dynamic intransitive noninterference.
Several results on dt-security and di-security are published in [ESW13]
and those on dot-security can be found in [ESW12].
4.1 Introduction to Dynamic Noninterference
Dynamic noninterference applies to systems with dynamic polices: systems
where the policy may change during the run of the system. This is a natural
generalization of the noninterference definitions of the previous chapter.
The requirement for dynamic policies appears in many system and is typical
in discretionary access control systems. In security specifications where
rights are passed by the agents, or where the rights of an agent changes
during a run, dynamic policies are necessary. An example of the latter is a
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program that has more rights if the system is connected to a secure network,
but limited rights if it is connected to an unprotected network.
However, changes of policy may lead to new covert channels in the
case that policy changes can be used to communicate information in an
unintended way. In our formalization, we generally do not restrict how the
policy can be changed in advance or who may perform the changes. Instead,
as a result, we find out which changes contradict other security requirements
and are forbidden in order to avoid unauthorized information leakage.
These new kinds of covert channels cannot be treated in isolation, since
they may appear in combination with possible covert channels analyzed in
the previous chapter.
As we have already seen in the analysis of noninterference with static
policies, high1 agents are generally not allowed to visibly change the sys-
tem’s state.
To formalize dynamic policies, we just define a (local) policy for every
state of the system. Then a family of local policies (s)s∈S in combination
with the dynamics of the system reflects the dynamic changes of the policy.
For any state s, we write us v if there is an edge from u to v in the policy
which applies to the state s. We say that an action a changes the policy
if the policy in the state s · a is different from the policy in the state s. In
particular, if we have u s v and u 6s·a v, then we say that the action a
has removed the edge from u to v. The intuition of a local policy in a state s
is that it specifies whose observations are allowed to be influenced by an
action, performed in the state s.
However, the question is what happens if a high action changes the part
of the policy that relates to low, given that high is not allowed to interfere
with low. This can lead to security problems if the policy changes have
visible effects to low. Hence, a general question is which policy should be
applied. When an action h has been performed in a state s where H is not
allowed to have any influence on any other agent, should we apply the
policy of state s or the one of state s · h? The simplest answer is always
to take the current state of the system. However, if the policy differs in
1With “high”, we mean an agent that is not allowed to interfere with some fixed observing
agent, or in the intransitive setting, an agent whose actions are not downgraded to the
observing agent.
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the state s and s · h and we take the policy of the state s · h, then some
information about performing the action h is encoded in the policy, which
might be revealed later on.
However, in systems with a dynamic policy, the question of what is a
high action is more subtle than in the static case, since if in some states,
there is an edge from high to low and in some other state, there is no edge,
then in general one cannot say that a particular agent is high.
This discussion should be more clear with the next example.
s0
A H
L
obsL : 0
s1
A H
L
obsL : 1
s2
A H
L
obsL : 0
s3
A H
L
obsL : 0
h
a
h
Figure 4.1. An insecure system with a dynamic policy
4.1.1 Example. In systems with a dynamic policy, the local policy that applies
to a particular state is depicted within the state.
We consider the system in Figure 4.1. For example, the local policy in
state s0 allows information flow from H to L. If H performs an action h in
the state s0, L is possibly allowed to observe it. We will provide a precise
security definition and semantics later. However, we want to argue here, on
an intuitive level why this system should be rejected as insecure.
The local policy in state s0 might suggest that the change of L’s observa-
tion is allowed, since it is done by H’s action and H is allowed to interfere
with L. In the case where H is not allowed to interfere with L, namely in
state s2, H’s action has no visible effect to L.
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However, the agent A is never allowed to interfere with any of the
agents. Therefore, A’s actions should not change the observations of any
other agent. But in this system, this is not the case, since if A performs
an action in the initial state, afterwards, H cannot change L’s observations,
but if L observes the value 1, it knows that A has not performed an action
before H’s first action. In this case, L gains information about A’s actions,
which is forbidden by every local policy.
Another argument why we should treat this system as insecure is the
following: For any reasonable security definition, it should hold that if a
system is insecure, then it remains insecure with respect to a more restrictive
policy. Conversely, we consider this system with a less restrictive policy
where in all states H is allowed to interfere with L, but A is still not allowed
to interfere with any other agent. Since we now have the same policy in all
states, we can apply the noninterference definitions of the previous chapter.
However, according to any noninterference definition of the last chapter, the
system is insecure. Back in the original system, by removing the previously
added edges, the system should now remain insecure by the assumption of
the monotony as mentioned before.
According to both arguments, any reasonable noninterference definition
for systems with dynamic policies should treat this system as insecure.
An intransitive interpretation of information flow in dynamic policies
leads to new kinds of downgrading effects. Due to the fact that information
flow from one agent is allowed in some states and may be not allowed
in some other states, actions performed in states where the information
flow is not allowed may be downgraded later in states where the infor-
mation flow is allowed. Hence downgrading information has a temporal
component additionally to the property of downgrading via agents as in
the previous chapter. Similarly to the previous chapter, we will present
different definitions for noninterference depending on if downgrading is a
desired property. For dynamic intransitive noninterference, we will provide
different incomparable definitions which reflect that different reasonable
generalizations of intransitive noninterference to a dynamic setting are
possible.
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4.2 dt-security
In this section, we introduce the first of our noninterference definitions
for systems with a dynamic policy. We call this notion dynamic transitive
noninterference, since it is a direct adaption of the notion of transitive
noninterference to systems with a dynamic policy. The idea of this very
restrictive security definition is that if the local policy in the state s forbids
the interference of an agent dom(a) with the agent u, then the agent u is
neither allowed to observe nor to deduce that this action has been performed
when the system was in the state s.
This can be directly formalized as:
4.2.1 Definition (dt-security). A system is dt-secure iff for all u ∈ D, s ∈ S,
a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗, the following implication holds:
If dom(a) 6s u, then obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α) .
4.2.2 Example. We continue with the system in Figure 4.1 of Example 4.1.1.
We have dom(a) 6s0 L, but obsL(s0 · ah) 6= obsL(s0 · h) and hence, the
system is not dt-secure.
Like in the case of a static policy, it is possible to formulate dt-security
in terms of a purge-like operator. Obviously, since the policy is state-
dependent, a purge operator has to keep track of the state from where
the policy should be taken. This state can differ from the state where the
system is in the actual run. When an action is purged, this action must not
influence the observing agent. This means that the run of the system should
be indistinguishable to the run where this action has not been performed. In
this case, no transition would be performed and the system would remain
in the same state. This is adopted by the following purge operator, by not
performing the transition if the corresponding action is purged.
4.2.3 Definition (dtpurge operator). For every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ define
dtpurge(e, u, s) = e
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dtpurge(aα, u, s) =
{
a dtpurge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a)s u
dtpurge(α, u, s) otherwise .
Next, we summarize some properties of the dtpurge operator to show
that it behaves similarly to the tpurge operator.
4.2.4 Lemma. Let u ∈ D, α, β ∈ A∗, and s ∈ S. Then we have
1. dtpurge(dtpurge(α, u, s), u, s) = dtpurge(α, u, s), and
2. dtpurge(αβ, u, s) = dtpurge(α, u, s) dtpurge(β, u, s · dtpurge(α, u, s)).
Proof. 1. We show this claim by an induction on the length of α. Since it
holds trivially for the base case α = e, we proceed with the inductive
step. Consider aα and assume that the claim holds for α. First, suppose
dom(a) 6s u. Then we have
dtpurge(dtpurge(aα, u, s), u, s) = dtpurge(dtpurge(α, u, s), u, s)
= dtpurge(α, u, s) .
Second, suppose dom(a)s u. In this case, we have
dtpurge(dtpurge(aα, u, s), u, s) = dtpurge(a dtpurge(α, u, s · α), u, s)
= a dtpurge(dtpurge(α, u, s · α), u, s · a)
= a dtpurge(α, u, s · a)
= dtpurge(aα, u, s · a) .
2. We show this claim by an induction on the length of α, too. Since the
base case clearly holds for α = β = e, we proceed with the inductive
step. Again, consider a trace aα and assume that the claim holds for α.
In the case of dom(a) 6s u, we obtain
dtpurge(aαβ, u, s)
= dtpurge(αβ, u, s)
= dtpurge(α, u, s) dtpurge(β, u, s · dtpurge(α, u, s))
= dtpurge(aα, u, s) dtpurge(β, u, s · dtpurge(aα, u, s)) .
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In the case of dom(a)s u, we have
dtpurge(aαβ, u, s)
= a dtpurge(αβ, u, s · a)
= a dtpurge(α, u, s · a) dtpurge(β, u, s · a dtpurge(α, u, s · a))
= dtpurge(aα, u, s) dtpurge(β, u, s · dtpurge(aα, u, s)) .
The first property shows that the dtpurge operator is idempotent: If it
is applied to an already purged trace, it has no effect. The second property
states that traces can be split into two parts and each trace can be purged
on its own if the purging of the second part starts in the state where the
purged value of the first part ends.
Like in the static case, if two traces have the same purge value, it is
required that they lead to the same observation. However, in the dynamic
case, it is required to start purging from every possible state.
4.2.5 Theorem. A system is dt-secure iff for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α, β ∈ A∗
with dtpurge(α, u, s) = dtpurge(β, u, s), we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β).
Proof. First, we prove this theorem from left to right by contraposition.
Hence, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α, β ∈ A∗ with
dtpurge(α, u, s) = dtpurge(β, u, s) ,
and
obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · β) .
Additionally, assume that the combined length of α and β is minimal for
all possible choices of u and s with this property. At least one of α and β is
not the empty trace, hence, w.l.o.g., we can assume that α 6= e. Therefore,
α = aα′ for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗.
Case 1: dom(a) 6s u.
In this case, we have dtpurge(aα′, u, s) = dtpurge(α′, u, s). If obsu(s · aα′) =
obsu(s · α′), then we could take α′ instead of α, which contradicts the
assumption about the minimality. Hence, we have dom(a) 6s u and
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obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α), which shows that the system is not dt-secure.
Case 2: dom(a)s u.
In this case, we have dtpurge(aα′, u, s) = a dtpurge(α′, u, s · a) and we can
assume that β = bβ′ for some b ∈ A, β ∈ A∗ with dom(b) s u, since
otherwise, we would proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped.
But in this case, we have
dtpurge(α′, u, s · b) = dtpurge(β′, u, s · b) ,
and still
obsu(s · aα′) 6= obsu(s · bβ′) .
Again, this contradicts the minimality of the combined length of α and β.
Therefore, this case is not possible.
For the other direction of the proof, suppose that the system is not dt-
secure. Therefore, there are u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6s u
and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Hence, we have
dtpurge(aα, u, s) = dtpurge(α, u, s) ,
and
obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α) .
As we saw in the previous theorem, for t-security, it is necessary to start
purging from every single state. That it is not sufficient to start in the initial
state only is shown with the next example.
4.2.6 Example. The system in Figure 4.2 is a not dt-secure system, since
dom(h) 6s1 L, but obsL(s1) = 0 6= 1 = obsL(s1 · h) = obsL(s2). However,
if we only required to start purging from the initial state, then we would
have for the values of the tpurge function applied to the traces ah and h:
dtpurge(ah, L, s0) = h = dtpurge(h, L, s0) ,
but also obsL(s0 · ah) = 1 = obsL(s0 · h). Also the traces a and e have the
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s0
A H
L
obsL : 0
s1
A H
L
obsL : 0
s2
A H
L
obsL : 1
s3
A H
L
obsL : 1
a
h
h
Figure 4.2. A not dt-secure system, but purging form the initial state only is not
sufficient
same dtpurge value and lead to the same observations. Hence the system
would be secure. We see that purging only from the initial state leads to a
strictly weaker security definition, which is too weak in our understanding.
4.2.1 Unwinding for dt-security
Similar to the static case, state-based unwinding relations can be defined for
dt-security. The only difference to the state-based transitive unwinding of
Definition 3.2.9 for systems with a static policy is that the (LRsdt) condition
depends on the state where it is applied.
4.2.7 Definition (state-based dynamic transitive unwinding). A state-based
dynamic transitive unwinding relation for u ∈ D is an equivalence relation
∼sdtu ⊆ S× S such that for every a ∈ A and every s, t ∈ S, the following
conditions are satisfied:
(LRsdt): If dom(a) 6s u, then s ∼sdtu s · a.
(SCsdt): If s ∼sdtu t, then s · a ∼sdtu t · a.
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The soundness and completeness of these unwinding relations for dt-
security is shown in the next theorem.
4.2.8 Theorem. A system is dt-secure iff for every u ∈ D, there exists a state-
based dynamic transitive unwinding relation ∼sdtu that is observation consistent
for u.
Proof. For the proof of the implication from left to right, suppose that the
system is dt-secure. Let u ∈ D. Define a binary relation on the set of states
for every s, t ∈ S by
s ∼sdtu t iff for all α ∈ A∗ it holds: obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
Clearly, the relation ∼sdtu is an equivalence relation. By taking α = e, this
relation is observation consistent for u.
For showing (LRsdt), let s ∈ S and a ∈ A with dom(a) 6s u. Since the
system is dt-secure, we have for every α ∈ A∗: obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
Hence, we have s ∼sdtu s · a.
For showing (SCsdt), let s, t ∈ S with s ∼sdtu t and let a ∈ A. Since we
have for every α ∈ A∗: obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α), this also holds for the states
s · a and t · a.
For the other direction of the proof, let u ∈ D and suppose that there
is a state-based dynamic transitive unwinding relation that is observation
consistent for u. Let ∼sdtu be such a smallest unwinding relation. By an
induction on the combined length of α and β, we will show that for every
s ∈ S the implication
if dtpurge(α, u, s) = dtpurge(β, u, s), then s · α ∼sdtu s · β
holds.
The base case α = β = e is obvious.
For the inductive step, let α = aα′ for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗ and
suppose that dtpurge(α, u, s) = dtpurge(β, u, s) holds.
Case 1: dom(a) 6s u.
In this case, we have
dtpurge(β, u, s) = dtpurge(aα′, u, s) = dtpurge(α′, u, s) .
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By applying the induction hypotheses, we have s · α′ ∼sdtu s · β. From the
property (LRsdt) it follows that s ∼sdtu s · a and by applying (SCsdt), we
obtain s · α′ ∼sdtu s · aα′. By symmetry and transitivity of ∼sdtu , we have
s · aα′ ∼sdtu s · β.
Case 2: dom(a) 6s u.
Let β = bβ′ for some b ∈ A and β ∈ A∗. If dom(b) 6s u, we may apply
Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped. Hence, assume that dom(b)u u
holds and therefore, dtpurge(α′, u, s · a) = dtpurge(β′, u, s · a) and a = b.
Applying the induction hypothesis to the traces α′ and β′ and the state s · a,
we obtain s · aα′ ∼sdtu s · bβ′.
Now, the desired claim follows from the fact that ∼sdtu is observation
consistent for u.
As we will see in Chapter 5, the definition of the unwinding relations
combined with this theorem provides both a useful proof technique and an
efficient verification procedure.
For a better comparison to the other noninterference definitions, we pro-
vide a definition of a trace-based unwinding for dt-security. The unwinding
conditions of the trace-based unwinding for dynamic transitive noninter-
ference are similar to those of the trace-based unwinding for t-security in
Definition 3.2.5.
4.2.9 Definition (trace-based dynamic transitive unwinding). A trace-based
dynamic transitive unwinding relation for u ∈ D is an equivalence relation
∼tdtu ⊆ A∗ × A∗ such that for every a ∈ A and every α, β ∈ A∗, the
following conditions are satisfied:
(LRtdt): If dom(a) 6sI ·α u, then α ∼tdtu α · a.
(SCtdt): If α ∼tdtu β, then αa ∼tdtu βa.
The soundness and completeness of this trace-based unwinding is estab-
lished by:
4.2.10 Theorem. A system is dt-secure iff for every u ∈ D there exists a trace-
based transitive unwinding relation ∼tdtu that is observation consistent for u.
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Proof. From left to right. Let u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and a ∈ A such that dom(a) 6s u.
Let α ∈ A∗. Then there is some trace β ∈ A∗ with s = sI · β, and by (LRtdt),
we have β ∼tdtu βa, and by (SCtdt), we have βα ∼tdtu βaα. By observation
consistency for u, we have obsu(sI · βα) = obsu(sI · βaα).
From right to left by contraposition. Suppose that the system is not dt-
secure. Then there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6s u
and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). For any equivalence relation satisfying
(LRtdt) and (SCtdt), it holds βα ∼tdtu βaα for every β ∈ A∗ with s = sI · β.
Then we have that ∼tdtu is not observation consistent for u.
4.2.2 dt-useless Edges and dt-uniformity
As we have seen, some edges in a local policy cannot be used, since they
contradict some others edges. In these cases, such contradicting edges can
be removed from the local policies without affecting security. We call these
edges dt-useless.
Since some edges in a local policy cannot be used, an edge v s u
should be interpreted as follows: The information flow from v to u is not
explicitly forbidden in the state s. However, there might be some reasons
why such an information flow is forbidden anyway. Conversely, if v 6s u
appears in the local policy of state s, the information flow from v to u is
explicitly forbidden in this state.
Intuitively, the incoming edges of an agent are only allowed to be
changed by agents that are allowed to interfere with the agent. Additionally,
in indistinguishable states, the policy changes have to be the same.
4.2.11 Example. Again, we continue with the system in Figure 4.1. One can
say that the action a performed in the initial state removes the edge from
H to L. However, since A is not allowed to interfere with L, this change is
“not allowed” in the sense that only in one of the two for L indistinguishable
states interference from H to L is allowed, and in the other it is forbidden.
This is some kind of contradiction between these two local policies, and we
always obey the more restrictive policy. Hence, the edge from H to L in the
initial state is useless and can safely be removed without affecting security.
However, if the policy changes are only performed by agents that are
allowed to interfere, the system is secure and no useless edges exist.
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s0
A B
L
obsL : 0
s1
A B
L
obsL : 1
s2
A B
L
obsL : 2
b
a a b
Figure 4.3. A dt-secure system without useless edges
4.2.12 Example. In the system in Figure 4.3, the incoming edges of L are
only changed by actions of those agents that are allowed to interfere. The
system is dt-secure and in this system there are no useless edges.
Before formalizing useless edges, we define an equivalence relation on
the states of the system.
4.2.13 Definition (dt-similarity). States s and t are dt-similar for an agent
u ∈ D, denoted by s ≈dtu t, if there exist s˜ ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ such that
dom(a) 6s˜ u, s = s˜ · aα, and t = s˜ · α.
Clearly, two states are dt-similar for an agent u if u is required to have the
same observations in these two states according to the dt-security definition.
One can also observe that ≈dtu is the smallest state-based dynamic transitive
unwinding relation for agent u. However, we define this relation explicitly
to have a clearer analogy to dynamic intransitive noninterference later in
this chapter. We use this equivalence relation to define useless edges. An
edge of a local policy is said to be dt-useless if in an equivalent state, this
edge does not exist.
4.2.14 Definition (dt-useless edge). An edge vs u is dt-useless if there is
a state t with s ≈dtu t and v 6t u.
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The next theorem shows that dt-useless edges are indeed useless in the
sense that their removal does not affect security.
4.2.15 Theorem. Let (s)s∈S be the dynamic policy of some given system. Define
the dynamic policy (′s)s∈S for every s ∈ S by
′s =s \ {vs u | vs u is dt-useless} .
Then the system is dt-secure w.r.t. (s)s∈S iff it is dt-secure w.r.t. (′s)s∈S.
Proof. For the proof from left to right, assume that the system is dt-secure
w.r.t. (s)s∈S. Then there is an observation consistent state-based dynamic
transitive unwinding relation for u. Let ∼sdtu be such a smallest unwinding
relation. Let ∼sdtu ′ be the smallest state-based dynamic transitive unwinding
for u w.r.t. the policy (′s)s∈S. We will show that ∼sdtu ′ ⊆ ∼sdtu . Let s, t ∈ S
with s∼sdtu ′t and t = s · a for some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6′s u. Then there
is some s′ ∈ S with s′ ∼sdtu s and dom(a) 6s′ u. From s′ ∼sdtu s · a and
s′ · a ∼sdtu s · a it follows s ∼sdtu t.
The other direction of the equivalence follows from the fact that the
dynamic policy (′s)s∈S is at least as restrictive as the dynamic policy
(s)s∈S.
The dynamic policy (′s)s∈S, which results from removing all dt-useless
edges, has the property that all edges in the local policies represent allowed
information flows. That means that no edge in a local policy contradicts
any other edge of another local policy. Hence, the information flow in a
state is allowed if and only if the local policy in that state allows it.
Since on all dt-similar states, every agent has the same incoming edges
in the local policies, the agent knows (better say, is allowed to know) its
incoming edges. We call such dynamic policies dt-uniform. Recall that us
denotes the set of all agents v with vs u.
4.2.16 Definition (dt-uniformity). A dynamic policy (s)s∈S is dt-uniform
iff for every u ∈ D and every s, t ∈ S with s ≈dtu t, we have us = ut .
Note that a dynamic policy is dt-uniform if and only if it does not
contain any dt-useless edges.
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In systems with a dt-uniform dynamic policy, the dtpurge operator
behaves very naturally in the combination with a state-based dynamic
transitive unwinding.
4.2.17 Lemma. Consider a system with a dt-uniform dynamic policy. Let u ∈ D
and let ∼sdtu be the smallest state-based dynamic transitive unwinding relation.
Then we have for every s, t ∈ S with s ∼sdtu t and every α ∈ A∗:
s · α ∼sdtu t · dtpurge(α, u, t) and dtpurge(α, u, s) = dtpurge(α, u, t) .
Proof. We prove this claim by an induction on the length of α. It clearly
holds for the base case with α = e. Consider a trace aα and assume that the
claim holds for α and all possible states. First, assume that dom(a) 6s u.
Since the dynamic policy is dt-uniform, we have dom(a) 6t u. In this case
we have
dtpurge(aα, u, s) = dtpurge(α, u, s)
= dtpurge(α, u, t)
= dtpurge(aα, u, t) ,
and
s · aα ∼sdtu s · α
∼sdtu t · dtpurge(α, u, t)
∼sdtu t · dtpurge(aα, u, t) .
Second, assume that dom(a)s u. Due to a dt-uniform dynamic policy,
we have dom(a)t u. This gives
dtpurge(aα, u, s) = a dtpurge(α, u, s · a)
= a dtpurge(α, u, t · a)
= dtpurge(aα, u, t) ,
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and
s · aα ∼sdtu t · aα
∼sdtu t · a dtpurge(α, u, t · a)
∼sdtu t · dtpurge(aα, u, t) .
Since in dt-uniform policies no contradicting edges exist, for purging, it
is sufficient to start in the initial state instead of starting from every state.
4.2.18 Theorem. A system with a dt-uniform dynamic policy is dt-secure iff for
every u ∈ D and all α, β ∈ A∗ with dtpurge(α, u, sI) = dtpurge(β, u, sI), we
have obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
Proof. For the proof of the claim from left to right, assume that the system
is dt-secure and by Theorem 4.2.8, for every agent u, there is a state-based
dynamic transitive unwinding relation ∼sdtu that is observation consistent
for u. Let α, β ∈ A∗ with dtpurge(α, u, sI) = dtpurge(β, u, sI). Since the
system has a dt-uniform policy, by Lemma 4.2.17, we have sI · α ∼sdtu
sI · dtpurge(α, u, sI) and sI · β ∼sdtu sI · dtpurge(β, u, sI). From observation
consistency for u it follows
obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · dtpurge(α, u, sI))
= obsu(sI · dtpurge(β, u, sI))
= obsu(sI · β) .
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the right-hand side of
the claim holds. Let u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and a ∈ A with dom(a) 6s u. Then
there is some γ ∈ A∗ with s = sI · γ. Let α be in A∗. By Lemma 4.2.4, we
have γ ∼sdtu dtpurge(γ, u, sI) and hence, dom(a) 6sI ·dtpurge(γ,u,sI) u. With
the properties of dtpurge from Lemma 4.2.4, the dtpurge values are:
dtpurge(γaα, u, sI)
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= dtpurge(γ, u, sI)dtpurge(aα, u, sI · dtpurge(γ, u, sI))
= dtpurge(γ, u, sI)dtpurge(α, u, sI · dtpurge(γ, u, sI))
= dtpurge(γα, u, sI) .
Therefore, we have
obsu(s · aα) = obsu(sI · γaα) = obsu(sI · γα) = obsu(s · α) .
4.2.3 Dynamic Transitively Securely Constructed Systems
The idea of securely constructed systems is to enforce noninterference by
the use of local state spaces for each agent, which contain only allowed
information and by the use of local transition function, which can only
transmit this locally stored information. If we want to apply this technique
to systems with dynamic policies, we have to ensure that policy changes
do not introduce new covert channels. Therefore, the policy changes may
depend only on the allowed information of those agents whose policy edges
are affected by the change. More precisely, for each agent, the incoming
edges of the policy have to be uniquely determined by the agent’s local
states. We define this property formally by:
4.2.19 Definition (transitively local state dependent policy). For a system
with local state spaces S0, . . . , Sn−1 and a global state space S = S0 × · · · ×
Sn−1, a dynamic policy (s)s∈S is transitively local state dependent if for
every i, j ∈ D and every s, t ∈ S with pii(s) = pii(t) we have
js i iff jt i .
The definition of a dynamic transitively securely constructed system is
similar to the corresponding construction of systems with a static policy.
However, for the composition of these local transition functions to a global
transition function, we require that the dynamic policy is transitively local
state dependent. With this restriction on the dynamic policy, the global
transition function is defined as
(s0, . . . , sn−1) · a = (s′0, . . . , s′n−1)
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with s′i =
{
si ·i a if dom(a)(s0,...,sn−1) i
si otherwise .
The local transition functions are only applied if the corresponding edge in
the local policy exists. Since the existence of an edge depends only on the
local state of the receiving agent, the agent does not gain more information
about the existence of a policy edge than what is already encoded in its own
local state space. Therefore, such a system is dt-secure if the observations
of every single agent depend only on its local states.
From this construction, it is clear that a dynamic transitively securely
constructed system does not contain any illegal information flow and hence,
it is dt-secure. Thus, we can skip to prove the following result.
4.2.20 Lemma. Every dynamic transitively securely constructed system is dt-
secure w.r.t. the dynamic policy from which it is constructed.
The completeness result for this construction shows that the requirement
of transitively local state dependent policies does not restrict the expres-
siveness of securely constructed systems. Every dt-secure system can be
transformed into an observation equivalent dynamic transitively securely
constructed system. Since the state space of a system will be modified by
such a transformation, we need a definition of equivalence between the
policies of these two systems. Intuitively, in both systems, after running the
same traces the same policy should apply.
We define dynamic policies (s)s∈S and (′s)s∈S′ to be trace-equivalent
iff for the respective initial states sI ∈ S and s˜I ∈ S′ and every trace α ∈ A∗
it holdssI ·α =′s˜I ·α.
4.2.21 Lemma. For every dt-secure system, there exists an observation equivalent
system that is dynamic transitively securely constructed from a trace-equivalent
policy.
Proof. Let M be a dt-secure system with agents D = {0, . . . , n− 1}, states S,
and dynamic policy (s)s∈S. Due to Theorem 4.2.15, we can assume that
the dynamic policy (s)s∈S is dt-uniform. As states for the constructed
system, we take the purged traces for each agent, starting from the initial
state. The system M′ is constructed from M as follows:
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. the local state space of each agent i is Si = {dtpurge(α, i, sI) | α ∈ A∗}
and the global state space is S′ = S0 × · · · × Sn−1,
. the local initial states are sIi = e, the global initial state is s˜
I = (sI0, . . . , s
I
n−1),
. the local transition function is for every i ∈ D, every a ∈ A, and every
s ∈ S defined by s ·i a = sa,
. the edges of the dynamic policy (′s)s∈S′ are for every i, j ∈ D and every
α ∈ A∗ defined by j′dtpurge(α,i,sI) i iff jsI ·dtpurge(α,i,sI) i, (the dtpurge
values are computed in both expressions w.r.t. (s)s∈S,)
. for every agent i, the new observation function obs′i(s) is defined as
obsi(sI · pii(s)).
For every agent i and every trace α, we have
obsi(sI · α) = obsi(sI · dtpurge(α, i, sI)) = obs′i(s˜I · dtpurge(α, i, sI))
and therefore the constructed system is observation equivalent to the origi-
nal system.
Next, we have to show that the dynamic policy of the constructed
system is transitively local state dependent. Let i ∈ D and s, t ∈ S with
pii(s) = pij(t). Then, there are α, β ∈ A∗ with
dtpurge(α, i, sI) = pii(s) = pii(t) = dtpurge(β, i, sI) .
Therefore, the states s and t are dt-similar for i and by the definition of
dt-uniform, we have is = it . This implies directly that the policy of the
constructed system is transitively local state dependent. From a similar
argument, it follows that the systems have trace-equivalent policies, since
the states sI · α and sI · dtpurge(α, i, sI) are dt-similar for the agent i.
Summarizing both results yields:
4.2.22 Theorem. A system is dt-secure iff there exists an observation equiva-
lent system that dynamic transitively securely constructed system from a trace-
equivalent policy.
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4.3 Downgrading Over Time
As an intermediate definition, before defining dynamic intransitive nonin-
terference, we consider a dynamic noninterference definition that allows
agents to transmit information about earlier performed actions, but not
to transmit information about actions of other agents. These new allowed
effects can be interpreted as allowing agents to store information about
their own actions and to delay the release until the policy allows to do so.
We will call this noninterference definition dot-security.2
s0
H
L
obsL : 0
s1
H
L
obsL : 0
s2
H
L
obsL : 1
h h
Figure 4.4. A dot-secure, but not dt-secure system
4.3.1 Example. The system in Figure 4.4 depicts a dot-secure system. In-
tuitively, L does not see the first h action. After performing this action, L
does not know if the system is still in the initial state or if it has reached
the state s1. However, H has this information, since H is the only agent
that performs any action and hence, it is always aware of the current state
of the system. After the first action of H, the system is in a state where
the information flow from H to L is not longer prohibited. Therefore, L is
allowed to observe H’s next action and also receive information about H’s
first action, since the second one downgrades the information that there was
one of H’s actions before the second h action. In summary, in this system
with the given dynamic policy, the agent L is not allowed to distinguish
traces e and h, but it is allowed to distinguish h from hh.
On the other hand, if we apply the state-based unwinding conditions
for transitive dynamic noninterference, we obtain s0 ∼L s1 by (LRsdt) and
s1 ∼L s2 by (SCsdt). But since obsL(s1) = 0 6= 1 = obsL(s2), the system
2dot stands for downgrading over time
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is not observation consistent for L and therefore insecure with respect to
dt-security.
4.3.2 Definition (dot-security). A system is dot-secure iff for every u ∈ D,
a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ the following implication holds:
If dom(a) 6s u and there are no b ∈ A and β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ,
dom(a) = dom(b), and dom(a)s·aβ u, then obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
This definition says that if an agent dom(a) performs an action a in a
state where it is not allowed to interfere with some agent u and later during
the run dom(a) does not perform any other action in a state where it is
allowed to interfere with u, then the two traces, one with and one without
the action a, should be indistinguishable for u.
To decide whether a particular action is downgraded to some observer u
by some actions occurring later in a trace, the function dotsrc collects these
agents. Note that agents could only be added to the computed set of agents
if they interfere in some state that is visited during the run described by
the parameter α. So, there is no intransitivity involved, compared to the
sources definition in the static case.
4.3.3 Definition (sources for downgrading over time (dotsrc)). For every
u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ define
dotsrc(e, u, s) = {u} ,
dotsrc(aα, u, s) =
{
dotsrc(α, s, s · a) ∪ {dom(a)} if dom(a)s u
dotsrc(α, u, s · a) otherwise .
Based on the dotsrc definition, dot-security is expressed as follows: If an
action a is not downgraded by agents involved in the trace after this action,
then this action is not allowed to change the observations of the observing
agent.
4.3.4 Lemma. A system is dot-secure iff for every u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and
α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ dotsrc(aα, u, s), we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
Proof. First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume that the
system is dot-secure and let u ∈ D, a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ with
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dom(a) /∈ dotsrc(aα, u, s). By the definition of dotsrc, there are no b ∈ A
and β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ, dom(a) = dom(b), and dom(a) s·aβ u.
Hence, by dot-security, we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · aα).
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the system is not
dot-secure. By the definition of dot-security, there are u ∈ D, a ∈ A,
s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6s u and there are no b ∈ A and
β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ and dom(a) = dom(b) and dom(a)s·aβ u and
obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Hence, we have dom(a) /∈ dotsrc(aα, u, s).
Based on the dotsrc definition, we give a purge-based definition. Similar
to the definition of dtpurge, we have to keep track of the state from which
we take the policy. Again, if the purge operator removes an action, the
argument of the purge operator which keeps the state remains the same.
An action a is removed from the trace by dotpurge if it is not transmitted
to the observing agent u, which is expressed as dom(a) is not in the set of
agents, created by dotsrc.
4.3.5 Definition (dotpurge operator). For every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ define
dotpurge(e, u, s) = e
dotpurge(aα, u, s) =
{
a dotpurge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a) ∈ dotsrc(aα, u, s)
dotpurge(α, u, s) otherwise .
The dotpurge operator characterizes dot-security in the usual way. Simi-
lar to Theorem 4.2.5, we need to start purging from every arbitrary state.
4.3.6 Theorem. A system is dot-secure iff for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S and all
α, β ∈ A∗ with dotpurge(α, u, s) = dotpurge(β, u, s), we have obsu(s · α) =
obsu(s · β).
Proof. From left to right, we prove this claim by an induction on the com-
bined length of α and β. Suppose the system is dot-secure. The claim
obviously holds for the base case α = β = e. Let u ∈ D and s ∈ S and let
α, β ∈ A∗ with dotpurge(α, u, s) = dotpurge(β, u, s). Assume as induction
hypothesis that the implication on the right-hand side holds for all traces α′
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and β′ with smaller combined length and all possible states s. Let α = aα′
for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗. We have the following two cases.
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dotsrc(aα′, u, s).
Then we have
dotpurge(α′, u, s) = dotpurge(aα, u, s) = dotpurge(β, u, s) .
By induction hypothesis, we have obsu(s · α′) = obsu(s · β). Since the
system is dot-secure, by applying Lemma 4.3.4, we obtain obsu(s · aα′) =
obsu(s · α′).
Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dotsrc(aα′, u, s).
Then we can assume that β = bβ′ for some b ∈ A and β′ ∈ A∗ with
dom(b) ∈ dotsrc(bβ′, u, s). Otherwise we proceed with Case 1 with the roles
of α and β swapped. It follows directly a = b and dotpurge(α′, u, s · a) =
dotpurge(β′, u, s · b). By applying the induction hypothesis on the traces α′
and β′ and on the state s · a, we obtain obsu(s · aα′) = obsu(s · bβ′).
For the other direction of the claim, we assume that the system is not dot-
secure. By applying Lemma 4.3.4, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗
with dom(a) /∈ dotsrc(aα, u, s) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Then we have
dotpurge(aα, u, s) = dotpurge(α, u, s) and still obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α),
which shows that the assertion on the right-hand side of this lemma does
not hold.
4.3.1 Unwinding for dot-security
We will characterize dot-security by an unwinding-like relation. However,
since the definition is asymmetric, in general, this relation will not be an
equivalence relation. Nevertheless, we call it an unwinding relation, even
though it is not one in the sense of Section 2.6.3.
4.3.7 Definition (state-based downgrading over time unwinding). A state-
based downgrading over time unwinding relation for agents u, v ∈ D is a relation
-sdotu,v ⊆ S× S such that for every a ∈ A, s, t ∈ S the following conditions
are satisfied:
(LRsdot): If dom(a) = v and v 6s u, then s -sdotu,v s · a.
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(SCsdot): If s -sdotu,v t and either dom(a) 6= v or dom(a) = v with v 6t u,
then s · a -sdotu,v t · a.
As usual, such an unwinding relation characterizes the corresponding
security definition if it is observation consistent for the observing agent.
4.3.8 Theorem. A system is dot-secure iff for every u, v ∈ D, there is a state-based
downgrading over time unwinding relation -sdotu,v that is observation consistent for
u.
Proof. First, we prove the implication from left to right. Suppose the system
is dot-secure. Let u, v ∈ D. We say a trace α ∈ A∗ has the property (†) in a
state t ∈ S iff
there are no b ∈ A and β,γ ∈ A∗ with (†)
α = βbγ, v = dom(a), and vt·β u .
We define the binary relation -sdotu,v for every s, t ∈ S by
s -sdotu,v t iff for every α ∈ A∗ which satisfies the property (†) in t it holds
obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
We will show that the relation -sdotu,v satisfies the properties (LRsdot) and
(SCsdot), and that it is observation consistent for u.
For showing (LRsdot), let s ∈ S, a ∈ A with dom(a) = v and v 6s u.
Let α ∈ A∗ such that it satisfies the property (†) in s · a. Since the system is
dot-secure, we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · aα).
For showing (SCsdot), let s, t ∈ S with s -sdotu,v t and assume that s ·
a 6-sdotu,v t · a for some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6= v, or dom(a) = v with v 6t u.
Therefore, there exists some α ∈ A∗ that satisfies the property (†) in t · a,
but obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(t · aα). But also aα satisfies (†) in t. This contradicts
the assumption that s -sdotu,v t.
The observation consistency for u follows from setting α = e.
For the other direction of this proof, assume that the system is not
dot-secure.
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Therefore, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and a ∈ A such that dom(a) 6s u,
and there is α ∈ A∗ satisfying property (†) in s · a and obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s ·
aα). Set v = dom(a) and let -sdotu,v be a state-based downgrading over time
unwinding relation for u and v. From (LRsdot) it follows s -sdotu,v s · a. Since
α satisfies (†), from (SCsdot) it follows s · α -sdotu,v s · aα. Hence, -sdotu,v is not
observation consistent for u.
4.4 Dynamic Intransitive Noninterference
Dynamic intransitive noninterference is a generalization of intransitive non-
interference to the setting with dynamic policies. Hence, we have to deal
with different effects, those stemming from the intransitive behavior of
downgrading and those stemming from the dynamic changes of policies
and the delayed transmission of information like in the previous section.
This combination makes the situation more complex than in all previously
discussed settings. In this section, we discuss the idea of dynamic down-
grading. Noninterference definitions for this setting will be provided in the
next sections.
4.4.1 Dynamic Downgrading
In dynamic noninterference, the policies are distributed on the states. Since
downgrading is about having a path from some agent that performs an
action to some agent that makes some observation, we need to assemble
the local policy to one large graph that captures each local policy and the
dynamics of changing policies by actions.
The idea is that we have a graph where each vertex corresponds to an
agent in a specific state. The edges are labeled with actions such that there is
an edge from (v, s) to (u, t) iff dom(a) = v and vs u and t = s · a. Hence,
this graph contains both the edges of the local policies and the transitions
of the underlying system.
More formally, the set of verticies of the graph is V = D× S and the set
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of labeled edges is
E = {((v, s), (u, t), a) | dom(a) = v and vs u and t = s · a} .
We say that an action a is downgraded by α to u starting in s if there
is a path labeled with aα from (dom(a), s) to (u, t) for some state t. In the
dynamic setting, we cannot simply take a subsequence as in the static case,
since other downgraded actions can influence the policy and hence cannot
be removed without possible effects on the downgrading.
s0
A L
D
H
obsL : 0
s1
A L
D
H
obsL : 0
s2
A L
D
H
obsL : 1
s2
A L
D
H
obsL : 0
h d
a
Figure 4.5. Dynamic intransitive downgrading
4.4.1 Example. Starting with the system of Figure 4.5, we generate the graph
as described above. The result is depicted in Figure 4.6. As usual, self-loops
are omitted. For example, if we are interested whether the action h is
downgraded by the trace had starting in the initial state, then one can see
that for every state s ∈ S, there is no path from (H, s0) to (L, s). Hence, the
action h is not downgraded to L via had. However, it is downgraded by hd,
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since there is a path labeled with hd which ends in the vertex (L, s2).
(A, s0) (L, s0)
(D, s0)
(H, s0)
(A, s1) (L, s1)
(D, s1)
(H, s1)
(A, s2) (L, s2)
(D, s2)
(H, s2)
(A, s3) (L, s3)
(D, s3)
(H, s3)
a
h
h
h d
d
a
Figure 4.6. Dynamic intransitive downgrading graph
4.5 di-security
Dynamic intransitive noninterference combines both the downgrading over
time behavior as explained in the previous section and the downgrading
through agents as in the case of intransitive noninterference with a static
policy, described in the previous chapter. The main idea is that an agent
may transmit all information about previously performed actions if they
have been transmitted to it earlier.
For formalizing this intuition, we need a function that finds all agents
which are allowed to transmit information. Like in the static case, we
provide a function called dsrc that collects all agents, which are allowed
to interfere with some given agent. Obviously, in the dynamic case, this
function has to keep track of the states in order to get the policy which
applies.
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As a formalization, we use Leslie’s definition of sources [Les06].
4.5.1 Definition (dynamic sources (dsrc)). For every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A,
and α ∈ A∗ define
dsrc(e, u, s) = {u}
dsrc(aα, u, s) =

dsrc(α, u, s · a) ∪ {dom(a)} if dom(a)
s dsrc(α, u, s · a)
dsrc(α, u, s · a) otherwise .
The set dsrc(aα, u, s) is the set of all agents, to which the information that
the action a has been performed, is transmitted by the sequence of actions
α. Note that only information about performed actions is transmitted and
not information about a particular action which has not been transformed.
Intuitively, dom(a) is added by dsrc(aα, u, s) to the set of agents collected
so far if α describes a path from dom(a) to u in the local policies if one
follows the path of α in the system.
Similar to the characterization of dot-security in Lemma 4.3.4, we provide
a definition for dynamic intransitive noninterference based on the dsrc
function. If the system would start in an arbitrary state and there is an action
in a trace that is not downgraded to some agent u, then the performing of
this action should not change u’s observations.
4.5.2 Definition (di-security). A system is di-secure iff for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S,
a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ the following implication holds:
If dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s), then obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α) .
We will provide several characterizations of di-security. The first one
is based on an intransitive purge operator, adapted to the dynamic setting,
which we will call dipurge. Applied to a trace, the dipurge operator pro-
ceeds from left to right and removes every action that is not downgraded
by the remaining sequence of actions. Again, dipurge has to keep track
of the state where the purge operation should be applied. However, if an
action is removed, then the dipurge operator remains in the state, since the
run of the system should behave in the same way as when this action had
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not been performed. If the dipurge operator proceeded in the state that is
reached after performing this action, some information about performing
this action would get into the result of the purging.
This is the only difference between Leslie’s [Les06] and our definition
of an intransitive purge operator. In Leslie’s definition, the transition is
performed in any case, independently of whether the action has been purged
or not. A comparison to the work of Leslie will be given in Section 4.8.
4.5.3 Definition (dipurge operator). For every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ define
dipurge(e, u, s) = e
dipurge(aα, u, s) =
{
a dipurge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s)
dipurge(α, u, s) otherwise .
The corresponding characterization of di-security is as always. If two
traces have the same dipurge values, then they have to lead to the same
observation. However, in order to have a characterization of di-security, it
is required that the purging has to be performed in any state of the system.
4.5.4 Theorem. A system is di-secure iff for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S and α, β ∈ A∗
the following implication holds:
If dipurge(α, u, s) = dipurge(β, u, s), then obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β) .
Proof. First, we prove this claim from left to right. Suppose that the system
is di-secure and assume that the right-hand side of the implication does not
hold. From all counter examples for the right-hand side, choose one where
α and β are of minimal combined length for all possible choices of u and s.
Hence, there are u ∈ D and s ∈ S with dipurge(α, u, s) = dipurge(β, u, s)
and obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · β). Since at least one of the traces α or β is not
the empty trace, we can assume that α = aα′ with a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗.
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s).
In this case, we have
dipurge(aα′, u, s) = dipurge(α′, u, s) = dipurge(β, u, s) .
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From di-security it follows: obsu(s · α′) = obsu(s · aα′) 6= obsu(s · β). Hence
α′ and β are a counter example of smaller combined length, which contra-
dicts our assumption.
Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s).
By the definition of the dipurge operator, we have dipurge(aα′, u, s) =
a dipurge(α′, u, s · a). We can assume that β = bβ′ with b ∈ A and
β′ ∈ A∗ with dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s) since otherwise we would pro-
ceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β swapped. Therefore, we
have dipurge(bβ′, u, s) = b dipurge(β′, u, s · b). It follows that a = b
and dipurge(α′, u, s · a) = dipurge(β′, u, s · a). But from obsu(s · aα′) 6=
obsu(s · aβ′) it follows that α′ and β′ are a counter example of smaller
combined length.
This contradicts our initial assumption that the right-hand side of the
claim is wrong.
For the other direction of the claim, assume that the right-hand side
holds. We will show that the system is di-secure. Let u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A,
and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s). By the definition of dipurge, we
have dipurge(aα, u, s) = dipurge(α, u, s) and by the assumption that the
right-hand side of the claim holds it follows obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
Next, we will analyze the monotonicity of the di-security definition.
Under monotony, we understand that a secure system with respect to some
policy remains secure under a less restrictive policy. In other words, an
insecure system remains insecure under a more restrictive policy. Recall
that a dynamic policy (′s)s∈S is at least as restrictive as a policy (s)s∈S
if for every u, v ∈ D and every s ∈ S, u′s v implies us v.
First we show that the definition of dsrc behaves in an expected way for
a more restrictive policy.
4.5.5 Lemma. Let (s)s∈S be a dynamic policy and let (′s)s∈S be at least as
restrictive as the policy (s)s∈S. Denote with dsrc the source function with respect
to (s)s∈S and with dsrc′ the source function with respect to (′s)s∈S. Then we
have for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ that dsrc(α, u, s) ⊇ dsrc′(α, u, s).
Proof. We prove this claim by an induction on the length of α and suppose
as induction hypothesis that it holds for all traces of smaller length in all
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states. For the inductive step, we distinguish the following three cases:
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s).
Then we have
dsrc(aα, u, s) = dsrc(α, u, s · a)
⊇ dsrc′(α, u, s · a) .
From dom(a) 6s dsrc(α, u, s · a) it follows dom(a) 6s dsrc′(α, u, s · a) and
by definition, we have dsrc′(α, u, s · a) = dsrc′(aα, u, s).
Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and dom(a) /∈ dsrc′(aα, u, s).
In this case, we have
dsrc(aα, u, s) = {dom(a)} ∪ dsrc(α, u, s · a)
⊇ {dom(a)} ∪ dsrc′(α, u, s · a)
⊇ dsrc′(α, u, s · a)
= dsrc′(aα, u, s) .
Case 3: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and dom(a) ∈ dsrc′(aα, u, s).
Here, we have
dsrc(aα, u, s) = {dom(a)} ∪ dsrc(α, u, s · a)
⊇ {dom(a)} ∪ dsrc′(α, u, s · a)
= dsrc′(aα, u, s) .
With this result of the dsrc function, we can simply conclude that di-
security has the desired monotony property.
4.5.6 Corollary. Let (s)s∈S be a dynamic policy and let (′s)s∈S be at least
as restrictive as the policy (s)s∈S. If the system is di-secure with respect to
(′s)s∈S, then it is di-secure with respect to (s)s∈S.
Proof. Denote again with dsrc the dynamic source function with respect
to (s)s∈S and with dsrc′ the dynamic source function with respect to
(′s)s∈S. Let u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗. If dom(a) /∈ dsrc(α, u, s),
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then by Lemma 4.5.5, dom(a) /∈ dsrc′(α, u, s) and hence, by di-security w.r.t.
(′s)s∈S, we have obsu(sI · aα) = obsu(sI · α).
4.5.1 Unwinding for di-security
The second characterization of di-security is in terms of an unwinding-like
definition. It defines a binary relation on the set of states, but in general, it
is not an equivalence relation. However, as with dot-security, we will call it
an unwinding relation nevertheless. In contrast to the previous state-based
unwinding relations, we need to consider such a relation for every possible
set of agents. Hence, the number of relations is exponential in the number
of agents, but it is polynomial in the number of states.
4.5.7 Definition (state-based dynamic intransitive unwinding). A state-based
dynamic intransitive unwinding relation for a set of agents D′ ⊆ D is a relation
-D′ ⊆ S× S such that for every s, t ∈ S and every a ∈ A, the following
conditions hold:
(LRsdi): s -{u∈D | dom(a) 6su} s · a.
(SCsdi): If s -D′ t, then s · b -D′′ t · b, where D′′ = D′ if dom(b) ∈ D′,
and else D′′ = D′ ∩ {u | dom(b) 6t u}.
Intuitively, s -D′ t expresses that there is a state s˜, an action a, and a
trace α such that s = s˜ · aα, t = s˜ · α, and dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s˜) for all
agents u ∈ D′.
A monotony property needed in the proof of the next theorem is: If
two states are in relation for some set of agents D′ then these states are
in relation for every subset of D′. From the definition of -D′ it directly
follows:
4.5.8 Proposition. For every set D′ ⊆ D and all states s, t ∈ States with s -D′ t,
we have for every D˜ ⊆ D′ that s -D˜ t.
The next result states that the state-based dynamic intransitive unwind-
ing indeed characterizes di-security.
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4.5.9 Theorem. A system is di-secure iff for every D′ ⊆ D there is a state-based
dynamic intransitive unwinding relation -D′ that is observation consistent for
every u ∈ D′.
Proof. Suppose the system is di-secure. Define for all states s, t ∈ S and
every set of agents D′ ⊆ D the relation s -D t by
s -D′ t iff there are s˜ ∈ S, a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗ such that s = s˜ · α,
t = s˜ · aα and for all u ∈ D′ we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s˜) .
We will show that these relations satisfy the unwinding conditions (LRsdi)
and (SCsdi) and that every relation -D′ is observation consistent for every
u ∈ D′.
Observation consistency for every u ∈ D′ follows directly from di-
security. The (LRsdi) condition is satisfied by taking s˜ = s and α = e. It
remains to show the (SCsdi) condition. Suppose that s -D′ t for some
states s, t and some set of agents D′. By definition, there is some s˜ ∈ S,
a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗ such that s = s˜ · α, t = s˜ · aα and for all u ∈ D′ we have
dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s˜). Let b ∈ A and u ∈ D′. First, assume that dom(b) ∈
D′. Then, we have dom(b) /∈ dsrc(aα, dom(b), s˜). By the definition of
the dsrc function, we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aαb, u, s˜). Second, we assume
that dom(b) /∈ D′ and u ∈ D′ with dom(b) 6t u. Therefore, we have
dsrc(aαb, u, s˜) = dsrc(aα, u, s˜), which gives dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aαb, u, s˜).
For the other direction of the proof, assume that the system is not
di-secure. Therefore, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗ such that
dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α).
We will show that for any β,γ ∈ A∗ with βγ = α, we have
s · β -dsrc(γ,u,s·aβ) s · aβ .
We will prove this claim by an induction on the length of β. For showing
the base case, let β = e. Since dom(a) 6v for all v ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s), we have
dsrc(aα, u, s) = dsrc(α, u, s · a) and s -dsrc(α,u,s·a) s · a.
For the inductive step, let α = βbγ for some action b and traces β and γ
such that
s · β -dsrc(bγ,u,s·aβ) s · aβ
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holds. First, assume that dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ). The condition (SCsdi)
gives
s · βb -dsrc(bγ,u,s·aβ) s · aβ .
By the definition of the sources, we have dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) = dsrc(bγ, u, s ·
aβ) ∪ {dom(b)}. Therefore, dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) ⊆ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ), and by
Proposition 4.5.8, we have
s · βb -dsrc(γ,u,s·aβb) s · aβ .
Second, assume dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ). By the definition of dsrc, we
have dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) = dsrc(γ, u, s · aβb). It also holds that
dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) = dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) ∩ {v ∈ D | dom(b) 6s·aβ v} .
The combination of the last two equations results in
s · βb -dsrc(γ,u,s·aβb) s · aβb .
4.5.2 Intransitively Useless Edges and di-similarity
Similar to the dynamic transitive case, also in the intransitive case, we might
have useless edges. However, the situation is more complex. For a policy
without useless edges, it is no longer sufficient that every agent knows its
incoming edges as we will see in the next example.
4.5.10 Example. As we have seen in the system of Figure 4.4, initially agent L
does not know whether the system is still in the initial state or in the state s1
and hence it does not know whether there is an edge from H to L or not.
However, the edge from H to L in the state s1 is clearly not useless, since
removing it would turn a secure system into an insecure one.
Analogue to the definition of dt-similarity, we define a similarity relation
on the states for the dynamic intransitive case.
4.5.11 Definition (di-similarity). For an agent u let ≈diu be the smallest
equivalence relation on S such that for every s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with
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dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s), we have
s · aα ≈diu s · α .
We call states s, t with s ≈diu t di-similar for u.
Clearly, two states are di-similar for some u when it is required for u to
have the same observations on these two states according to the definition
of di-security. Hence, a system is di-secure if and only if for every agent u,
the relation ≈diu is observation consistent for u.
We can now define intransitive useless edges. We treat an edge of a local
policy as useless if its removal does not change the di-similarity relation of
any agent.
4.5.12 Definition (intransitively useless edges). Let e be an edge in a local
policy of (s)s∈S and let (′s)s∈S be the policy obtained from (s)s∈S by
removing the edge e. For every u ∈ D, let ≈diu be the di-similar relation
w.r.t. (s)s∈S and let ≈ˆdiu be the di-similar relation w.r.t. (′s)s∈S. Then the
edge e is intransitively useless iff for every u ∈ D and for every s, t ∈ S hold:
s ≈diu t iff s ≈ˆdiu t .
An edge is intransitively useless if its removal does not forbid any
previously allowed information flow. Note that the uselessness of an edge
is independent of the observation function. Also, in a particular system
with a static policy, there might be an edge whose removal would not affect
security, however, in general, it depends on the observations of the agents.
The next example shows a system with an intransitively useless edge
whose removal does not affect security.
4.5.13 Example. The system in Figure 4.7 depicts a not di-secure system. At a
first glance, this system might look like a di-secure system. However, when
we consider the trace h2h1h2, then h2 is not downgraded by the actions h1h2,
but the traces h2h1h2 and h1h2 lead to different observations.
We will show that the edge from H to L in state s1 is useless. Without
this edge, it is much easier to verify that this system is not secure, since the
action h2 performed in the state s1 changes L’s observation.
119
4. Dynamic Noninterference
s0
H
D
L
obsL : 0
s1
H
D
L
obsL : 0
s2
H
D
L
obsL : 1
s3
H
D
L
obsL : 0
s4
H
D
L
obsL : 2
s5
H
D
L
obsL : 3
h1
h2
d
d
h2
Figure 4.7. A system with an intransitively useless edge
Next, we will analyze formally why this edge is indeed intransitively
useless by computing the di-similarity relation for L. One can easily verify
that
s0 · h2h1 ≈diL s0 · h1 , s0 · h2h1h1 ≈diL s0 · h2h1 ,
s0 · h2h1h1 ≈diL s0 · h1h1 , s0 · h2h1h2 ≈diL s0 · h2h1 ,
s0 · h2h1h2 ≈diL s0 · h1h2 .
By symmetry and transitivity of the ≈diL relation, we obtain
s0 · h1 ≈diL s0 · h1h1 ≈diL s0 · h1h2 .
Hence, removing the edge from H to L in the state s1 does not change the
relation ≈diL . Therefore, this edge is useless.
The next theorem shows that the removal of intransitively useless edges
indeed does not affect security.
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4.5.14 Theorem. If a dynamic policy (′s)s∈S is obtained from (s)s∈S by
removing intransitively useless edges, then the system is di-secure with respect to
(s)s∈S iff it is di-secure with respect to (′s)s∈S.
Proof. Suppose the system is di-secure w.r.t. (s)s∈S but not di-secure w.r.t.
(′s)s∈S. Inductively, we can also assume that (′s)s∈S arose from (s)s∈S
by removing a single edge e in one of the local policies. By the definition
of di-security, we have u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈
dsrc(aα, u, s) (with respect to (′s)s∈S) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). But
since the system is di-secure w.r.t. (s)s∈S, we have dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s)
(with respect to (s)s∈S). This contradicts the assumption that e is useless.
The other direction follows from the monotony of di-security as stated
in Corollary 4.5.6, since (s)s∈S is less restrictive than (′s)s∈S.
4.5.3 Intransitive Uniformity
Like in the case of dynamic transitive noninterference, it is possible to
give a reasonable definition of a uniform policy. A policy is uniform if
every agent knows—in the sense that it is allowed to know—its incoming
edges in each local policy. Unlike the transitive case, this is not equivalent
to removing all useless edges. However, we will consider this special
case of intransitive policies, since we can provide a sound and complete
polynomial-size unwinding for it.
4.5.15 Definition (intransitive uniformity). A dynamic policy (s)s∈S is
intransitively uniform if for every u ∈ D and every s, t ∈ S the following
implication holds:
If s ≈diu t, then us = ut .
In a system with an intransitively uniform policy, every agent knows its
incoming edges of the local policy. In other words, if there is some reason
why an agent is not allowed to distinguish two states, then this agent has
the same incoming edges in the local policies of these two states. Next, we
will give a state-based unwinding for systems with intransitively uniform
policies.
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4.5.16 Definition (state-based uniform dynamic intransitive unwinding). A
state-based uniform dynamic intransitive unwinding relation for agents v and u
and a state s˜ is an equivalence relation ∼sudis˜,v,u ⊆ S× S such that for every
s, t ∈ S and every a ∈ A the following conditions hold:
(LRsudi): If v = dom(a) and v 6s˜ u, then s˜ ∼sudis˜,v,u s˜ · a.
(SCsudi): If s ∼sudis˜,v,u t and a ∈ A with v 6s˜ dom(a), then s · a ∼sudis˜,v,u t · a.
(PCsudi): If s ∼sudis˜,v,u t, then us = ut .
The condition (PCsudi) of this definition is denoted as policy consistency.
This condition requires that if two states have to be indistinguishable for
some agent u, then u’s incoming edges have to be the same in these states.
Similar to Theorem 3.4.9 in the case of a static policy, we can adopt the
idea of a policy cut to systems with a uniform dynamic policy. However,
the cut is only considered in a local policy for a single state. For this result,
the following technical lemma is needed.
4.5.17 Lemma. In a system with a dynamic intransitively uniform policy, we have
for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and β,γ ∈ A∗:
If dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβγ, u, s), then dsrc(γ, u, s · aβ) = dsrc(γ, u, s · β)
and for every v ∈ dsrc(γ, u, s · aβ) and every prefix δ of β we have
s · aδ ≈div s · δ .
Proof. Let u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and let β,γ ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈
dsrc(aβγ, u, s). We will show this claim by an induction on γ. For the
base case γ = e, we have
dsrc(e, u, s · β) = {u} = dsrc(e, u, s · aβ) .
For every prefix δ of β, it follows from dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβγ, u, s) that
dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aδ, u, s), and from the definition of di-similarity it follows
that s · aδ ≈diu s · δ.
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As induction hypothesis, we consider a trace βbγ with b ∈ A and
β,γ ∈ A∗ with
dsrc(γ, u, s · aβb) = dsrc(γ, u, s · βb) , (I.H.)
and for every v ∈ dsrc(γ, u, s · aβb) and every prefix δ of βb, we have
s · aδ ≈div s · δ .
Let be v ∈ dsrc(γ, u, s · aβb). From the induction hypothesis, it follows
s · aβ ≈div s · β. By uniformity, we have dom(b) s·aβ v if and only if
dom(b) s·β v. Therefore, we have dsrc(bγ, u, s · β) = dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ).
Let δ be a prefix of β and let v ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ). If v is already in
dsrc(γ, u, s · βb), then by induction hypothesis it follows s · aδ ≈div s · δ. If
this is not the case, then v = dom(b) and since dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβbγ, u, s),
we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aδ, dom(b), s). Otherwise dom(a) would be down-
graded to u. By definition of di-similarity, we have s · aδ ≈didom(b) s · δ.
Now, we will prove the characterization of di-security in terms of policy
cuts, given that the dynamic policy is intransitively uniform.
4.5.18 Lemma. A system with a dynamic intransitively uniform policy is di-secure
iff for all u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and
dom(a) 6s dom(alph(α)), we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · aα).
Proof. We will prove this lemma by contraposition. Suppose that the right-
hand side of this lemma does not hold. Then it follows directly from the
definition of di-security that the system is not di-secure.
For proving the other direction, assume that the system is not di-secure.
By definition, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈
dsrc(aα, u, s) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Additionally, assume that α is
of minimal length for all possible choices of u, s, and a.
For showing the property dom(a) 6s dom(alph(α)), assume the con-
verse. Therefore, α is of the form βbγ for some b ∈ A with dom(a) s
dom(b) and some β,γ ∈ A∗.
From dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβγ, u, s) and Lemma 4.5.17 it follows dsrc(bγ, u, s ·
aβ) = dsrc(bγ, u, s · β). In the case of dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ), we had
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dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aβbγ, u, s · a), which would contradict our assumption.
Therefore, we have dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ), and by uniformity and
Lemma 4.5.17, we also have dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · β). Applying again
Lemma 4.5.17, we have
dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) = dsrc(γ, u, s · aβb)
= dsrc(γ, u, s · aβ) ,
and similarly
dsrc(bγ, u, s · β) = dsrc(γ, u, s · βb)
= dsrc(γ, u, s · β) .
Therefore, we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) = dsrc(aβγ, u, s). Since γ is
of smaller length than α, it follows from dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ) that
obsu(s · aβbγ) = obsu(s · aβγ). Similarly from dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · β)
it follows obsu(s · βbγ) = obsu(s · βγ). Therefore, we have obsu(s · aβγ) 6=
obsu(s · βγ). This contradicts the minimality of α, since we would take the
shorter trace βγ instead.
For intransitive uniformity, it is sufficient to consider only those traces
where every action but the first one is downgraded.
4.5.19 Lemma. Let be u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗. If the following two
properties imply us·aα = us·α, then the system has an intransitively uniform policy:
1. dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s).
2. If for every b ∈ A and β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ, then we have dom(a) 6s
dom(b).
Proof. For contradiction, assume that the claim of this lemma does not
hold. Hence, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈
dsrc(aα, u, s) and us·aα 6= us·α. Additionally, suppose that α is of smallest
length for all possible choices of u, s, and a. By the conditions of this lemma,
there are b ∈ A and β,γ ∈ A∗ with α = βbγ and dom(a)s dom(b). From
the definition of dsrc it follows that dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bγ, u, s · aβ).
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Case 1: us·aβbγ 6= us·βγ.
This case is not possible since it contradicts the minimality of α.
Case 2: us·βbγ 6= us·βγ.
To obtain a contradiction, it is sufficient to show that dom(b) is not in the set
dsrc(bγ, u, sI · β). For contradiction, assume that dom(b) ∈ dsrc(bγ, u, sI ·
β). Let δ be a prefix of minimal length of bγ such that there is a v ∈ D
with dom(b) ∈ dsrc(δ, v, s · β), but dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβδ, v, s). Such a v exists,
since one could choose v = u and δ = bβ. Then we can write δ as µcν for
some c ∈ A and µ, ν ∈ A∗ with
dom(b) ∈ dsrc(µ, dom(c), s · β) and dom(c)s·βµ v .
Since dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβδ, v, s), it follows dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβµ, v, s). By
the minimality of α, we have us·βµ = u

s·aβµ. In particular, we have
dom(a) s·aβµ u. Hence, we have dom(b) ∈ dsrc(µ, dom(c), s · β). Since
dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβδ, v, s), we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβµ, dom(c), s). This is a
contradiction to the minimality of δ.
Case 3: us·aβbγ = u

s·βγ and u

s·βbγ = u

s·βγ.
From us·aβbγ 6= us·βbγ it follows us·βbγ 6= us·βγ. Hence, we will show
that dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβγ, u, s). Assume that this is not the case and we
have dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aβγ, u, s). Let δ be the prefix of minimal length
of γ such that there is some v ∈ D with dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβbδ, v, s), but
dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aβδ, v, s). Such a trace δ and an agent v exist, since one
can take δ = γ and v = u. Similar to the previous case, we can split δ in
δ = µcν with c ∈ A and µ, ν ∈ A∗ such that dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aβµ, dom(c), s)
and dom(c) s·aβµ v. Since dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβbδ, v, s) and dom(a) s
dom(b), it follows dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bδ, v, s · aβ). Since µ is a prefix of
δ, we have dom(b) /∈ dsrc(bµ, v, s · aβ). The minimality of α implies
vs·aβbµ = v

s·aβµ and dom(c) s·aβbµ v. From dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβbδ, v, s),
it follows dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβbµ, dom(c), s).
We also have dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aβµ, dom(c), s).
This contradicts the minimality of δ, since µ is shorter than δ.
The next theorem shows that the existence of an unwinding is both
necessary and sufficient for systems with intransitively uniform policies.
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4.5.20 Theorem. A dynamic policy of a system is intransitively uniform iff for
every u, v ∈ D and every s˜ ∈ S, there is a state-based uniform dynamic intransitive
unwinding relation ∼sudis˜,v,u.
Proof. For the proof from left to right, assume that the system has an
intransitively uniform dynamic policy. Define for every u, v ∈ D and every
s˜ ∈ S the following relation for every s, t ∈ S:
s ∼sudis˜,v,u t iff for every trace α that does no contain any b
with vs˜ dom(b), we have us·α = ut·α .
Clearly, ∼sudis˜,v,u is an equivalence relation and it satisfies (PCsudi) since e is a
valid value for α.
For showing (LRsudi), let a ∈ A, set v = dom(a) and let s˜ ∈ S with
v 6s˜ u. Let α ∈ A∗ such that there is no b ∈ A which appears in α with
v s˜ dom(b). Since we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s˜), it follows by the
definition of uniformity that us·aα = us·α.
For showing (SCsudi), let s ∼sudis˜,v,u t and a ∈ A with v 6s˜ dom(a).
Let α be a trace that does not contain any action b with v s˜ dom(b).
Since v 6s˜ dom(a), also the trace aα has this property. Hence we have
us·aα = ut·aα. Therefore, we have s · a ∼sudis˜,v,u t · a.
For proving the other direction, assume that for every state s˜ and every
agent u and v there is a state-based uniform dynamic intransitive unwinding
relation ∼sudis˜,v,u. For contradiction, additionally, assume the system does not
have an intransitive uniform dynamic policy. Due to Lemma 4.5.19, there
are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s), α does not
contain b with dom(a) s dom(b), and us·aα 6= us·α. Let v = dom(a)
and let ∼sudis,v,u be a state-based uniform dynamic intransitive unwinding
relation. Since we have dom(a) 6s u, it follows from (LRsudi) s ∼sudis,v,u s · a.
Then, since α does not contain b with dom(a)s dom(b), it follows with
(SCsudi) that s · α ∼sudis,v,u s · aα. Therefore, us·aα 6= us·α contradicts the (PCsudi)
condition.
The soundness and completeness of the unwinding conditions for sys-
tems with intransitive uniform policies is provided by the following theo-
rem.
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4.5.21 Theorem. A system with an intransitive uniform policy is di-secure iff for
every u, v ∈ D and every s˜ ∈ S, there is a state-based uniform dynamic intransitive
unwinding relation ∼sudis˜,v,u that is observation consistent for u.
Proof. For proving the direction from left to right, suppose that the system
is di-secure. For every state s˜ and all agents u, v ∈ D define a relation ∼sudis˜,v,u
for every s, t ∈ S by
s ∼sudis˜,v,u t iff for every α ∈ A∗ that contain no b ∈ A with vs˜ dom(b),
we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
Clearly, this relation is an equivalence relation on the states and it is obser-
vation consistent for u by choosing α = e.
For showing (LRsudi), let a ∈ A and suppose that v = dom(a) and
v 6s˜ u. Let α be in A∗ such that it does not contain an action b with
v s˜ dom(b). Hence we have v = dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s˜). Since the
system is di-secure, we have obsu(s˜ · aα) = obsu(s˜ · α) and hence s˜ ∼sudis˜,v,u s˜ · a.
For showing (SCsudi), let s, t ∈ S with s ∼sudis˜,v,u t and a ∈ A with v 6s˜
dom(a). Let α be in A∗ such that it does not contain an action b with vs˜
dom(b). Then also the trace aα has the property that it does not contain an
action b with vs˜ dom(b). Therefore, we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα)
and hence s · a ∼sudis˜,v,u t · a.
For showing the other direction of the proof, assume that the system
is not di-secure. Due to Lemma 4.5.18, there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and dom(a) 6s dom(alph(α)) and
obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · aα). Set v = dom(a) and let ∼sudis,v,u be an equivalence
relation that satisfies (LRsudi) and (SCsudi). Since, clearly, v 6s u, we
have s ∼sudis,v,u s · a by (LRsudi). By the property dom(a) 6s dom(alph(α))
and the repeated application of (SCsudi), we have s · α ∼sudis,v,t s · aα. From
obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · aα) it follows that ∼sudis,v,u is not observation consistent
for u.
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4.6 dta-security
As we have seen in the previous chapter about static noninterference, i-
security has some disadvantages compared to ta-security, since i-security
allows too much information flow in a complete asynchronous setting.
The same problem appears in the dynamic setting, when all policies are
the same in all states and we essentially have a global policy, and hence
di-security and i-security are equivalent. Therefore, it is desirable to have
a definition similar to ta-security for the dynamic setting which captures
this issue. We will provide such a definition which we call dta-security
by a trace-based unwinding, which can also be expressed by a dynamic
version of the ta operator if the dynamic policy satisfies some consistency
property. This consistency property of the policy is a weaker condition than
the requirement of intransitively uniform policies. From this perspective
dta-security is more restrictive than di-security.
However, di-security only allows transmission of information about
performed actions. But it does not allow one to transmit information about
not performed actions. We will see that dta-security will allow this kind of
transmission of negative information. Hence, from this point of view dta-
security is less restrictive than di-security. In Section 4.7, we will provide
examples, which illustrate these issues and show that neither dta-security
implies di-security nor di-security implies dta-security.
We will provide a dynamic ta operator, called dta which requires restric-
tions on the structure of the dynamic policy. We call these dynamic policies
ta-consistent policies. Intuitively, dynamic policies are ta-consistent if every
two agents know, in the sense of distributed knowledge, whether there is a
local edge between them or not, after performing every particular trace.
Instead of defining dta-security by the use of a ta-like operator, we
use a definition based on trace-based unwinding. We will see that this
definition is more general than a definition by a ta-like operator since the
latter requires some restriction on the structure of the dynamic policy.
4.6.1 Definition (trace-based unwinding for dta-security). A trace-based
unwinding relation for dta-security for an agent u is an equivalence relation
∼tdtau ⊆ A∗ × A∗ that satisfies for every a ∈ A and every α, β ∈ A∗ the
following conditions:
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(LRtdta): If dom(a) 6sI ·α u, then α ∼tdtau αa.
(SCtdta): If α ∼tdtau β and α ∼tdtadom(a) β, then αa ∼tdtau βa.
These unwinding conditions are very similar to those of the trace-based
unwinding for ta-security. The only difference is that in the condition
(LRtdta), the policy depends on the particular state where it is applied. This
also shows that this is a very natural adaption of ta-security to the dynamic
setting.
We define dta-secure by the existence of a trace-based unwinding instead
of using a trace operator.
4.6.2 Definition (dta-security). A system with a dynamic policy is dta-secure
if for every agent u, there exists a trace-based unwinding relation ∼tdtau for
dta-security that is observation consistent for u.
Next, we adapt the ta operator to the dynamic setting in a straightfor-
ward way. However, we will see that it does not lead to a reasonable security
definition without further restrictions. The most obvious generalization of
the ta operator is to apply it to the local policy in the current state.
4.6.3 Definition (dta operator). For every agent u ∈ D, every action a ∈ A
and every trace α ∈ A∗ define
dtau(e) = e
dtau(αa) =
{
(dtau(α), dtadom(a)(α), u) if dom(a)sI ·α u
dtau(α) otherwise .
The next definition looks very similar to the definition of ta-security
in the static case. But in the dynamic case, we do not use it as a security
definition on its own and denote it as a consistency property.
4.6.4 Definition (dta-observation-consistency). A system is dta-observation-
consistent iff for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α, β ∈ A∗ the following condition
holds:
If dtau(α) = dtau(β), then obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β) .
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In the next example, we discuss why applying dta-observation-consis-
tency does not lead to a reasonable security definition.
s0
H A
L
obsL : 0
s1
H A
L
obsL : 1
s2
H A
L
obsL : 0
a
h
Figure 4.8. A dta-observation-consistent, but intuitively insecure system
4.6.5 Example. Let us have a closer look at the system in Figure 4.8. The
local policies of the system never allow any information flow from agent H
to any other agent. However, H’s action h enforces a change of the local
policy and forbids the previously allowed information flow from A to L.
By performing the action h the allowed information flow from A to L is
revoked. However, L can deduce, by observing 1, that H has not performed
an action in the initial state. Hence, since L gains information about H’s
performed action, one should consider this system as insecure.
The only two (shortest) interesting traces in this system according to
security are the traces a and ha. The values of the dta operator are
dtaL(a) = (e, e, a) and
dtaL(ha) = e .
Due to the different values of the dta operator of these two traces, and more
generally, of any two traces which lead to different observations for L, the
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system is dta-observation-consistent—a contradiction to our intuition.
This system is not only insecure according to our intuition, it is also not
dta-secure. We have e ∼tdtaA h and e ∼tdtaL h by (LRtdta) and, by (SCtdta),
a ∼tdtaL ha. Therefore the relation ∼tdtaL is not observation consistent for L
and hence the system is insecure.
We solve the problem of the discrepancy between dta-security and dta-
observation-consistency by restricting the structure of the dynamic policy.
The restriction is that the presence (or absence) of an edge between any
two agents only depends on the dta values of these two agents. In the
terminology of knowledge—here, we mean, as usual, the maximal allowed
knowledge—every two agents always know, in the sense of distributed
knowledge, whether there is an edge between them or not. We call this
property of a dynamic policy dta-consistency.
4.6.6 Definition (dta-consistency). A dynamic policy (s)s∈S is dta-consis-
tent iff for every u, v ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗ with dtau(α) = dtau(β) and
dtav(α) = dtav(β), we have
usI ·α v iff usI ·β v .
4.6.7 Example. We continue with the system of Example 4.6.5. For the
agents L and A, both agents have the same dta-value after the trace e and
the trace h, but after the first trace there is an edge from A to L and after
the latter trace, this edge is not present. Hence, this system does not have a
dta-consistent dynamic policy.
Next we show that in systems with a dta-consistent policy, dta-obser-
vation-consistency and dta-security are equivalent. The main part of this
result comes from the next lemma.
4.6.8 Lemma. Consider a system with a dta-consistent dynamic policy and let, for
every u ∈ D, ∼tdtau be the smallest trace-based unwinding relation for dta-security.
Then we have α ∼tdtau β iff dtau(α) = dtau(β).
Proof. First, we proof the implication from left to right. We can assume
that the smallest trace-based unwinding relation is inductively created by
applying the (LRtdta) and (SCtdta) conditions iteratively.
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Case 1: Suppose α ∼tdtau β is created from the (LRtdta) condition.
Hence β = αa for some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6sI ·α a. We have dtau(β) =
dtau(αa) = dtau(α) by the definition of the dta operator.
Case 2: Suppose α and β are constructed from the (SCtdta) condition.
Then α = α′a and β = β′a with α′ ∼tdtau β′ and α′ ∼tdtadom(a) β′. By induction
hypothesis, we have dtau(α′) = dtau(β′) and dtadom(a)(α′) = dtadom(a)(β′).
Since the policy is dta-consistent, we have dom(a)sI ·α′ u if and only if
dom(a) sI ·β′ u. By definition of the dta operator, we have dtau(α) =
dtau(β).
We proceed with the other direction of the proof. We prove this direction
by an induction on the combined length of α and β. For the inductive step,
let α = α′a for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗.
Case 1: dom(a) 6sI ·α′ u.
Then we have dtau(α) = dtau(α′) = dtau(β). By induction hypothesis, we
have α′ ∼u β and by applying the (LRtdta) condition, we have α ∼tdtau β.
Case 2: dom(a)sI ·α′ u.
In the case of β = β′b with dom(b) 6sI ·β′ u, we could proceed with
the first case with the roles of a and b swapped. Hence we assume that
dom(b) sI ·β′ u. By the definition of the dta operator, we have a = b,
dtau(α′) = dtau(β′), and dtadom(a)(α′) = dtadom(a)(β′). By induction, we
have α′ ∼tdtau β′ and α′ ∼tdtadom(a) β′ and by (SCtdta) α′a ∼tdtau β′b.
We summarize the connection between dta-consistency, dta-observation-
consistency, and dta-security.
4.6.9 Corollary. A system with a dta-consistent policy is dta-observation-consis-
tent iff it is dta-secure.
The next theorem shows the completeness of this approach by showing
that by removing edges, every arbitrary dynamic policy can be translated
into a dta-consistent dynamic policy without affecting dta-security. This
shows that dta-consistency is the missing condition for achieving dta-secu-
rity with the dta operator.
4.6.10 Theorem. For every system M with states S and a dynamic policy
(s)s∈S, there is an dta-consistent policy (′s)s∈S such that M is dta-secure
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w.r.t. (s)s∈S iff M′ is dta-secure w.r.t. (′s)s∈S. Moreover, the policy (′s)s∈S
is at least as restrictive as (s)s∈S.
Proof. For every u ∈ D let ∼tdtau be the smallest trace-based unwinding
relation satisfying (LRtdta) and (SCtdt) w.r.t. the policy (s)s∈S. Define the
policy (′s)s∈S by
u′sI ·α v iff for every β ∈ [α]∼tdtau ∩ [α]∼tdtav it holds usI ·β v .
From this definition, it is clear that the policy (′s)s∈S is at least as restrictive
as the policy (s)s∈S.
For every u let ≈tdtau be the smallest trace-based unwinding relation
that satisfies (LRtdta) and (SCtdta) w.r.t. the policy (′s)s∈S. Let u be in D.
We claim that ∼tdtau = ≈tdtau holds. It is clear that ∼tdtau ⊆ ≈tdtau holds,
since (′s)s∈S is at least as restrictive as (s)s∈S. By an induction on the
inductive definition of ≈tdtau , we will show for every u ∈ D and every
α, β ∈ A∗ that α ≈tdtau β implies α ∼tdtau β.
Let α = α′a for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗ and assume inductively that the
claim holds for all shorter traces and all agents. Since ∼tdtau is the smallest
unwinding relation, we can assume that ∼tdtau is iteratively constructed
by applying the (LRtdta) and (SCtdta) conditions. Hence, it is sufficient to
consider traces that are constructed by applying one of these conditions.
Case 1: α and β are constructed from the (LRtdta) condition of ≈tdtau .
Here we have α′ = β and dom(a) 6′sI ·α′ u. From α′a ≈tdtau α′ ≈tdtau β it
follows by induction hypothesis α′ ∼tdtau β. Since dom(a) 6′sI ·α′ u, there is
some γ ∈ [α′]∼tdtau ∩ [α′]∼tdtadom(a) with dom(a) 6sI ·γ u. From α
′ ∼tdtau γ and
α′ ∼tdtadom(a) γ it follows by (SCtdta) that α′a ∼tdtau γa. From dom(a) 6sI ·γ u
it follows by (LRtdta) that γa ∼tdtau γ. By combination, we get α′a ∼tdtau α′
and hence α ∼tdtau β.
Case 2: α and β are constructed from the (SCtdta) condition of ≈tdtau .
Note that the (SCtdta) condition is independent of the policy. Hence we
have α = α′a and β = β′a with α′ ≈tdtau β′ and α′ ≈tdtadom(a) β′. By applying
the induction hypothesis, we have α′ ∼tdtau β′ and α′ ∼tdtadom(a) β′ and by the
(SCtdta) condition applied to ∼tdtau , we have α′a ∼tdtau β′a. We have shown
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that the system is dta-secure w.r.t. (s)s∈S if and only if it is dta-secure
w.r.t. (′s)s∈S.
It remains to show that the policy (′s)s∈S is dta-consistent. First, we
will show for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗ that dtau(α) = dtau(β) (w.r.t.
(′s)s∈S) implies α ≈tdtau β. We prove this by an induction on the combined
length of α and β. Let α = α′a and suppose that the claim holds for all
traces of smaller combined length.
Case 1: dom(a) 6′sI ·α′ u.
In this case, we have dtau(α′a) = dtau(α′). By induction hypothesis, we
have α′ ≈tdtau β and by (LRtdta) α′a ≈tdtau α′ ≈tdtau β.
Case 2: dom(a)′sI ·α′ u.
Then we can assume with the same argument as usual that β = β′b holds for
some b ∈ A and β′ ∈ A∗ with dom(b)′sI ·β′ u. Then we have dtau(α′) =
dtau(β′), dtadom(a)(α′) = dtadom(a)(β′), and a = b. By induction hypothesis
we have α′ ∼tdtau β′ and α′ ∼tdtadom(a) β′ and by (SCtdta), α′a ∼tdtau β′a.
Now we obtain the dta-consistency as follows: If dtau(α) = dtau(β) and
dtav(α) = dtau(β) (w.r.t. (′s)s∈S), then we have α ∈ [β]≈tdtau ∩ [β]≈tdtav and
hence u′α v iff u′β v.
4.6.1 Dynamic Intransitively Securely Constructed Systems
We provide more support for dta-consistent policies as they appear natu-
rally in securely constructed systems in the dynamic intransitive case. We
proceed with a definition of securely constructed systems. Similar to the
dynamic transitive case, the edges of the dynamic polices depend only on
the local states of the involved agents. Analogue to the static intransitive
case, the information flow from an agent v to an agent u should only de-
pend on v’s and u’s local state. Hence we require that the existence of a
possible edge from v to u is uniquely determined by the local state of these
two agents. Similar to the transitive case, we define local state dependent
policies:
4.6.11 Definition (intransitively local state dependent policy). For a system
with local state spaces S0, . . . Sn−1 and global state space S = S0× · · ·×Sn−1,
a dynamic policy (s)s∈S is intransitively local state dependent if for every
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i, j ∈ D and every s, t ∈ S with pij(s) = pij(t) and pii(s) = pii(t), we have
js i iff jt i .
Unlike in the transitive case, we require that the existence of an edge
depends on both local states of i and of j, and not only on the local state of i.
For the composition of these local transition functions to a global transition
function, we require that the dynamic policy is intransitively local state
dependent. With this restriction on the dynamic policy, the global transition
function is defined by
(s0, . . . , sn−1) · a = (s′0, . . . , s′n−1)
with s′i =
{
(sdom(a), si) ·i a if dom(a)(s0,...,sn−1) i
si otherwise .
As usual, we require that the observation function for each agent only
depends on its local state. The next lemma provides the core argument why
dynamic intransitively securely constructed systems are dta-secure.
4.6.12 Lemma. In a dynamic intransitively securely constructed system, we have,
for every i ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗ with dtai(α) = dtai(β), pii(sI · α) =
pii(sI · β).
Proof. Let i ∈ D. We prove this lemma by an induction on the combined
length of α and β. Since the base case is clear, we proceed with the inductive
step. Let α, β ∈ A∗ with dtai(α) = dtai(β) and assume that for all traces
with smaller combined length the claim holds. Since at least one of α and
β is not the empty trace, we can assume, w.l.o.g., that α = α′a for some
α′ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A.
Case 1: dom(a) 6sI ·α′ i.
By the definition of intransitively securely constructed systems, we have
pii(sI · α′a) = pii(sI · α). From the definition of the dta operator it follows
that dtai(α′a) = dtai(α′), and from dtai(α′a) = dtai(β), it follows by apply-
ing the the induction hypothesis that pii(sI · α′) = pii(sI · β).
Case 2: dom(a)sI ·α′ i.
We suppose that β = β′b for some β′ ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A with dom(b)sI ·β′ i,
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since otherwise we would proceed with Case 1 with the roles of α and β
swapped. By the definition of the dta operator, we have a = b, dtai(α′) =
dtai(β′), and dtadom(a)(α′) = dtadom(a)(β′). Applying the induction hy-
pothesis gives pii(sI · α′) = pii(sI · β′) and pidom(a)(sI · α′) = pidom(b)(sI · β′).
From the definition of the local transition function of an intransitively
securely constructed system it follows
pii(sI · α′a) = (pidom(a)(sI · α′),piu(sI · α′)) ·i a
= (pidom(a)(s
I · β′),piu(sI · β′)) ·i a
= pii(sI · β′b) .
Since, by definition, every dynamic intransitively securely constructed
system has an intransitively local state dependent policy, it follows from the
previous lemma that such a system has a dta-consistent policy. Hence, for
intransitively securely constructed systems, we do not need the requirement
of a dta-consistent policy explicitly. The dependence of the observation
functions on the local states follows immediately.
4.6.13 Corollary. Every dynamic intransitively securely constructed system is
dta-secure.
The next result shows the completeness of expressing dta-secure systems
as dynamic intransitively securely constructed systems.
4.6.14 Lemma. For every dta-secure system, there exists an observation equivalent
system which is dynamic intransitively securely constructed from a trace-equivalent
policy.
Proof. Let M be a dta-secure system with a dynamic policy (s)s∈S. Ac-
cording to Theorem 4.6.10, we can suppose that (s)s∈S is dta-consistent.
Let the agents be enumerated as D = {0, . . . , n− 1}. As the states of the
constructed system, we take the dta-values of the corresponding agents.
The new system is constructed as
. the local states of each agent i are Si = {dtai(α) | α ∈ A∗} and the global
state space is as usual S′ = S0 × · · · × Sn−1,
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. the local initial state of each agent i is sIi = e,
. the edges of the dynamic polices (′s)s∈S′ are for every i, j ∈ D and every
α ∈ A∗ defined by j′sI ·α i iff for every β ∈ A∗ with dtai(β) = dtai(α) it
holds: jsI ·β i,
. for every agent i and every state s, we define the observation function
obs′i(s) = obsi(sI · β) for some β ∈ A∗ with β = pii(s).
Note that due to dta-observation-consistency, the observation function
is well-defined. It also follows from dta-observation-consistency that the
constructed system is observation equivalent to the system from which it is
constructed.
Next, we show that the policy of the constructed system is intransitively
local state dependent. Let i, j ∈ D and s, t ∈ S with pii(s) = pii(t) and
pij(t) = pij(t). Then there are α, β ∈ A∗ with
dtai(α) = pii(s) = pii(t) = dtai(β), and
dtaj(α) = pij(s) = pij(t) = dtaj(β) .
Because of the dta-consistency of the policy, the policy of the constructed
system is intransitively local state dependent. Similarly, it follows that the
systems have trace-equivalent policies.
Summarizing the previous results give:
4.6.15 Theorem. A system is dta-secure iff there exists an observation equivalent,
dynamic intransitively securely constructed system.
4.7 Relation between Dynamic Noninterference
Definitions
We compare the different security definitions of this chapter with each other
and explain how they are related to the security definitions of the previous
chapter if the local policies are the same in all states.
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Clearly, dt-security implies dot-security since the definitions are the
same, except that in the definition of dot-security, there are further require-
ments on the trace α after the hidden action a. In Example 4.3.1, we showed
that dot-security does not imply dt-security. That dot-security implies di-se-
curity follows directly from dotsrc(α, u, s) ⊆ dsrc(α, u, s) for every α ∈ A∗,
u ∈ D, and s ∈ S. In contrast, di-security does not imply dot-security, since,
applied to a system with a static policy, i-security does not imply t-security.
That dt-security implies dta-security can easily be seen by comparing the
definition of a trace-based dynamic transitive unwinding with the definition
of dta-security. Here, we have for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗ that
α ∼tdtau β implies α ∼tdtu β. Again, in a system with a static policy, we have
that ta-security does not imply t-security, and hence, dta-security does not
imply dt-security.
The next example shows that neither dot-security nor di-security implies
dta-security. The reason for that is essentially the same as in the static case:
dot-security and di-security allow one to observe information about the
ordering of actions which is not observable by any agent. According to
dta-security this information about the order of actions is not allowed to be
observed by any agent.
4.7.1 Example. We will show that the system depicted in Figure 4.9 is dot-
secure, but L observes the order of the actions h1 and h2 in the case that
there are not edges from H1 and H2 to L.
Computing the smallest state-based unwinding relations for dot-security
gives:
s0 -sdotL,H1 s2 s0 -
sdot
L,H2 s1
s1 -sdotL,H1 s3 s2 -
sdot
L,H2 s4
s1 -sdotL,H1 s4 s2 -
sdot
L,H2 s3
s2 -sdotL,H2 s5
s2 -sdotL,H2 s6
Since for all pairs of states in this relation, the observation of L is 0, the
system is dot-secure and hence di-secure. However, L should not be able
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s0
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s1
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s2
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s3
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s4
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s5
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s6
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
s7
H1 H2
L
obsL : 1
s8
H1 H2
L
obsL : 2
h2
h1
h1 h2
h1 h1
h2 h2
Figure 4.9. A dot-secure, but not dta-secure system
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to observe, which of the agents H1 and H2 had performed the first action
in the traces h1h2h1h2 and h2h1h1h2. This is captured by the definition of
dta-security. Computing several elements of the unwinding relations ∼tdtaL ,
∼tdtaH1 , and ∼tdtaH2 is needed to show the equivalence of the traces h1h2h1h2
and h2h1h1h2 for L. We obtain:
e ∼tdtaL h1 e ∼tdtaH1 h2 e ∼tdtaH2 h1
e ∼tdtaL h2 h1 ∼tdtaH1 h2h1 h2 ∼tdtaH2 h1h2
h2 ∼tdtaL h1h2 h1 ∼tdtaH1 h1h2 h2 ∼tdtaH2 h2h1
h1 ∼tdtaL h2h1 h1h2 ∼tdtaH2 h2h1 h1h2 ∼tdtaH2 h2h1
h1h2 ∼tdtaL h2h1 h1h2h1 ∼tdtaH2 h2h1h2
h1h2h1 ∼tdtaL h2h1h1
h1h2h1h2 ∼tdtaL h2h1h1h2
From obsL(s0 · h1h2h1h2) = 2 6= 1 = obsL(s0 · h2h1h1h2) it follows that this
system is not dta-secure.
The next example shows that dta-security does not imply di-security
and hence not dot-security. This example shows that dta-security allows
the transmission of information about not performed actions, which is not
allowed by di-security.
4.7.2 Example. The system in Figure 4.10 is clearly not di-secure. We consider
the traces hd and d since the dipurge values of these two traces are the same
for L if one starts purging in s0:
dipurge(hd, L, s0) = dipurge(d, L, s0) = d .
But the observations after these two traces are different for L.
For the trace-based equivalence relations of the definition of dta-security,
we have that D is allowed to observe every action in every state. Hence
the equivalence classes of the ∼tdtaD are singleton sets and hence from
the perspective of L, we cannot apply the (SCtdta) condition with the d
actions. We have e ∼tdtaL h ∼tdtaL hd, but it is not possible that the trace d is
equivalent to any other trace that does not start with the action d. Therefore,
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s0
H D
L
obsL : 0
s1
H D
L
obsL : 0
s2
H D
L
obsL : 0
s3
H D
L
obsL : 1
h
d
d
Figure 4.10. A dta-secure, but not di-secure system
the system is dta-secure.
Figure 4.11 summarizes the implications of the noninterference defini-
tions for a setting with dynamic policies.
dt-security dot-security di-security
dta-security
\\ \
\
Figure 4.11. Relations between our dynamic noninterference definitions
If we have a system with a dynamic policy that has the same local
policy in all states, we can interpret it as a system with a global policy and
we can apply the security definitions of the previous chapter to it. From
the definition of the dynamic notions of security it directly follows that
t-security is equivalent to dt-security, i-security is equivalent to di-security,
and ta-security is equivalent to dta-security. The most notable equivalence
is that in the static case dot-security is also equivalent to t-security. This is
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interesting, because the effects of intransitivity and downgrading disappear
if one shifts from the dynamic to the static case.
4.8 Comparison with Leslie’s Work
To the best of our knowledge, the first notion of intransitive noninterfer-
ence for state-based systems with dynamic policies was introduced by
Leslie [Les06]. In this section we will discuss her notion of security and
compare it to ours. The system model used in Leslie’s work is the one of
Rushby [Rus92] and hence we can adapt her notion directly to our setting.
Instead of starting with the structurally easier case of transitive noninter-
ference, Leslie adapted dynamic intransitive noninterference directly from
the corresponding definition of static noninterference.
Leslie’s definition of dynamic noninterference follows the same pattern
as ours, however, there are slight, though important differences. Since we
use the same definition for the dynamic sources function as in Leslie’s work,
we can directly state their dipurge definition, which we will denote here as
Lpurge in order to have a clear distinction between their operator and our
definition.
4.8.1 Definition (Leslie’s dynamic intransitive purge operator [Les06]). For
every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ define
Lpurge(e, u, s) = e
Lpurge(aα, u, s) =
{
a Lpurge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s)
Lpurge(α, u, s · a) otherwise .
The only difference between the definition of Lpurge and dipurge is that
in the case an action is purged, in this definition, the transition is performed
and Lpurge proceeds in the state s · a instead of remaining in the state s,
like the dipurge operator does. This is somehow counter intuitive, since
removing an action from the purged trace means that the observation agent
should not get any information about the fact that the action was in the
trace. However, if we perform the transition, even in the case the action has
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been purged, we still have some influence of the purged action in the result
of the purged trace. Hence, the action is removed from the trace, but the
fact that the action was in the trace can still have effects on the purging of
the remaining actions in the trace. We will discuss this issue in one of the
next examples after recalling Leslie’s security definition. The corresponding
security definition from [Les06], which we call L-security, is:
4.8.2 Definition (L-security [Les06]). A system is L-secure iff for every u ∈ D
and every α ∈ A∗ it holds:
obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · Lpurge(α, u, sI)) .
Note that L-security only requires purging from the initial state rather
than starting from an arbitrary state as required in di-security. First, we
correct this issue by giving a stronger, persistent security definition based
on Lpurge which requires this property.
4.8.3 Definition (L-per-security). A system is L-per-secure iff for every u ∈ D,
α ∈ A∗ and every s ∈ S
obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · Lpurge(α, u, s)) .
Clearly, from this definition it follows that L-per-security implies L-
security. That L-per-security is indeed stricter then L-security is visible in
the next example.
4.8.4 Example. In the system in Figure 4.12 the agent H has two actions,
h1 and h2. The only interesting trace w.r.t. L-security is the trace h1h2d,
which is purged to d and hence leads to the same observation, and the trace
h1d which is purged to e and hence leads to the same observations, too.
However, if one starts purging the trace h2d in the state s1 then the purged
value is d which leads to different observations when starting from s1.
With the next example, we show that L-per-security neither implies
di-security nor dta-security.
4.8.5 Example. In this example, we explain why the system in Figure 4.13 is
L-per-secure. We suppose that agent L has no actions. In this system, it is
only necessary to consider purging from the initial state. Any trace starting
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s0
H D
L
obsL : 0
s1
H D
L
obsL : 0
s2
H D
L
obsL : 0
s3
H D
L
obsL : 1
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L
obsL : 1
h1
d
h2 d
Figure 4.12. An L-secure, but not L-per-secure system
s0
H D
L
obsL : 0
s1
H D
L
obsL : 0
s2
H D
L
obsL : 1
h
d
Figure 4.13. An L-per-secure, but neither di-secure nor dta-secure system
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with an action h will be purged to e, since after performing h, we are in the
state s1 and all remaining actions are purged and in the initial state also the
action h is purged. For example for the trace hd, we have
Lpurge(hd, L, s0) = Lpurge(d, L, s1) = e .
But every trace starting with h or the empty trace ends in a state where L’s
observation is 0.
Conversely, every trace starting with an action d will be purged to a
trace starting with d, since D is allowed to interfere with L in the initial
state. But every trace starting with d ends in the state s2 and therefore, on
all of these traces, L has the same observation, namely 1.
As a consequence, the system is L-per-secure. However, if L observes 1,
it knows that there was no action of H in the state s0 which is some
information about H. Intuitively, this contradicts the assumption that H is
never allowed to interfere with any of the agents.
This system is not di-secure, since we have dipurge(hd, L, s0) = d =
dipurge(d, L, s0).
This system is not dta-secure, since we have by (LRtdta) e ∼tdtaL h and
e ∼tdtaD h and by (SCtdta) d ∼tdtaL hd, and hence the system is not observation
consistent for L.
Before we will show that di-security implies L-per-security and hence
also L-security, we provide a technical lemma which states that the agents
in the sources of a trace are exactly those whose actions are in the Lpurge
value of the trace.
4.8.6 Lemma. For every u ∈ D, α ∈ A∗ and s ∈ S, we have
dsrc(α, u, s) = dom(alph(Lpurge(α, u, s))) .
Proof. We prove this result by an induction on the length of α and suppose
for the inductive step that α = aα′ holds for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗. By
induction hypothesis (I.H.), we assume that the claim holds for α′ in all
states.
Let s be a state. We distinguish these cases:
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s).
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Then we have
dom(alph(Lpurge(aα′, u, s))) = dom(alph(Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)))
(I.H.)
= dsrc(α′, u, s · a)
= dsrc(aα′, u, s) .
Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s).
Then we have
dom(alph(Lpurge(aα′, u, s)))
= dom(alph(a Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)))
= dom({a} ∪ alph(Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)))
= {dom(a)} ∪ dom(alph(Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)))
(I.H.)
= {dom(a)} ∪ dsrc(α′, u, s · a)
= dsrc(aα′, u, s) .
With this result, we can now prove that di-security implies L-per-secu-
rity.
4.8.7 Lemma. Every di-secure system is L-per-secure.
Proof. We prove this result by contraposition. Suppose we does not have a
not L-per-secure system. Hence, there exist u ∈ D, α ∈ A∗, and s ∈ S with
obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · Lpurge(α, u, s)) .
Additionally, we suppose that α is of minimal length for all possible choices
of u and s . Since α is not the empty trace, we can assume that α = aα′
for some a ∈ A and α′ ∈ A∗. From the minimality, it follows that the first
action a is purged from the trace, i. e., dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s) and hence
Lpurge(aα′, u, s) = Lpurge(α′, u, s · a). Applying the observations to these
purged traces after starting in the state s gives
obsu(s · Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)) = obsu(s · Lpurge(aα′, u, s)) .
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Since the trace α′ is shorter than α, from the minimality of α, it follows
obsu(s · aα′) = obsu(s · a Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)) .
Because of the initial assumption, the values of the last two equations are
different, which gives
obsu(s · Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)) 6= obsu(s · a Lpurge(α′, u, s · a)) .
It remains to show that dom(a) /∈ dsrc(a Lpurge(α′, u, s · a), u, s). It follows
from Lemma 4.8.6 that we have a /∈ alph(Lpurge(aα′, u, s)), since dom(a) /∈
dsrc(aα′, u, s). Further, if dom(a) ∈ dsrc(a Lpurge(α′, u, s · a), u, s), then
there is some b ∈ alph(Lpurge(aα′, u, s)) with dom(a)s dom(b). From
Lemma 4.8.6 it follows that dom(b) ∈ dsrc(aα′, u, s) and hence, dom(a) ∈
dsrc(aα′, u, s), which is a contradiction to our initial assumption. Hence,
the system is not di-secure.
Next, we show that dta-security implies L-per-security, too.
4.8.8 Lemma. Every dta-secure system is L-per-secure.
Proof. We show this lemma by contraposition. Suppose that the system is
not L-per-secure. Then there are u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α ∈ A∗ with
obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · Lpurge(α, u, s)) .
Let δ ∈ A∗ with s = sI · δ. We will show the following claim: For every
β, β′ ∈ A∗ with α = ββ′ and for every γ ∈ A∗ with Lpurge(α, u, s) =
γ Lpurge(β′, u, s · β) and for every v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s · β), we have δβ ∼tdtav δγ.
We prove this claim by an induction on β. For the base case with β = e,
we have that α = β′ and hence γ = e from which the claim is immediate. For
the inductive step, let β = β˜b for some action b. The induction hypothesis
is: For some γ with Lpurge(α, u, s) = γ Lpurge(bβ′, u, s · β˜) and every
v ∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s · β˜), we have δβ˜ ∼tdtav δγ.
We consider the following two cases:
Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s · β˜).
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In this case, we have
dsrc(bβ′, u, s · β˜) = dsrc(β′, u, s · β˜b)
and
Lpurge(bβ′, u, s · β˜) = Lpurge(β′, u, s · β˜b) .
Hence, the new value of γ is the same as the previous value. And since
dom(b) 6s·δβ˜ v, by (LRtdta), for every v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s · β˜b), we have
δβ˜b ∼tdtav δβ˜, and combined with δβ˜ ∼tdtav δγ it follows the claim.
Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s · β˜).
In this case, we have dsrc(bβ′, u, s · β˜) = {dom(b)} ∪dsrc(β′, u, s · β˜b). Since
Lpurge(α, u, s) = γ Lpurge(bβ′, u, s · β˜)
= γb Lpurge(β′, u, s · β˜b) ,
the new value of γ is γ′ = γb. For every v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s · β˜b), we have
δβ˜ ∼tdtav δγ by induction hypothesis and additionally δβ˜ ∼tdtadom(b) δγ. From
the condition (SCtdta) it follows for every such v: δβ˜b ∼tdtav δγb = δγ′.
From this claim it follows δα ∼tdtau δ Lpurge(α, u, s) with β = α and
hence ∼tdtau is not observation consistent for u and the system is not dta-
secure.
Summarizing these results, we conclude that both di-security and dta-
security imply L-per-security and hence L-security. All of these implications
are strict. This is outlined in Figure 4.14.
We believe that both L-per-security and L-security are too weak. Addi-
tionally, we will point out a serious shortcoming of these two noninterfer-
ence definitions.
The next example shows that the definition of L-security is not monotone
according to restrictiveness of dynamic policies. The system in the next
example is not L-secure, but becomes secure with a more restrictive policy.
This is highly counterintuitive and an undesired property. As we have
seen in Corollary 4.5.6, di-security has this monotonicity property. From
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dt-security dot-security di-security
dta-security
L-per-security L-security
\\ \
\
Figure 4.14. Relations between ours and Leslie’s dynamic noninterference defini-
tions
its definition, it follows clearly that dta-secure has this monotony property,
too.
s0
H D
L
obsL : 0
s1
H D
L
obsL : 0
s2
H D
L
obsL : 0
s3
H D
L
obsL : 1
h
d
d
Figure 4.15. Non-monotony of L-security and L-per-security
4.8.9 Example. The system in Figure 4.15 has two different configurations of
the dynamic policy indicated by the dotted policy edge in state s1: in one
configuration there is an edge from D to L and in the other, this edge is
non-existing. First, consider the configuration where this edge exists. With
respect to L-security and hence to L-per-security, this system is insecure,
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since we have
Lpurge(hd, L, s0) = Lpurge(d, L, s1) = d ,
but obsL(s0 · hd) = 0 6= 1 = obsL(s0 · d).
However, if we remove the edge from D to L in state s1, this system
becomes both L-per-secure and L-secure. We have Lpurge(hd, L, s0) = e
and obsL(s0 · hd) = 0 = obsL(s0).
This is highly counterintuitive since the policy without this edge is more
restrictive than the policy with this edge.
The counterintuitive behavior of the L-security definition as outlined in
Example 4.8.9 gives us more evidence that this is not a reasonable security
definition and strengthens our proposals for alternative security definitions
as provided in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Analyzing Information Flows -
Algorithms and Complexity
Efficient algorithms for the verification of security properties and for the
automated detection of security holes are fundamental for the application
and acceptance of a theoretical framework. In this section, we analyze
the complexity of the verification problem for finite-state systems for the
security notions given in the previous chapters and present verification
algorithms for those security notions for which we have a characterization
by a polynomial-size unwinding.
We will show in Section 5.1 that on a system with a static policy, t-
security, i-security, and ta-security can be verified in polynomial time. In
Section 5.2, we will see that in systems with dynamic policies, both dt-
security and dot-security can be verified in polynomial time, too. However,
for the dynamic intransitive notion di-security, we show in Section 5.3
that the verification problem is NP-complete. In contrast, we will see in
Section 5.5 that for those notions which include the observations in the
allowed knowledge, to-security and ito-security, the verification problem
is undecidable. We do not have analyzed the complexity of dta-security
and leave it as an open problem for future research. At the end of this
chapter, in Section 5.7, we provide a brief digression on the disjoint-set data
structure which is extensively used in most of our algorithms.
Similar algorithms for static noninterference and undecidability results
are submitted for publication in [EvdMSW13]. The NP-completeness result
for di-security follows the same idea as the one in [ESW13].
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5.1 Verification of t-security, i-security, and
ta-security
We will show that t-security, i-security, and also ta-security can be veri-
fied in polynomial time. Indeed, they can be verified in nondeterministic
logarithmic space. We will provide verification algorithms for these three
security definitions by translating the state-based unwinding relations into
algorithms. In the case that the verified system is insecure with respect to
the corresponding security definition, the algorithm outputs two traces as a
witness for the insecurity.
The common idea of these algorithms is to compute the smallest state-
based unwinding relation and to verify observation consistency for the
observing agent. We will provide a detailed high level description of these
algorithms. We use the disjoint-set data structure for a highly efficient
implementation of these algorithms. The details of this data structure will
be given in Section 5.7.
More precisely, the algorithms start with singleton sets for each state of
the system. By applying the unwinding conditions, the smallest equivalence
relation on the states that satisfies all required unwinding condition will
be computed. After each step, observation consistency is verified for the
observing agent.
Except of the previously published algorithms in [EvdMSW13], to the
best of our knowledge, no polynomial-time algorithm for the verification of
t-security or ta-security has been published. For the verification of i-security,
Pinsky [Pin95] claimed to provide a polynomial-time algorithm. However,
it has been pointed out [Man01, EvdMSW13] that this result is wrong. In
[HALL+05], Hadj-Alouane et al. presented an exponential-time algorithm
for the verification of i-security.
5.1.1 State-based Generalized Unwinding
We generalize the state-based unwinding for t-security and i-security in
order to formulate a single algorithm for the verification and to avoid
proving the correctness of the algorithms twice.
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5.1.1 Definition (state-based generalized unwinding). A state-based general-
ized unwinding relation for u ∈ D and L, X ⊆ D is an equivalence relation
∼sgu,L,X ⊆ S× S that satisfies the following conditions for every a ∈ A,
s, t ∈ S.
(LRsg): If dom(a) ∈ L, then s ∼sgu,L,X s · a.
(SCsg): If s ∼sgu,L,X t and dom(a) ∈ X, then s · a ∼sgu,L,X t · a.
Instantiated with a policy, intuitively, L is the set of all agents which
are not allowed to interfere with u. The set X are those agents which
cannot transmit any information from any agent of L to u. The state-based
generalized unwinding can be instantiated for t-security by L = {v ∈ D |
v 6 u} and X = D and for i-security for every agent v by L = {v} and
X = {w ∈ D | v 6 w}. Hence, the state-based unwinding definition for
t-security in Definition 3.2.9 and for i-security in Definition 3.4.11 are special
cases of this generalized unwinding. The corresponding characterizations
in terms of unwinding relations follow directly by taking u as the observing
agent.
5.1.2 Verifying a State-based Generalized Unwinding
The first algorithm is the core of the algorithms for verifying t-security and
i-security.
It computes the smallest state-based generalized unwinding relation for
input parameters u, L, and X.
Algorithm 1 computes the the smallest equivalence relation that satisfies
the conditions (LRsg) and (SCsg) of a state-based generalized unwinding. It
starts with the identity relation. Then it increases the relation by iteratively
applying the conditions (LRsg) and (SCsg) until they are satisfied for all
states and actions. After every change of the relation computed so far, the
algorithm checks if observation consistency holds. If this is not the case, the
algorithm computes a witness, i. e., a pair of traces that proves the insecurity
of the system, and interrupts it.
The equivalence relation is represented as a partition of the state space S,
using the disjoint-set data structure. The list P maintains the pairs of states
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Algorithm 1: generalized-unwinding(u, L, X)
Input: agent u, set of agents L, set of agents X
/* create a new partition */
1 foreach s ∈ S do
2 Make-Set(s) ;
3 let P be an empty list ;
4 let store be empty ;
/* left respect from L agents */
5 foreach s ∈ S do
6 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) ∈ L do
7 if Find(s) 6= Find(s · a) then
8 add ((s · a, s), (s, s), (a, e)) to store;
9 insert (s · a, s) into the list P ;
10 Union(s · a, s) ;
11 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(s) then
12 return compute-witness(u, s · a, s, e, e) ;
/* step consistency from X agents */
13 while P 6= ∅ do
14 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
15 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) ∈ X do
16 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
17 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
18 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
19 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
20 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
21 return compute-witness(u, s · a, t · a, e, e) ;
22 return false
Figure 5.1. Algorithm for computing a generalized unwinding
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Procedure compute-witness(u, s, t, α, β)
1 if s = t then
2 return (u, s, α, β) ;
3 else
4 choose stored entry ((s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b)) ;
5 compute-witness(u, s′, t′, aα, bβ) ;
Figure 5.2. Procedure for computing a witness for insecurity
that are merged in a union step. To compute a witness in the case of
insecurity, the store data structure keeps track of all created pairs, as well
as the pair of states and the pair of actions (or an action and the empty
trace) from which it has been created.
The entries of the store data structure consist of three pairs of the form
(s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b), where s, t, s′, t′ are states and a is an action and b is either
an action or the empty trace. Such an entry is inserted into the store if a
Union operation is performed on the states s and t, where s is reached
from s′ by performing the action a and t is reached from t′ by performing
the action b (in the case of b = e, the state t is equal to t′).
Since the union is only applied if Find(s) 6= Find(t) and after the union,
the Find values of s and t are the same, the first pair of each stored entry
is unique. Hence, the store data structure can be implemented as an array,
indexed by the first pair of each entry.
If the union operation is applied to states with different observations
for u, observation consistency for u is violated and the run of the algorithm
terminates immediately with a call to the procedure compute-witness,
which computes a witness for the insecurity.
To reference different values of the Find function, we parameterize it
with the number of unions done during the run of the algorithm. The func-
tion Findi, with i ≥ 0, denotes the values of Find after the ith application
of Union during the run of the algorithm. Note that only an application of
the function Union may change the value of the function Find. We call i
the union-number.
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Similarly, the list Pi denotes the set of all pairs in P after the ith applica-
tion of union. The set P≤i =
⋃
j≤i Pj is the set of all pairs inserted into P up
to the ith union-number, including those that have been removed. Since P≤i
is a set of pairs of states, we consider it as a binary relation on S.
Define for all states s and t the observation equivalence relation for agent
u as
s ∼obsu t iff obsu(s) = obsu(t) .
To refer to the states of the construction of the equivalence relation,
define for all union-numbers i and all states s and t
s ∼Findi t iff Findi(s) = Findi(t) ,
and
s ∼stepi t iff s ∼Findi t and
for all a ∈ A with dom(a) ∈ X: s · a ∼Findi t · a .
The relation ∼Findi is the equivalence relation computed during the run
of the algorithm after the ith union. The relation ∼stepi is a subset of the the
equivalence relation ∼Findi that includes those states that are step consistent
for all possible actions from A. Clearly, as mentioned, both relations are
equivalence relations. Also note that the relations are monotone in the
union-number, i. e., for every union-number i, and all states s and t, we
have if s ∼Findi t, then s ∼Findi+1 t and if s ∼
step
i t, then s ∼
step
i+1 t.
We want to show the correctness of Algorithm 1. The proof is split into
the following lemmas.
5.1.2 Lemma. Let i be a union-number. Then ∼Findi is the smallest equivalence
relation on S that includes P≤i.
Proof. We prove this claim by an induction on the union-number i. For the
base case, we have i = 0 and P0 is empty. The smallest equivalence relation
which includes the empty set is the identity relation, which represents the
values of Find right before the first application of Union in the algorithm.
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At each application of Union, the pairs inserted into P are exactly
those that are used by the union. Hence ∼Findi is the reflexive, symmetric,
transitive closure of P≤i. Therefore, ∼Findi is the smallest equivalence
relation on S that includes P≤i.
5.1.3 Lemma. If the algorithm terminates with a witness (u, s, α, β), then the
traces α and β differ only in actions from agents of L, but lead to different observa-
tions of u starting in s, i. e., dom(alph(α)) and dom(alph(β)) are both subsets
of L ∪ X and αX\L = βX\L and obsu(s · α) 6= obsu(s · β).
Proof. The procedure compute-witness is called with two states as parame-
ters having different observations for u, which are by the construction of
the compute-witness procedure the states s · α and s · β. By the insertion of
actions in store, there are actions of agents from L inserted asymmetrically
and actions of agents from X are appended on both traces symmetrically,
from which the claim follows.
To complete the proof of the correctness of Algorithm 1, we show that
the converse holds, too.
5.1.4 Lemma. If the algorithm generalized-unwinding, run with input parame-
ters u, L, and X, terminates with false, then there exists a state-based generalized
unwinding relation ∼sgu,L,X that is observation consistent for u.
Proof. Let u ∈ D and L, X ⊆ D. Consider a run of the algorithm generalized-
unwinding terminating with false.
Let m be the last union-number. We will show inductively that the
equivalence relation ∼Findm will satisfy the conditions (LRsg) and (SCsg) of
the state-based generalized unwinding and also show that ∼Findm satisfies
observation consistency for u.
Let i be the union-number right after the foreach-loop starting in line 5.
Then the (LRsg) condition holds, since for every s ∈ S and every a ∈ A with
dom(a) ∈ L, we have s ∼Findi s · a.
For showing observation consistency of u, it is checked that the obser-
vations for u are equal in every two states which are merged by a union.
Inductively, if the observations are equal for u on any two merged sets,
the observations are then also equal in the resulting set. Therefore, for
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every i ≤ m, we have ∼Findi ⊆ ∼obsu . Moreover, the relation ∼Findm satisfies
observation consistency for u.
For showing (SCsg), we observe that Pm is empty and that for every
s, t ∈ S with (s, t) ∈ P≤m, we have s ∼Findm t and s · a ∼Findm t · a for
every a ∈ A with dom(a) ∈ X. This is guaranteed by the foreach-loop in
line 15 for every pair taken out of P in the line above. Therefore, we have
P≤m ⊆ ∼stepm . Since ∼stepm is an equivalence relation and since ∼Findm is the
smallest equivalence relation that contains P≤m, we have ∼Findm ⊆ ∼stepm .
Therefore, the relation ∼Findm = ∼sgu,L,X satisfies the (SCsg) condition and is a
state-based generalized unwinding relation for u, L, and X.
The next lemma shows the correctness and the running time for the
compute-witness procedure.
5.1.5 Lemma. The procedure compute-witness computes a witness for insecurity
in O(|S| · |A|).
Proof. For showing the correctness of the procedure compute-witness, we
will first show that the graph induced by the stored values forms a wood
of directed rooted trees. Recall that for every stored entry of the form e =
((s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b)) the projections onto its components are pi0(e) = (s, t),
pi1(e) = (s′, t′) and pi2(e) = (a, b). For every union-number i, the graph
Gi = (Vi, Ei) induced by the stored pairs of states is defined by
Vi ={pi0(e) | e is a stored entry up to the ith union-number}
∪ {pi1(e) | e is a stored entry up to the ith union-number} ,
Ei ={(pi0(e),pi1(e)) | e is a stored entry up to the ith union-number} .
We will show by an induction on the union-number i that the graph Gi is
a wood and that each of its trees is a directed rooted tree. All edges are
oriented towards the root and each root is of the form (s, s) for some state
s ∈ S. We will also show that the following two inclusions hold for every
union-number i:
P≤i ⊆ Vi ⊆ P≤i ∪ {(s, s) | s ∈ S} .
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In any iteration of the loop starting in line 5, only edges of the form
((s, t), (s′, s′)) with s 6= t are inserted into the graph. Therefore, each
connected component of each graph Gi after each iteration of this loop is a
directed rooted tree, since only the root vertices are pairs with same entries.
In an iteration of the loop starting in line 15, an edge e = ((s, t), (s′, t′)) is
only inserted into Gi, if Findi(s) 6= Findi(t). Therefore, (s, t) /∈ P≤i ∪ {(s′′, s′′) | s′′ ∈ S}
and by induction hypothesis, we have (s, t) /∈ Vi. Since (s′, t′) ∈ P≤i, the
new edge e connects a new vertex with one from Vi. Hence, again, each
connected component in the graph Gi+1 is a directed rooted tree.
In the remainder of this proof, we analyze the complexity of this pro-
cedure. The procedure compute-witness is called with two states s and t
with (s, t) ∈ P≤i. Then, it finds a path to the root (s′, s′) of the tree where
(s, t) belongs to. This can be done within O(|S|). Then a shortest path from
s′ to the initial state sI can be found within O(|S| · |A|), which is an upper
bound for the running time of the whole algorithm.
Next, we analyze the running time of the algorithm generalized-unwind-
ing.
5.1.6 Lemma. The running time of the algorithm generalized-unwinding is
bounded by O(|A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
Proof. The Union operation is only applied to states in different sets and in
this case, the number of sets in the partition is reduced by one. Hence the
number of unions is bounded by |S|.
Also insertions into P are only done in combination with a union step.
Hence the number of elements inserted into P during a run of the algorithm
is bounded by |S|. The Union and Find operations have an amortized
running time of α(|S|). The number of the iterations of the loops starting in
line 5 and line 15 are bounded by |A| · |S|. Hence the running time of the
whole algorithm is in O(|A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
5.1.3 t-security
For the verification of t-security, Algorithm 1 can be easily used. The state-
based generalized unwinding conditions can be parameterized such that
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they are equivalent to the transitive unwinding conditions in Definition 3.2.9.
This is achieved by setting L(u) = {v ∈ D | v 6 u} and X = D iterated
on every possible choices of u ∈ D. Hence the algorithm for verifying
t-security has a loop running over all agents u and calls in each of its
iterations Algorithm 1 with input parameters u, L(u), and D.
Algorithm 2: verify-t-security
1 set result = false ;
2 foreach u ∈ D do
3 result = generalized-unwinding(u, {v ∈ D | v 6 u}, D) ;
4 if result then
5 return system is insecure with witness result
6 return system is t-secure
Figure 5.3. Algorithm for verifying t-security
5.1.7 Lemma. For a finite-state system, t-security can be verified in O(|D| · |A| ·
|S| · α(|S|)) by the algorithm verify-t-security.
Proof. Algorithm 2 has a single loop which runs over all agents u ∈ D and
in each iteration the algorithm generalized-unwinding is called. Hence the
running time is |D| times the running time of the algorithm generalized-
unwinding.
5.1.4 i-security
Similar to the verification of t-security, i-security can be verified by instan-
tiating the state-based generalized unwinding with appropriate sets for L
and X. Here, we define for each v ∈ D with v 6 u the sets L(v) = {v} and
X(v) = {w ∈ D | v 6 w}. With these choices, the state-based generalized
unwinding is equivalent to the state-based unwinding for i-security.
5.1.8 Lemma. For a finite-state system, i-security can be verified in O(|D|2 · |A| ·
|S| · α(|S|)) by the algorithm verify-i-security.
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Algorithm 3: verify-i-security
1 set result = false ;
2 foreach u ∈ D do
3 foreach v ∈ D with v 6 u do
4 result = generalized-unwinding(u, {v}, {w ∈ D | v 6 w}) ;
5 if result then
6 return system is insecure with witness result
7 return system is i-secure
Figure 5.4. Algorithm for verifying i-security
Proof. Algorithm 3 has two iterated loops which both run over a subset
of D and in each iteration the algorithm generalized-unwinding is called.
Hence the running time of this algorithm is |D|2 times the running time of
the algorithm generalized-unwinding.
5.1.5 ta-security
ta-security can be verified in a similar way as t-security or i-security. How-
ever, we can not apply the algorithm for the verification of the generalized
unwinding. Algorithm 4 verifies the conditions of the state-based un-
winding for ta-security given in Definition 3.5.20. The main difference
to Algorithm 1 is that the loop that computes the partition for the (LRsg)
condition is substituted by a loop that computes the (SWAPsta) condition
of Definition 3.5.20. As shown in Theorem 3.5.21, ta-security can be ex-
pressed as a combination of i-security and an additional unwinding. Since
we have already shown how to verify i-security, it remains to provide an
algorithm for the verification of the state-based unwinding conditions of
Definition 3.5.20. Hence, for verifying ta-security, one needs to apply both
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.
5.1.9 Lemma. On a finite-state system, ta-security can be verified in O(|D|3 ·
|A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
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Algorithm 4: ta-security-verification
1 foreach u ∈ D do
2 foreach v ∈ D do
3 foreach w ∈ D with w 6 v and v 6 w and w 6 u do
4 foreach s ∈ S do
5 Make-Set(s) ;
6 let P be an empty list ;
7 let store be empty ;
/* apply (SWAPsta) condition */
8 foreach s ∈ S do
9 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) = v do
10 foreach b ∈ A with dom(b) = w do
11 if Find(s · ab) 6= Find(s · ba) then
12 add ((s · ab, s · ba), (s, s), (ab, ba)) to store;
13 insert (s · ab, s · ba) into the list P ;
14 Union(s · ab, s · ba) ;
15 if obsu(s · ab) 6= obsu(s · ba) then
16 return
compute-witness(u, s · ab, s · ba, e, e) ;
/* apply (SCsta) condition */
17 while P 6= ∅ do
18 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
19 foreach a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a) do
20 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
21 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
22 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
23 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
24 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
25 return compute-witness(u, s · a, t · a, e, e) ;
26 return “ta-secure if di-secure”
Figure 5.5. An algorithm for the state-based ta-security unwinding
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Proof. Algorithm 4 has a similar structure as Algorithm 1. However, each of
the three outer loops iterates on a subset of D. This leads to the additional
factor of |D|3. The rest of the analysis of the running time is similar to that
in the proof of Lemma 5.1.6. Since the running time of Algorithm 4 bounds
the running time for verifying i-security, for our analysis, we do not need
to take into account the latter.
5.2 Verification of Dynamic Noninterference
Similar to those of the previous section, we provide verification algorithms
for dt-security and dot-security. Due to the similar structure of the state-
based unwinding conditions for dt-security to those for t-security, the
verification algorithm is analogue. For the verification of dot-security, the
verification algorithm differs, since the state-based unwinding relations for
dot-security are in general not equivalence relations.
5.2.1 dt-security
As we saw in Theorem 4.2.8, dt-security is characterized by the existence of
state-based unwinding relations for every agent. These unwinding relations
lead to a verification algorithm similar to the one for t-security. In Figure 5.6,
an algorithm for verifying dt-security is provided. The procedure compute-
witness is the same as in the static case, since it is independent of the
policy.
5.2.1 Lemma. On a finite-state system, dt-security can be verified in O(|D| · |A| ·
|S| · α(|S|)) by the algorithm verify-dt-security.
Proof. Algorithm 5 computes the smallest unwinding relation satisfying
(LRsdt) and (SCsdt) and verifies that it is observation consistent for the
observing agent. The only difference to the verification of t-security is that
the policy is dynamic. However, the dynamic policy has no influence on
the running time.
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Algorithm 5: verify-dt-security
/* create a new partition */
1 foreach u ∈ D do
2 foreach s ∈ S do
3 Make-Set(s) ;
4 let P be an empty list ;
5 let store be empty ;
/* apply (LRsdt) condition */
6 foreach s ∈ S do
7 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) 6s u do
8 if Find(s) 6= Find(s · a) then
9 add ((s · a, s), (s, s), (a, e)) to store;
10 insert (s · a, s) into the list P ;
11 Union(s · a, s) ;
12 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(s) then
13 return compute-witness(u, s · a, s, e, e) ;
/* apply (SCsdt) condition */
14 while P 6= ∅ do
15 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
16 foreach a ∈ A do
17 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
18 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
19 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
20 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
21 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
22 return compute-witness(u, s · a, t · a, e, e) ;
23 return false
Figure 5.6. Algorithm for verifying dt-security
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Algorithm 6: verify-dot-security
/* create a new partition */
1 foreach u ∈ D do
2 foreach v ∈ D do
3 let P be an empty list ;
4 let store be empty ;
/* apply (LRsdot) condition */
5 foreach s ∈ S do
6 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) = v and v 6s u do
7 if (s, s · a) not stored then
8 add ((s, s · a), (s, s), (e, a)) to store;
9 insert (s, s · a) into the list P ;
10 if obsu(s) 6= obsu(s · a) then
11 return compute-witness(u, s, s · a, e, e) ;
/* apply (SCsdot) condition */
12 while P 6= ∅ do
13 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
14 foreach a ∈ A with either dom(a) 6= v or dom(a) = v with
v 6t u do
15 if (s · a, t · a) not stored then
16 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
17 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
18 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
19 return compute-witness(u, s · a, t · a, e, e) ;
20 return false
Figure 5.7. Algorithm for verifying dot-security
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5.2.2 dot-security
As we have already seen in this chapter, the existence of a characteriza-
tion in terms of a state-based unwinding relation can be translated into
a verification algorithm. This also holds for dot-security, since it can be
characterized by the existence of a state-based downgrading over time
unwinding, defined in Definition 4.3.7. However, these relations are not
equivalence relations and hence cannot be expressed as partitions of the
state space. This will be reflected in the complexity as we cannot use the
highly efficient disjoint-set data structure as in the previous algorithms.
Nonetheless, we encode the conditions of this unwinding into a polynomial-
time algorithm.
The algorithm verify-dot-security in Figure 5.7 computes for every pair
of agents v, u the smallest unwinding relation -sdotu,v and verifies after each
new pair whether the created relation is observation consistent for u. The
condition “(s, t) not stored” in line 7 and line 15 means that there is no
triple in store, such that (s, t) is its first entry.
We provide here only a very coarse analysis of the running time.
5.2.2 Lemma. On a finite-state system, dot-security can be verified in O(|D|2 ·
|A| · |S|2) by the algorithm verify-dot-security.
Proof. Algorithm 6 follows the same pattern as the previous algorithms,
except that the visited states are not maintained by the disjoint-set data
structure. This increases the running time, but does not affect the correctness
of the algorithm.
The most important observation is that every possible pair of states is
only inserted into P when a corresponding value is stored. Since values are
never removed from the store, the stored values are uniquely determined
by their first entry. Every possible pair of states is only inserted into P
once. Hence the number of the iterations of the while-loop is bounded
by |S|2.
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5.3 Complexity of di-security
For dynamic intransitive noninterference, the verification problem has a
higher complexity than for i-security, dt-security, or dot-security. Although
we have seen that di-security can be characterized by the existence of a state-
based unwinding, the number of needed unwinding relations is exponential
in the number of the agents of the system. We will not provide an algorithm
for the verification of di-security. Instead, we will show that the verification
problem is NP-complete. We will show NP-hardness by a reduction from
the 3-SAT problem which simplifies the proof compared to the reduction
from 3-colorability problem as given in [ESW13].
First, we show that the verification problem is in NP.
5.3.1 Lemma. Deciding whether a system is not di-secure is in NP.
Proof. We will describe an algorithm which verifies that a system is not
di-secure. The algorithm guesses a state s, an action a, an agent u, and a
trace α and verifies that these satisfy
dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α) . (∗)
To show that this is an NP-algorithm, it suffices to show that the length of α
is polynomially bounded by the size of the system. For that, let α be a trace
of minimal length satisfying the condition (∗).
Let M2 be the product system of a copy of the system M when the initial
state is set to s and a copy of the system M when the initial state is set to
s · a. Clearly, the number of states of this system is |S|2. If the length of
α is greater than |S|2, then the run of α in M2 visits a state of M2 twice.
Therefore, α contains a loop. This loop can be removed from α without
changing the reached state of M2. We call β the reduced trace. Clearly, β
and aβ lead to the same observations as α and aα do, respectively. Since β
is a subsequence of α, we have dom(a) /∈ dsrc(aβ, u, s).
Next, we show the NP-hardness of the verification problem of di-security
by a reduction from the 3-satisfiability problem (3-SAT). An instance of the
3-SAT problem is given by a conjunction of clauses, where each clause is
a disjunction of exactly three literals. A literal is a boolean variable or its
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negation. Such an instance is a positive instance if and only if it is satisfiable.
It is well-known that this decidability problem is NP-complete [Coo71].
The following construction encodes a 3-SAT instance into a system
equipped with agents and a dynamic policy. After the construction, we will
show that the constructed system is not di-secure if and only if the used
instance is a positive one.
Consider a 3-SAT instance given by variables x1, . . . , xn and clauses
c1, . . . , cm. Each clause ci contains literals l1i , l
2
i , l
3
i . Each literal l
j
i is equal to
some variable xk or a negated variable ¬xk.
First, we provide the formal construction of the system and will give a
more intuitive description of the components afterwards.
For any variable xi, the system has agents Xi and Xi. The set of all these
agents is defined as X = {Xi, Xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Additionally, we have agents
L and H. Hence the set of all agents is D = X ∪ {L, H}. We identify every
literal with an action. Therefore, for each variable xi, there is an action xi
and one denoted by xi corresponding to the literal ¬xi. These actions can be
performed by the agents Xi and Xi, respectively. The agent H can perform
an action h, the agent L has no actions. The states of the system are of the
form
. (y, z, i) with y ∈ {right, left}, z ∈ {choice, pos, neg} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
. (y, clause, j) with y ∈ {right, left} and j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
. (y, last) with y ∈ {right, left}.
The initial state is sI = (left, choice, 1).
The transitions of the action h are
(left, choice, 1) · h = (right, choice, 1),
and for any y ∈ {right, left}, any z ∈ {pos, neg} and any 1 ≤ i < n:
(y, z, i) · h = (y, choice, i + 1), and
(y, z, n) · h = (y, clause, 1) .
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The transitions of the actions xi and xi are for any y ∈ {right, left} and
any 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(y, choice, i) · xi = (y, pos, i),
(y, choice, i) · xi = (y, neg, i),
and for every literal l ji contained in clause ci, there is a transition
(y, clause, i) · l ji = (y, clause, i + 1) if i < n, and
(y, clause, i) · l ji = (y, last) if i = n .
All transitions not explicitly given loop in the corresponding state.
Only the agent L has non-constant observations. The observations of L
are 0 on all states, except on the state (left, last), here, L observes 1.
The edges in the dynamic policy are given by: All agents of the form
Xi and Xi interfere in all states with L. Additionally, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
agent H interferes with Xi in the state (right, pos, i) and H interferes with Xi
in the state (right, neg, i). The agent H interferes with L in all states marked
with left, except the initial state.
V(left) V(right)
C(left) C(right)
(left, last)
obsL : 1
(right, last)
obsL : 0
h
Figure 5.8. Coarse structure of the system M(ϕ)
The coarse structure of the constructed system is depicted in Figure 5.8.
The system consists of subsystems V(left) and V(right). The latter one is
depicted in Figure 5.9. The other one has the same structure, except for the
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X
L
H
Xi
X
L
H
Xi
X
L
X
L
H
Xi+1
X
L
H
Xi+1
X
L
xi xi
h h
xi+1 xi+1
Figure 5.9. Structure of the subsystem V(right)
X
L
X
L
X
L
l0j , l
1
j , l
2
j
l0j+1, l
1
j+1, l
2
j+1
Figure 5.10. Structure of the subsystem C(right)
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less restrictive policies as described above. The idea is that the choice of the
actions xi corresponds to an assignment of true to the respective variable
and the choice of xi corresponds to the assignment of false to it. In any of
these cases, the agent that does not perform the action allowed to receive
the following h action from H. This process is repeated for all variables
occurring in the formula.
Afterwards, the system reaches the subsystems C(left) or C(right). Again,
these are the same systems, except the less restrictive policies in the sub-
system labeled with left. In this subsystem, each state corresponds to a
particular clause of the formula. The actions that can be performed in a
state corresponding to a clause ci are exactly those that correspond to the
literals of that formula. The last transitions of this subsystem lead to one
of the states labeled with last. From these states, there are no non-looping
transitions.
The main property of this system is that it contains a run hα from initial
state to (right, last) such that h is not downgraded by α to L if and only if
the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable. We call such a trace a hiding trace.
5.3.2 Definition (hiding trace). A trace hα is hiding if H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, sI)
and sI · hα = (right, last).
Intuitively, the subsystem V(right) enforces to choose a variable assign-
ment for all variables occurring in the formula. This is done by performing
one of the actions xi for true of xi for false. In any of these cases, it is
followed by an action h in a state where H is allowed to interfere with one
of the agents Xi or Xi, namely that one that has not performed an action
in the previous state. This guarantees that if the agent that receives the
action h performs an action later in a run, the performing of the initial
action h will be revealed.
After leaving the subsystem V(right), the run has to proceed into the
subsystem C(right). The intuition is that for each clause, one literal has to
be chosen to proceed in the system. If a literal has been chosen that was
not previously chosen in the subsystem V(right), then, as explained, the h
action is transmitted to L.
If the actions corresponding to the literals have been chosen in the
way explained, then h is not transmitted to L and a hiding path hα exists.
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Obviously, this is only possible if the formula is satisfiable.
5.3.3 Lemma. Let ϕ be a 3-SAT formula. A system M constructed from ϕ has a
hiding path iff ϕ is satisfiable.
Proof. First, assume that the constructed system has a hiding path. Then,
there is a sequence of actions α such that H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, sI) and sI · hα =
(right, last). We choose α of minimal length from all possible choices with
this property. The run of hα has no self-loops, since otherwise α would
not be of minimal length. Since the run of α goes through the system
V(right), there is a prefix of α of the form l1hl2h · · · lnh, where li is one of
the actions xi or xi. Depending on that choice, define a truth assignment
f : {x1, . . . , xn} → {true, false} by
f (xi) =
{
true if xi = li
false if xi = li .
Assume that ϕ is not satisfied by this truth assignment. Therefore, there is
a clause ci such that all literals are mapped to false by f . Since the hiding
path reaches the state (right, last), each action l corresponding to a literal of
ci that has been taken in the state (right, clause, i). But since this action l has
not been taken in the subsystem V(right), there was an action h performed
in a state s where H s dom(l). Therefore, after performing the action l,
the agent H is in the corresponding set of sources, which contradicts the
property of a hiding path that H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, sI). Hence, the formula ϕ is
satisfiable.
Assume for the other direction of the proof that ϕ is satisfiable. Then,
there is a satisfying truth assignment
f : {x1, . . . , xn} → {true, false} .
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n set
li =
{
xi if f (xi) = true
xi if f (xi) = false .
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Since this truth assignment is satisfying, there is a sequence of literals
lc1, . . . , l
c
m such that at least one of every clause is evaluated to true. There-
fore, we have that {lc1, . . . , lcm} ⊆ {l1, . . . , ln}. Define the path α as
α = l1hl2h · · · lnhlc1 · · · lcm .
By the construction of the system, we have sI · hα = (right, last). Since every
action lci appeared earlier in the trace α, we have in all states s, where h is
performed that H 6s dom(lci ). Therefore the action h is not downgraded
to L, i.e., H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, sI).
We will show that in systems arising from this construction, the existence
of a hiding path is equivalent to being insecure with respect to the definition
of di-security.
5.3.4 Lemma. A system as constructed above is not di-secure iff it contains a
hiding path.
Proof. Assume that the constructed system is not di-secure. Since L is the
only agent that has non-constant observations and H is the only agent that is
not allowed to interfere with L in all states, there is a state s and a sequence
of actions α such that H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, s) and obsL(s · hα) 6= obsL(s · α).
Thus, exactly one of the states s · hα and s · α has to be (left, last). Therefore,
the state s is a state labeled with left. But in any of these states, except sI , all
agents, including H, are allowed to interfere with L. Therefore, the state s
has to be sI . Since the action h moves from the initial state to the right
system, we have that sI · α has to be the state (left, last). Since the transitions
are essentially identical in the left and the right subsystems, we have that
sI · hα = (right, last). Hence, hα is a hiding path.
For the other direction, assume that there is a hiding path hα in the con-
structed system. Since sI · hα = (right, last), we have that sI · α = (left, last).
Therefore obsL(sI · hα) 6= obsL(sI · α). From the existence of a hiding path,
it follows that H /∈ dsrc(hα, L, sI) and hence the system is not di-secure.
From the lemmas above and the fact that the construction can be done
in polynomial time, it follows that the verification of di-security is an
NP-complete problem.
173
5. Analyzing Information Flows - Algorithms and Complexity
5.3.5 Theorem. Deciding whether a system is not di-secure is NP-complete.
5.4 Computing Information Flows
Besides the problem of verifying security and detecting security flaws,
the computation of information flows is a further algorithmic problem of
interest. Here, we consider systems with security domains (or agents) but
without a policy. Then the question is: Between which security domains an
information flow does exist in the system? This question can be rephrased:
What is the most restrictive policy with respect to which the system is
secure?
We will consider this problem of computing information flows only
for the notions of t-security and i-security. We will see that we can reuse
the algorithms used for verification. However, depending on the notion of
security, we first have to clarify what is meant by a most restrictive policy.
5.4.1 t-security
For t-security the situation is quite simple. Every single edge in a policy
only says something about the information flow between the two agents
that are connected by the edge. Hence, we need an edge from an agent v
to u if and only if v can influence u’s observation in some way. The idea
of computing a most restrictive policy is to verify for every possible edge
v u whether the system is t-secure with respect to a policy without this
edge. Hence, we verify whether the system is secure for the policy v 6 u
and w  u for all w 6= v. Then, if this system is secure, the edge is not
needed in any policy. In the other case, the system is not secure without
this edge and this edge is needed in every policy with respect to which the
system is secure. Moreover, since in a most restrictive policy, every edge is
uniquely defined as explained, such a policy is unique.
We formalize the intuition of a most restrictive policy as follows.
5.4.1 Definition (most restrictive t-security-preserving policy). For a system
equipped with agents D, a static policy  ⊆ D× D is a most restrictive
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t-security-preserving policy if the system is t-secure w.r.t. and not t-secure
w.r.t. \ {(v, u)} for every (v, u) ∈.
Such a most restrictive policy is found by Algorithm 7. The next lemma
follows directly from the arguments explained above and the correctness of
the generalized-unwinding procedure.
5.4.2 Lemma. On a finite-state system, a most restrictive t-security-preserving
policy can be found in O(|D|2 · |A| · |S| · α(|S|)) by the algorithm compute-
transitive-information-flow
Algorithm 7: compute-transitive-information-flow
1 set = {(u, u) | u ∈ D} ;
2 foreach u ∈ D do
3 foreach v ∈ D with v 6= u do
4 if generalized-unwinding(u, {v}, D) then
5 set =∪ {(v, u)} ;
6 return ;
Figure 5.11. Algorithm for computing transitive information flows
5.4.2 i-security
The problem of defining a most restrictive policy is more complex in the
context of an intransitive interpretation of a policy. Let us consider the
policy H D L. There are two reasons why the edge H D might be
necessary in this policy. This can be either because D can observe any of H’s
actions or L can observe any of H’s actions indirectly after some interaction
of D. To keep this situation more simple, we will restrict ourselves to only
a single observing agent and assume that all other agents have constant
observations.
If we have only one observing agent, then a minimal policy will be
acyclic and all edges are directed towards the observing agent, say u, which
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forms a sink in the graph. However, a definition of a most restrictive policy
is not immediate. Consider the two policies in Figure 5.12 with the only
observing agent L. Clearly, every system that is i-secure w.r.t. the policy
at the left-hand side is also i-secure w.r.t. the policy at the right-hand side,
but the converse does not hold. Hence, it is reasonable to say that the
left policy is more restrictive than the right one. On a more intuitive level,
with the left policy, the information flow from H to L is conditioned by
some interaction of D. The right policy allows unconditional information
flow from H to L. We can conclude that the longer the paths are the more
restrictive an intransitive policy is.
H
D
L
H D
L
Figure 5.12. Two HDL-policies
The distance of an agent v to u in the policy  is denoted by du (v)
and is the length of a shortest path from v to u in. As the length of a
path we understand the number of edges in the path. If there is no path
from v to u, we write du (v) = ∞.
There might be different ways of how to define a partial order between
policies according to restrictiveness. As explained above, a partial order
induced by inclusion, as we had for t-security or in the previous chapters,
does not work here. First, we decided to compare policies by the amount of
agents that have no paths to the observing agent, then by the number of
edges in the policy, and lastly by the sum of the shortest distances of each
agent to the observing agent.
5.4.3 Definition (Restrictiveness between intransitive policies). A policy
is at least as restrictive as a policy′ if
|{v ∈ D | du (v) = ∞}| ≥ |{v ∈ D | d
′
u (v) = ∞}| ,
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and if both values are equal, then
| | ≤ |′ | ,
and if these values are equal, too, then
∑
v∈{w∈D|du (w)<∞}
du (v) ≥ ∑
v∈{w∈D|d′u (w)<∞}
d
′
u (v) .
We say that a policy is most restrictive if it is a maximal element accord-
ing to this partial order between policies. A most restrictive policy for an
observing agent u is computed by Algorithm 8. The idea is to compute the
policy layer-wise, starting with the observing agent u in layer 0. Initially all
other agents are isolated. Then it is tested whether there is an information
flow from one of the isolated agents v through one agent w of the highest
layer of the policy so far and all agents on a lower layer. In this case the
edge v w is needed.
Next, we show the correctness of the algorithm. That means that the
system is secure w.r.t. the returned policy and that the policy is most
restrictive according to the definition of restrictiveness above.
5.4.4 Lemma. Let be the policy constructed by Algorithm 8. Then
1. The system is i-secure w.r.t..
2. If an edge v  w with v 6= w is removed from , then the system is not
i-secure anymore.
3. The distances from every agent to u are maximal.
Proof. 1. We prove this claim inductively by insertions of agents into the
policy graph. By that we mean to connect previously isolated agents
with the remaining agents. With Vi, we denote the set of agents after the
ith agent has been inserted. The first agent inserted is u, hence we have
V1 = {u}. The only line in the algorithm where agents are inserted into
the policy is line 10. If an agent v is inserted in this line, in the following
foreach-loop, it is checked whether there is a new forbidden information
flow stemming from the insertion of v. Hence, after all iterations of this
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Algorithm 8: compute-intransitive-information-flow
Input: observing agent u
1 set = {(v, v) | v ∈ D} ;
2 foreach v ∈ D with v 6= u do
3 set layer(v) = ∞ ;
4 set layer(u) = 0 ;
5 for i = 1 to |D| do
6 set X = {v ∈ D | layer(v) ≤ i− 2} ;
7 foreach v ∈ D with layer(v) = ∞ do
8 foreach w ∈ D with layer(w) = i− 1 do
9 if generalized-unwinding( u, {v}, X ∪ {w} ) then
10 set =∪ {(v, w)} ;
11 set layer(v) = i ;
12 foreach x ∈ D with layer(x) > 1 do
13 if generalized-unwinding( u, {x},
{y ∈ D | x 6 y and layer(y) < ∞}) then
14 set =∪ {(x, v)} ;
15 return ;
Figure 5.13. Algorithm for computing intransitive information flow for a single
observer
innermost foreach-loop, the system, restricted to the non-isolated agents,
is again secure.
Note that if in some iteration of the for-loop starting in line 5, no agent
is inserted in the policy graph, in no further iteration of that loop any
agent will be inserted. Moreover, in the last iteration of this loop, no
agent will be inserted and hence, from all remaining isolated agents, no
information flow to u is possible.
2. An edge v w with v 6= w is only inserted into the constructed policy
if there is some set of agents W such that generalized-unwinding(v, {w},
W) does not return false. Hence, the system without the edge v w is
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insecure.
3. We prove this claim inductively by inserting agents into the layers.
Clearly du (v) = layer(v) where is the policy returned by the algo-
rithm. By induction, every agent inserted into the policy has maximal
distance to u. When a new agent is inserted, then this was necessary to
preserve security and hence, the distance to u of this agent is maximal
again. The edges inserted in line 14 do not reduce the distance of any
inserted vertex to u.
5.5 Beyond Decidability
In contrast to the previous result, the verification problems for the notions
of to-security and ito-security are undecidable. The main difference between
these two notions and all other notions in this thesis is that the allowed
information depends on the observations of the agents. This is the deeper
reason why one can build systems in which the length of a witness for
insecurity cannot be bounded by the size of the system.
5.5.1 Undecidability of to-security
We will show that the verification problem for to-security is undecidable.
The proof is a reduction from Post’s Correspondence Problem [Pos46]
introduced in the next paragraph. It is well-known that this problem is
undecidable.
Post’s Correspondence Problem (PCP) An instance of PCP consists of two
finite sequences x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn of words over some alphabet Σ
with at least two symbols. Such an instance is a positive instance if and
only if there exists a sequence of indices i1, . . . , ik with 1 ≤ ij ≤ n for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
xi1 . . . xik = yi1 . . . yik .
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We will give a reduction from PCP to to-insecurity, which shows that the
verification problem for to-security is undecidable. This problem remains
undecidable for a fixed policy with three agents. This improves the result
in [EvdMSW11] where this result was only shown for at least four agents.
Clearly, to-security is decidable for a policy with two agents, since the policy
is transitive and hence, to-security and t-security coincide.
5.5.1 Theorem. It is undecidable whether a system is to-secure, even for a fixed
policy with three agents.
H
D
L
Figure 5.14. The modified HDL policy in the undecidability result of to-security
Proof. To prove the correctness of this reduction, we encode a PCP instance
into a system M with agents H, D, L and a policy with edges H  D,
D L, and L D, as depicted in Figure 5.14, such that the instance is a
positive instance if and only if the system is not to-secure. For this reduction
consider a PCP instance given by some alphabet Σ and sequences of words
x1, . . . , xn and words y1, . . . , yn. With X and Y we denote the set of these
words, respectively.
Intuitively, in the constructed system, the agent L guesses words over Σ.
The agent H chooses whether these words will be compared with words
from X or with words from Y. It also guesses when a possible sequence of
actions guessed by L ends Additionally, it also guesses the corresponding
index of the word, such that the sequence of actions guessed by L is exactly
the word with H’s guessed index from either the set X or Y. The agent D
observes the guessed indices of H. It has a single action that ends this
procedure and downgrades all of its observations to L. If the sequence of
symbols guessed by L and the indices guessed by H match to a sequence
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(X, initial) (Y, initial)
(X, e) (Y, e)
(X, x1(0)) (X, xn(0))
(X, x1(|x1| − 1)) (X, xn(|xn| − 1))
(X, 1) (X, n)
(X, accept)
(Y, y1(0)) (Y, yn(0))
(Y, y1(|y1| − 1)) (Y, yn(|yn| − 1))
(Y, 1) (Y, n)
(Y, accept)
changeToY
start
x1(0) xn(0)
h1 hn
end end
start
y1(0) yn(0)
h1 hn
end end
Figure 5.15. System constructed from a PCP instance
of words of X or of Y, depending on the initial choice of H, the agent L
observes this choice of H.
The proof can be sketched as follows: If we have a positive instance,
then there is a sequence of symbols such that these symbols are a sequence
of words from both X and Y with the same sequence of indices. In this case,
L has the same allowed information but observes whether this sequence
was compared to X or to Y. Therefore the system is insecure.
If the instance is not positive, then there are no two guesses with the
same sequence of symbols and the same indices matching both X and Y.
One of these guesses cannot be expressed as a sequence of words from
X or Y. The agent D can distinguish these cases and hence, the allowed
information of L differs.
We proceed with the formal description of the constructed system,
starting with the state space. With X and Y we denote just symbols that
indicate whether the sequences of symbols are compared to words of X or
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to words of Y, respectively. An overview of the structure of the system is
illustrated in Figure 5.15—however, several edges are missing for clarity.
There are the following kinds of states:
1. (X, initial) and (Y, initial),
2. (X, accept) and (Y, accept),
3. reject
4. (X,γ) where γ is a prefix of some word from X, and
(Y,γ) where γ is a prefix of some word from Y,
5. (X, j) and (Y, j) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The initial state of the system is sI = (X, initial).
The following actions can be performed:
Agent H has an action changeToY and actions hi for guessing the index i
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Agent D has a single action end. The actions of agent L
are identified with the symbols of Σ, and in addition, it has an action start.
The transition function is defined by:
. (X, initial) · changeToY = (Y, initial) ,
. for every z ∈ {X,Y} by
(z, initial) · start = (z, e) ,
. for every a ∈ Σ and every prefix γ of a word from z by
(z,γ) · a =
{
(z,γa) if γa is a prefix of a word from z
reject otherwise ,
. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and every prefix γ of a word from z by
(z,γ) · hi =
{
(z, i) if γ is the ith word from the sequence z
reject otherwise ,
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. for every a ∈ Σ and 1 ≤ i ≤ n by
(z, i) · a =
{
(z, a) if a is a prefix of a word from z
reject otherwise ,
. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n by
(z, i) · end = accept .
All not mentioned transitions lead to the state reject.
The observations of agent H are the same on all states. The observations
of D are:
for every z ∈ {X,Y} and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n
obsD((z, i)) = i ,
obsD(reject) = ↑ ,
and for all other states s
obsD(s) =y .
The symbol ↑ stands for a failure andy for an ongoing run. The observa-
tions of L are
obsL((X, accept)) = X ,
obsL((Y, accept)) = Y ,
and for all other states s
obsL(s) = ⊥ .
Intuitively, with the action changeToY, the agent H decides whether the
following action sequence is compared to words from X or from Y. If this
decision has been made, agent L starts the run with the start action. Once
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performed, agent L proceeds with actions corresponding to symbols of
the given alphabet Σ. However, these sequences have to match words in
X or Y, depending on H’s initial choice. Otherwise the system reaches
the reject state. After L has performed a sequence of symbols matching
a word, H guesses the index of the word. Again, if this guess is wrong,
the system goes into the reject state. After such a guess of H, the agent L
can either proceed with the next word or the agent D can perform the
action end to signal the end of such a sequence of words and indices. In
the latter case, the system reaches a state marked with accept and agent L
observes whether the sequences of actions has been compared to words in
X or in Y. The action end downgrades the sequence of H’s index-guesses
to L, since it was the observation of D. Hence, L obtains the sequence of
performed actions corresponding to symbols from Σ and the sequence of
matching indices. With this information, L can reconstruct whether this
was a sequence of words from X or from Y, except it is possible that it is a
sequence of words from both X and Y with the same indices. But the latter
case is only possible if it is a positive instance. In that case, L can deduce
whether the changeToY action has been performed in the initial state, which
is not allowed by the to operator.
We will proceed now with a formal proof of Theorem 5.5.1. First,
assume that the PCP instance is a positive one. Then there exists a sequence
of indices i1, . . . , ik such that xi1 · · · xik = yi1 · · · yik . As explained, the
corresponding traces of the system are
α = start xi1 hi1 · · · xik hik end
and
β = changeToY start yi1 hi1 · · · yik hik end .
We will show that these two traces are a witness for the to-insecurity of
the system by applying Lemma 3.6.4. For agent L, we have for the tpurge
values:
tpurgeL(α) = start xi1 · · · xik end = start yi1 · · · yik end = tpurgeL(β) .
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For agent D the tview values are:
tviewD(α) =y i1y i2 · · ·y ik end = tviewD(β) .
However, L’s observations are different after these two traces:
obsL(sI · α) = X 6= Y = obsL(sI · β) .
Hence the system is to-insecure.
For the other direction of the proof assume that the system is to-insecure.
Again by Lemma 3.6.4, there are traces α and β such that tpurgeL(α) =
tpurgeL(β), tviewD(α) = tviewD(β), and obsL(s
I · α) 6= obsL(sI · β).
Since the observations of L after α and β are different, in at least one
of these traces the action end has to appear and leads the system to reach
either (X, accept) or (Y, accept). Since the end action appears in the tview
value of D, it has to be performed in both traces. Note that after performing
end, the system reaches either one of the states marked with accept or the
state marked with reject, and hence, no further actions have any effects on
the system. Therefore, we can, w.l.o.g., assume that both traces end with
the action end.
Since D’s tview values of both traces are the same, in none of these
traces the system has reached the reject state before the end action where
D’s observation is ↑. And since one of these traces reaches an accept state,
D has not ↑ in its tview. Hence, for both traces D’s tview value has the form
y i1 · · ·y ik end. But from this tview value, it follows that the end action
has been performed in either the state (X, ik) or (Y, ik). Hence the reached
state is (X, accept) or (Y, accept), respectively. Since the observations of L
are different after performing α and β, exactly one of the traces reaches
(X, accept) and the other reaches (Y, accept). Hence exactly one trace starts
with the action changeToY.
Since the sequences reach different accept states, the tpurge values of
these traces w.r.t. L have to be
start xi1 · · · xik end
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and
start yi1 · · · yik end ,
and both sequences have to be equal. This constitutes an evidence that this
PCP instance is a positive one.
5.5.2 Undecidability of ito-security
As for to-security, the verification problem for ito-security is also undecid-
able. We will show that by a reduction from to-security to ito-security.
First, we will provide the construction of the reduction. For a given
system M, we construct a system M′ such that the system M is to-secure if
and only if the system M′ is ito-secure.
Recall that the difference between the ito and the to operator is that
for an agent dom(a) with dom(a) u, but dom(a) 6= u, the ito operator
allows u to get the sequence viewdom(a)(αa). While the to operator allows
u only to receive the sequence viewdom(a)(α). Note that nonetheless, the
to operator transmits the action a after the sequence α. Therefore, the
only additional information that is transmitted is the observation after the
action a. This is also only important if the action a is the last action of
dom(a), since otherwise the observation after the action a is eventually
transmitted by the next action performed by dom(a).
The reduction handles this by introducing new actions, so-called final ac-
tions. Such an action corresponds to the last action of each agent performed
in a trace. After such an action, the observation of that agent changes to
the uninformative information ⊥ and will not be changed anywise. The
additional information that is transmitted by the ito operator is artificially
removed. Therefore, the reduced system has to keep track of the agents
that have already performed one of their final actions.
More precisely, a system M with states S, initial state sI , actions A,
transition function step, observation function obs, agents D, and the cor-
responding dom function is transformed into a system M′ with states S′,
initial state s˜I , actions A′, transition function step′, same agents D, and
dom′ function as follows.
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A new set of additional actions Af = {af | a ∈ A} with dom′(af) =
dom(a), denoted as final actions, is introduced. The states and actions of
the created systems are:
S′ = S×P(D) ,
s˜I = (sI ,∅) ,
A′ = A ∪ Af .
The observation function of the new system is defined for every s ∈ S
and U ⊆ D by
obs′u(s, U) =
{
obsu(s) if u /∈ U
⊥ otherwise .
The transition function is in both systems denoted with ·, since the intended
system is clear from the structure of the state space. For any s ∈ S, any
action a ∈ A, and any U ⊆ D, the transition function is defined as:
(s, U) · a =

(s · a, U) if dom′(a) 6∈ U and a ∈ A
(s · b, U ∪ {dom′(a)}) if dom′(a) 6∈ U and a ∈ Af
with a = bf
(s, U) if dom′(a) ∈ U .
For clarity, for functions like view, tview, etc., we use primed functions
if the function refers to the system M′, and the usual function name if it
refers to the original system M.
Before proving the correctness of this construction, we need a func-
tion that transforms traces of one system into traces of the other system.
For transforming traces of the original system into traces of the system
constructed by the reduction, we define a function
convert : D× A∗ → A′∗ .
Applied to an agent u and a trace α, it replaces in α for each agent v 6= u
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with v u the last action a with dom(a) = v by the action af .
For transforming traces of the reduced system back into traces of the
original system, we define a function convertback : A′∗ → A∗ that trans-
forms final actions into the corresponding non-final actions. If an agent has
no final action in a trace, none of its actions will be removed. For any action
a ∈ A′, let a = a if a ∈ A and a = b if a ∈ Af with a = bf . More precisely,
the function convertback is inductively defined by
convertback(e) = e
convertback(αa) =

convertback(α) if there is a final action
of dom′(a) in α
convertback(α) a if there is no final action
of dom′(a) in α .
The next lemma collects some properties of the function convertback.
5.5.2 Lemma. For every u ∈ D and every α ∈ A′∗ that does not contain a final
action of u, we have
1. obsu(sI · convertback(α)) = obs′u(s˜I · α), and
2. viewu(convertback(α)) = view′u(α).
Proof. 1. By the construction of the system M′, if an agent has performed
one of its final actions, all further actions of this agent will be ignored,
i. e., the corresponding transitions loop. Therefore, any trace α ∈ A′∗
leads in M′ to essentially the same state as the trace convertback(α) in
M. The precise meaning of that is: If s˜I · α = (s, U) for some s ∈ S and
U ⊆ D, then s = sI · convertback(α). If α ∈ A′∗ does not contain any
final action of u, then sI · α is some state (s, U) with u /∈ U and therefore
obs′u(s, U) = obsu(s). This gives
obsu(sI · convertback(α)) = obs′u(s˜I · α) .
2. This claim is an extension of the previous one to the viewu function. We
will prove it by an induction on α.
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The claim clearly holds for the base case α = e. Suppose that α = α′a
for some a ∈ A′ and α′ ∈ A′∗ and assume that α does not contain a final
action of u and that for α′ the induction hypothesis holds. Hence, we
have as induction hypothesis:
viewu(convertback(α′)) = view′u(α) . (I.H.)
Consider the following cases:
Case 1: dom′(a) = u.
Then a is not a final action and α′ contains no final action of u, so
convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′) a and
view′u(α′a) = view′u(α′) a obs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
(I.H.)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) a obs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) a obsu(sI · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α′)) a obsu(sI · convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α′a)) .
Case 2: dom′(a) 6= u and there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′.
Then convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′) a, therefore,
view′u(α′a) = view′u(α′)◦ˆobs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
(I.H.)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α′a)) .
Case 3: dom′(a) 6= u and there is a final action of dom′(a) in α′.
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Then convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′), therefore,
view′u(α′a) = view′u(α′) ◦ˆ obs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
(I.H.)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obs′u(s˜I0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α′)) ◦ˆ obsu(sI · convertback(α′))
= viewu(convertback(α′))
= viewu(convertback(α′a)) .
This shows the inductive step and therefore, we have
viewu(convertback(aα′)) = view′u(aα′) .
The correctness of the reduction provided before the previous lemma is
stated in the next lemma.
5.5.3 Lemma. A system M is to-secure iff the system M′, constructed as described
above, is ito-secure.
Proof. First, we show the implication from left to right. For that, we will
show that for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A′∗ that do not contain a final
action of u, with
tpurge′u(α) = tpurge
′
u(β)
and
ftview′v(α) = ftview′v(β) for all v 6= u, v u ,
we have
tpurgeu(convertback(α)) = tpurgeu(convertback(β))
and
tviewv(convertback(α)) = tviewv(convertback(β)) for all v 6= u, v u .
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We prove the claim by an induction on the combined length of α and β.
This claim clearly holds for the base case α = β = e.
Consider α = α′a and β, neither containing a final action of agent u,
such that tpurge′u(α′a) = tpurge′u(β) and ftview
′
v(α
′a) = ftview′v(β) for
all v 6= u with v  u hold. As induction hypothesis, suppose that the
implication holds for all traces of smaller combined length.
We consider the following cases:
Case 1: dom′(a) 6 u.
This gives
tpurge′u(α
′) = tpurge′u(α
′a) = tpurge′u(β)
and
ftview′v(α′) = ftview′v(α′a) = ftview′v(β)
for all v 6= u, v u. By applying the induction hypothesis, we obtain
tpurgeu(convertback(α
′)) = tpurgeu(convertback(β))
and
tviewv(convertback(α′)) = tviewv(convertback(β))
for every v 6= u with v u.
If there is a final action of dom′(a) in α′, then convertback(α′a) =
convertback(α′) and the claim for the pair α′a and β follows directly by
applying the induction hypothesis.
From now on, we assume that there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′.
Hence, since dom(a) = dom′(a) 6 u, we have
tpurgeu(convertback(α
′a)) = tpurgeu(convertback(α
′) a)
= tpurgeu(convertback(α
′))
= tpurgeu(convertback(β)) ,
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and for all v 6= u, v u, we have:
tviewv(convertback(α′a)) = tviewv(convertback(α′) a)
= tviewv(convertback(α′))
= tviewv(convertback(β)) .
Case 2: dom′(a) u.
In this case, we have tpurge′u(α′) a = tpurge′u(α′a) = tpurge′u(β), and hence,
β = β′b for some action b. If dom′(b) 6 u, then we may swap the roles
of α and β and apply the previous case. Hence, without loss of generality,
dom′(b)  u, and we have tpurge′u(β) = tpurge′u(β′) b. It follows that
a = b and tpurge′u(α′) = tpurge′u(β′). For every v 6= u with v  u and
v 6= dom(a), we have
ftview′v(α′) = ftview′v(α′a)
= ftview′v(β′a)
= ftview′v(β′) .
If v = dom′(a), we have
view′v(α′a) = ftview′v(α′a)
= ftview′v(β′a)
= view′v(β′a) .
This implies view′v(α′) = view′v(β′) and therefore, we have ftview′v(α′) =
ftview′v(β′).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
tpurgeu(convertback(α
′)) = tpurgeu(convertback(β
′))
and
tviewv(convertback(α′)) = tviewv(convertback(β′))
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for every v 6= u with v u.
If there is a final action of dom′(a) in α′ then, by tpurge′u(α′) = tpurge′u(β′),
there is also a final action of dom′(a) in β′, and hence, we have both
convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′) and convertback(β′a) = convertback(β′).
The desired conclusion directly follows from the inductive conclusion above.
Alternately, if there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′, then there is no final
action of dom′(a) in β′. In this case, since dom(a) = dom′(a) u, we have
tpurgeu(convertback(α
′a)) = tpurgeu(convertback(α
′) a)
= tpurgeu(convertback(α
′)) a
= tpurgeu(convertback(β
′)) a
= tpurgeu(convertback(β
′) a)
= tpurgeu(convertback(β
′a)) .
In the case dom′(a) 6= v, for every v 6= u with v u, we have
tviewv(convertback(α′a)) = tviewv(convertback(α′) a)
= tviewv(convertback(α′))
= tviewv(convertback(β′))
= tviewv(convertback(β′) a)
= tviewv(convertback(β′a)) .
In the case dom′(a) = v we argue as follows. If a is not a final action, then
we have
view′dom′(a)(α
′a) = ftview′dom′(a)(α
′a)
= ftview′dom′(a)(β
′a)
= view′dom′(a)(β
′a) .
Since there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′ or β′, and since a is not a final
action, there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′a or β′a, and therefore,
viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = viewdom(a)(convertback(β′a)) ,
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using the equivalence proved above. From this equation, it follows that
tviewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewdom(a)(convertback(β′a)) .
In the case that a is a final action, we have
view′dom′(a)(α
′) a⊥ = ftview′dom′(a)(α′a)
= ftview′dom′(a)(β
′a)
= view′dom(a)′(β
′) a⊥ .
Therefore view′dom′(a)(α
′) = view′dom′(a)(β
′).
Since there is no final action of dom′(a) in α′ or β′, it follows, using the
equivalence proved above, that
viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′)) = viewdom(a)(convertback(β′)) .
Thus,
tviewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewdom(a)(convertback(α′) a)
= viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′)) a
= viewdom(a)(convertback(β
′)) a
= tviewdom(a)(convertback(β
′a)) .
This completes the proof of the claim.
For completing the proof of the direction from left to right, suppose that
M is to-secure, but assume that M′ is not ito-secure. By Lemma 3.6.8, there
exist α, β ∈ A′∗ and an agent u such that
tpurge′u(α) = tpurge
′
u(β) ,
ftview′v(α) = ftview′v(β) for every v 6= u with v u ,
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and
obs′u(s˜I0 · α) 6= obs′u(s˜I0 · β) .
It follows from tpurge′u(α) = tpurge′u(β) that α contains a final action of
agent u if and only if β contains a final action of agent u. But if both contain
such a final action, then
obs′u(s˜I0 · α) = ⊥ = obs′u(s˜I0 · β) ,
which contradicts the assumption. Thus neither α nor β contain a final
action of u. Therefore, we have
tpurgeu(convertback(α)) = tpurgeu(convertback(β))
and
ftviewv(convertback(α)) = ftviewv(convertback(β))
for all agents v 6= u with v u. We also have
obsu(sI · convertback(α)) 6= obsu(sI · convertback(β)) .
By the characterization of to-security of Lemma 3.6.4, this implies that M is
not to-secure.
For the other direction of the proof, we use the function convert as
defined above.
We observe for all u ∈ D that if γ,γ′ are prefixes of α and convertu(α),
respectively, of the same length, then for all U ⊆ D, if s˜I · γ′ = (s, U), then
s = sI · γ. Therefore, since convertu(α) contains no final action of agent u,
we have obsu(sI · convertu(α)) = obsu(sI · α). Moreover, if γ,γ′ are prefixes
of the same length of α and convertu(α), respectively, and γ does not contain
the rightmost action of agent v in α (if any), then viewv(γ) = viewv(γ′).
We show for all u ∈ D and all α, α′ ∈ A∗ that if tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(α′)
and tviewv(α) = tviewv(α′) for all v 6= u, v u, then
tpurge′u(convertu(α)) = tpurge
′
u(convertu(α
′))
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and
ftview′v(convertu(α)) = ftview′v(convertu(α′))
for every v 6= u with v u.
By an argument similar to that for the opposite direction, it then follows
that if M′ is ito-secure then M is to-secure.
We observe that for any agent u, the functions tpurgeu and convertu
commute. This shows for all α, α′ ∈ A∗ that if tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(α′),
then tpurge′u(convertu(α)) = tpurge′u(convertu(α′)).
To complete the argument, we assume tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(α
′) and
for every agent v 6= u with v  u, we have tviewv(α) = tviewv(α′), and
we will show that ftview′v(convertu(α)) = ftview′v(convertu(α′)) holds.
From tpurgeu(α) = tpurgeu(α
′) it follows that the sequences of actions
of agent v in α and α′ are the same. In particular, if neither sequence
contains an action of agent v, then the claim is trivial. Suppose that a is the
last action of agent v in both α and α′. Then we may write α = α1aα2 and
α′ = α′1aα
′
2, where α2, α
′
2 contain no actions of agent v. Since tviewv(α) =
tviewv(α′), we have viewv(α1) = viewv(α′1). Also convert
′
u(α) = γ1afγ2
and convert′u(α′) = γ′1a
fγ′2 hold, where γ1,γ′1 are of the same length as
α1, α′1, respectively, and γ2,γ
′
2 contain no actions of agent v. Thus, using the
observation above, we obtain
ftview′v(convertu(α)) = ftview′v(γ1afγ2)
= view′v(γ1) af⊥
= view′v(α1) af⊥
= view′v(α′1) a
f⊥
= view′v(γ′1) a
f⊥
= ftview′v(convertu(α′)) .
From the construction, it is clear that this system constructed by a com-
putable function. Hence, from the previous lemma and the undecidability
result for to-security it follows:
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5.5.4 Theorem. It is undecidable whether a system is ito-secure, even for a fixed
policy with three agents.
5.6 Beyond Deterministic Finite-State Machines
In this thesis, we mainly consider deterministic machines. However, several
results can be adapted to nondeterministic finite-state machines or semanti-
cally richer machine models, for example pushdown systems. In particular,
the trace-based security definitions are independent of the underlying ma-
chine model. However, reasonable security definitions for nondeterministic
systems are not as obvious as they might seem. There is a vast bulk of
literature dealing with noninterference-like properties for nondeterministic
systems. Several of them are listed in Section 7.2.
In this section, we discuss only the complexity of the verification problem
for some richer machine models, including nondeterministic finite-state
machines. Essentially, nearly every input-enabled machine or automaton
model can be used to model noninterference properties in a similar way as
we do in this work. We claim that the complexity of the verification problem
for noninterference properties like t-security is polynomially equivalent
to the complexity of the equivalence problem of the underlying automata
model: The problem of deciding whether two given automata accept the
same language.
Since this is not a precise statement, we cannot provide a proof for it.
Instead, we will give a general construction pattern of how such reductions
work without restricting ourselves to a particular automata model.
We require that the automata have a complete transition relation, i. e.,
for every configuration and every element of the input alphabet, there is a
transition that can be applied.
Hardness We will give a reduction that transforms two automata into a
single system which is t-secure w.r.t. the HL policy if and only if these two
automata accept the same language.
Let M0 and M1 be two automata of the same automata model. Let S
M0
0
and SM10 be the sets of initial states, respectively. Let A be the common
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M0
M1
SM00
SM10
sI
s1
h
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 5.16. Reduction from automata equivalence to t-security
input alphabet. Let h and l be two new symbols, not contained in A. The
constructed system M, as depicted in Figure 5.16, contains two new states
sI and s1 and all states of M0 and M1. We assume that the set of states of
M0 is disjoint to the set of states of M1. The actions of M are A ∪ {h, l}. In
addition to all transitions of M0 and M1, the constructed system M has a
transition from sI to s1 labeled with h and transitions from sI to all initial
states of M0 labeled with l and from s1 to all initial states of M1 also labeled
with l. The state sI is the only initial state of the system M. All transitions
not mentioned, corresponding to the actions h and l, loop. The agents are
H and L with dom(h) = H and dom(a) = L for all a ∈ A ∪ {l}. For the
policy we require that there is no edge from L to H. Agent H has constant
observations and agent L observes whether a state is accepting or not. Such
a system can only be insecure if L observes if the transition from sI to s1
labeled with h has been taken or not. This is the case if and only if there is
a word that is accepted by exactly one of the two systems of M0 and M1.
Note that the system M is deterministic if the systems M0 and M1
are deterministic and, in particular, M’s set of initial states has only one
element.
Completeness For the other direction, we transform a system with the
HL policy into two automata such that these automata accept the same
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language if and only if this system is t-secure.
Let M be some system. Consider the policy with agents H and L such
that L 6 H. We assume w.l.o.g. that H has constant observations and L
has only two possible observations on the set of configurations, say 0 and 1.
We construct two automata M0 and M1 as follows. The automaton M0
is the same as the system M. The automaton M1 is the same as M, but all
transitions labeled with actions of H are removed and for preserving the
completeness of the transition function, loops, which do not change the
configuration of the system, are inserted. The accepting configurations of
these two systems are exactly those in which L has observation 1.
Intuitively, the automaton M1 purges the input word and ignores all
inputs from H. Hence, for any word α, these two automata have the
same acceptance behavior if and only if α and tpurgeL(α) lead to the same
observation for L in the original system M.
Related Results The complexity of t-security adapted to nondeterministic
finite-state systems was analyzed in [vdMZ07]. They showed that the
verification problem is PSPACE-complete. This is also the complexity one
would expect from this construction pattern, since it is the complexity of
the equivalence problem for nondeterministic finite automata [Kle56].
In [DRS05], D’Souza et al. showed that several of Mantel’s basic security
predicates (BSPs) [Man00, Man03], which can also be used to express t-
security-like properties on nondeterministic finite-state systems, can be
verified in PSPACE.
In [DHK+08], the verification problem for BSPs was analyzed on push-
down systems and it was shown that it is undecidable. One would also
obtain an undecidability result from the construction above, since the equiv-
alence problem for pushdown automata is undecidable.
Barthe et al. [BDR11] presented a technique for analyzing information
flows by self-composition in the context of language-based information flow
security, which has some analogy to this construction.
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5.7 Excursus: The Disjoint-Set Data Structure
Several of the algorithms in this chapter made extensive use of a disjoint-
set data structure [Tar75] for maintaining a collection of pairwise disjoint
sets. They used this data structure to maintain partitions of the state space,
derived from the state-based unwinding conditions. We provide an excursus
on this data structure and its associated algorithms.
The main feature of this data structure is that it allows the union of
pair-wise disjoint sets. The definitions of the data structure and the corre-
sponding algorithms are summarized in Figure 5.17. Each set in the the
maintained collection is identified by a representative which is an element
of this set. Such a set is created by the function Make-Set(x) which creates
a singleton set containing x. In this case, x is the representative of this set. It
is required that x is not an element of any other set. For every element x, the
representative of the set, which x belongs to, can be requested by Find(x).
To merge two disjoint sets, the function Union(x, y) creates the union
of the set containing x and of the set containing y. The new representative
of this union is either the previous representative of the set containing x or
the one of the set containing y. The choice depends on an internal ranking
function. The previous sets containing x and y are removed from the data
structure and substituted by the union, to have again pairwise disjoint sets.
In the disjoint-set data structure, each set is represented as a rooted tree.
The root of a tree is the representative and all edges are directed towards
the root. To be highly efficient, the data structure uses two heuristics, called
union by rank and path compression.
The idea of the union by rank heuristic is to keep track of the size of the
trees and if the union operation is applied to let the the smaller tree become
a subtree of the larger tree. However, the rank is not the exact size of the
tree, instead, it is an upper bound for the height of the tree.
The path compression heuristic is used to reduce the length of paths
within the trees. If the Find(x) method is called, the path of x and all
entries on this path to the root of the tree are reduced to one (if x is not the
root itself). This not only reduces the length of the paths of these entries
to the root, but also it reduces the distance of all subtrees of any of these
entries to the root.
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A precise analysis of the running times of these procedures can be found
in [Tar75].
We will give now the mentioned procedures in pseudo code, following
the presentation in [CLRS01]. Let X be the set that should be maintained.
For every entry x ∈ X, there is an array rank[x] that stores an integer value,
which represents the rank of the value x. The value parent[x] is a pointer
to the successor of x in its tree. The procedure for the union operation has
a sub procedure, called Link, which effectively performs the union of two
sets.
Function Make-Set(x)
1 set parent[x] = x ;
2 set rank[x] = 0 ;
Function Union(x,y)
1 Link(Find(x), Find(y)) ;
Function Link(x, y)
1 if rank[x] > rank[y] then
2 set parent[y] = x ;
3 else
4 set parent[x] = y ;
5 if rank[x] = rank[y] then
6 set rank[y] = rank[y] + 1
Function Find-Set(x)
1 if x 6= parent[x] then
2 set parent[x] = Find(parent[x]) ;
3 return parent[x] ;
Figure 5.17. Procedures of the disjoint-set data structure
For defining the running times of these procedures, we need the Acker-
mann function and its inverse. The Ackermann function A : N×N→N
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is inductively defined by
A(0, m) = m + 1
A(n + 1, 0) = A(n, 1)
A(n + 1, m + 1) = A(n, A(n + 1, m))
The generalized inverse of the Ackermann function is defined as
α(n) = min{k | A(k, 1) ≥ n} .
The running time of these procedures can now be expressed with help
of the generalized inverse of the Ackermann function.
5.7.1 Theorem. A sequence of m Make-Set, Union and Find operations on a
set with n elements can be performed in O(m · α(n)).
The interpretation of this theorem is that each of this operations has
nearly constant time running times on an amortized analysis, since the
value α(n) is less than 5 for all practical issues.
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Application to Access Control
Historically, the development of noninterference and access control systems
share a strong a connection. Detection of covert channels in access control
systems was one of the earliest applications of noninterference and the
initial motivation for developing this general theory of information flow
security. Already in the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [GM82],
their theory was motivated by applications to access control systems. Later,
the observation that intransitive effects of information flow arise in access
control systems very naturally, led to the development of the theory of
intransitive noninterference [HY87]. Also their generalizations [Rus92] and
corrections [vdM07] were motivated by applications to access control sys-
tems. However, these results only analyzed information flow in access
control systems with a fixed or static access control mechanism, also known
as mandatory access control. For analyzing information flows in these
systems, Rushby [Rus92] and van der Meyden [vdM07] showed that in-
transitive noninterference with static polices is an appropriate theory. In
systems with dynamic rights—rights which may change during the run of
the access control system—a rigorous theory for formulating and analyzing
information flows was missing. In this chapter, we close this gap—at least
partially—by demonstrating that the theory of dynamic intransitive nonin-
terference, developed in the previous chapter, can successfully be applied
to an access control system with a distributed and dynamic access control
mechanism.
We will give a brief introduction to access control in general in Sec-
tion 6.1 and discuss information flow in mandatory access control systems
in Section 6.2. We introduce discretionary access control systems in Sec-
tion 6.3 combined with an introduction to a distributed dynamic access
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control system called Flume [KT09]. In the remaining Section 6.4, we trans-
late the Flume system into our system model and analyze it carefully with
regard to dynamic noninterference.
6.1 Introduction to Access Control
In general, systems that enforce confidentiality and integrity properties
are called access control systems. Access control systems (or systems
equipped with an access control mechanism), are used to protect data from
unauthorized access or manipulation. The permission to access data is
called authorization.
In an access control system, a usual distinction is between the active
parts that can read or write data, and those parts which should be protected
from unintended access or modification. The former could be users or
processes and are called subjects, the latter are mostly files, variables, or
some part of the memory and are called objects. Additionally, there is a
fixed number of access controls or rights that a subject may have on an
object. The earliest formalization goes back to Lampson [Lam74] and has
been refined by Graham and Denning [GD72].
The simplest structure of an access control system is an access control
matrix M, where for every subject s and every object o each cell M[s, o] of
the matrix contains the rights that the subject s has on the object o. The
rights are taken from some finite set of rights, mostly including the classic
rights of read and write access.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) In mandatory access control systems,
the policy is controlled by some administrator and is globally fixed. The
users or processes (subjects) have neither the ability to change the policy
nor to pass any rights to any to subject.
Historically, MAC systems have been introduced in the context of mili-
tary database systems. But recently, modern operating systems also imple-
ment MAC, as for instance SELinux and AppArmor in Linux and Manda-
tory Integrity Control in Microsoft Windows Vista and its successors.
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Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Unlike mandatory access control,
in a discretionary access control system, the users or processes (or in general
subjects) have the ability to modify the policy under some restrictions.
The most famous example is the UNIX file mode where access to files
is represented by write, read, and execute bits for each of user, group, and
others. Additionally, files are owned by some user and some group. Any
of the owners can modify the right of each file and hence can grant rights
to other users or remove a specific right from them, as long as it relates to
its own file. It is also possible to changes the owner of a file, which also
possibly changes the rights of a specific user with respect to the file.
6.1.1 The Bell-LaPadula Model
The most influential work on the mechanism for enforcing confidential
properties is from Bell and LaPadula [BL73, BL76]. This framework, also
denoted as Bell-LaPadula model, defines confidentiality polices for access
control systems. It is also known as multilevel security (MLS). We present
this access control model not only because of its historical influence and
importance, we also use it as an example to introduce basic concepts,
used later in this chapter. However, here we only present a very reduced
and simplified version of it and refer to the original work for a complete
presentation.
The Bell-LaPadula model requires a multilevel security policy. Histori-
cally, such a policy was defined in a military style. In the context of subjects,
their security levels are denoted as security clearances, a linearly ordered
set of security levels, for example depicted in Figure 6.1. In the context
of objects this is denoted as security classification. Intuitively the security
clearance of a subject must be as high as the security classification of an
object in order to have access to it. That means, in general, information is
allowed to go upwards, but never allowed to go downwards.
In addition to the security clearances or classifications, there are also
security categories, which are partially ordered sets with a minimum and
maximum, which usually form a lattice. In Figure 6.2, the diagram depicts
the relation between them, as they are partially ordered by inclusion.
A security level then consists of both the security clearance or clas-
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top secret
secret
confidential
unclassified
Figure 6.1. Totally ordered security clearances
{NUC, EUR, US}
{NUC, US}{NUC, EUR} {EUR, US}
{EUR}{NUC} {US}
∅
Figure 6.2. Partially ordered security categories
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sification and the security category, for example a security level can be
(confidential, {NUC, EUR}). This partial order of the security categories
also defines a partial order on the security level. A security level l = (C, L)
is at least as high as l′ = (C′, L′) for security clearances C and C′ and
security categories L and L′ if C ≥ C′ and L ⊆ L′
Read and write operations in the Bell LaPadula Model are only allowed
according to the security level, captured by the following two properties:
simple security property (ss-property): A subject at a given security level l
is only allowed to read an object with security level l′ with l′ ≤ l (no
read-up).
star property (?-property): A subject at a given security level l′ is only allowed
to write to an object with security l′ with l′ ≥ l (no write-down).
These security levels provide only an upper bound for the subjects’ access
to objects. Additionally there is an access control matrix which provides
which right a particular subject has to a particular object. Both the security
levels and the access control matrix are state-dependent and may change
during the run of the system. To capture that a particular subject has only
those rights that are allowed by the access control matrix, there is a third
property:
discretionary security property (ds-property): Every right that a particular
subject has to a particular object is allowed by the access control matrix
of the corresponding state.
A system is then said to be secure (as a Bell LaPadula model) if it satisfies
the ss-property, the ?-property, and the ds-property.
Often in this context, a fourth property is mentioned, namely the principle
of tranquility. This property states that the security levels are fixed and do
not change during a run of a system. It can be seen as an option and pushes
the system in the direction of a MAC system.
Biba Model
While the Bell-LaPadula model is used to satisfy confidentiality properties,
the Biba model [Bib77] addresses integrity policies. Integrity policies ad-
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dress the problem of integrity or correctness of data, rather than disclosure.
The concept of integrity is dual to confidentiality. Only for completeness,
we mention the properties here:
. A subject can read an object only if its integrity level is at most that of
the object.
. A subject can write an object only if its integrity level is at least that of
the object.
Capability Systems
One class of discretionary access control systems is the class of capability
systems, which is also used in our case-study of the Flume system. Ca-
pabilities are communicable, unforgeable tokens of authority and usually
refer to a right on an object. A subject can only access an object if it has the
capability that allows it to do so. Capability can be used for both, protecting
confidentiality and integrity. Usually, capability systems have some mecha-
nism to exchange capabilities among the subjects. However, there are often
restrictions on the communication between subjects, for example, a subject
itself may need the capability to send capabilities to other subjects. The
main difference to many other discretionary access control systems is that
the capabilities are not owned by a specific subject. Instead, capabilities are
held by subjects and may be passed to other subjects. Again, it is required
that a reference monitor or the operating system enforces the restriction
given by the design of the capability system in order to achieve security.
A common question in this context is “is it possible for a particular
subject to gain a particular access right at a particular object?”. The decid-
ability and complexity of this question depends on the expressiveness of
the underlying framework for modeling the access control system. It ranges
from linear time in take-grant systems [LM82] to undecidable for protection
systems in [HRU76].
However, we will not address this question. Instead, we will analyze
an access control system with respect to illegal information flows. This
problem is orthogonal to this question and is often not considered in the
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classic literature on discretionary access control systems and capability
systems.
6.2 Information Flow in MAC Systems
A definition of security domains and of a policy as a relation between
them is fundamental for analyzing information flow or noninterference in a
system. In general, definitions of access control systems provide neither of
them. To apply our theory of noninterference, we need to interpret access
control systems and to extract definitions of domains or agents and a policy
from the access control mechanism.
For defining security domains, the two possibly most obvious ways are
either to take each subject and each object as a security domain, or to take
only the subjects. Rushby and van der Meyden favored the latter approach
in [Rus92, vdM07]. The subjects are the agents or security domains and the
objects are defined separately. The implicit idea of the information flow
interpretation is that subjects are allowed to interact only with each other
by writing to and reading from objects. This interpretation leads directly to
a policy which says that an agent u is allowed to interfere with an agent v
if and only if there exists an object to which u has write access and v has
read access. This interpretation has been formalized as “reference monitor
conditions” and van der Meyden [vdM07] has shown that for an access
control system satisfying these conditions is equivalent to ta-security.
6.3 Information Flow in DAC Systems
An appropriate formalization of DAC systems as information flow systems
is often more complex than in the case of MAC systems or even not possible.
DAC systems usually have some mechanism for changes of access control
rights during runtime, which is, in an information flow interpretation, a
dynamic policy. However, in our interpretation of systems with dynamic
policies, the changes of policies are performed by actions and therefore
can be uniquely assigned to a particular agent which is responsible for the
policy change. This is not the case in all DAC systems. In some systems the
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policy changes come from some global mechanism, they can generally be
performed unconditionally by any agent, or it is completely not specified
who is responsible for the policy changes. To analyze information flow
security, we always need any action and any changes to a policy to have
some responsibility to some agent. If this technical restriction is given,
then our noninterference definitions provide a tool for detecting undesired
information flows which may stem from communication forbidden by
some implicit policy or from policy changes which are not safe. As in
the information flow analysis of MAC systems, for DAC systems we also
need an interpretation of security domains and a policy. Here the situation
might be more complex since DAC systems often have communication
methods which lie outside the communication through the objects. These
are necessary to provide a mechanism for policy changes which often
involves some direct communication or interaction between the subjects.
An example of DAC systems which have these desired requirements for
an information flow analysis are capability systems. In these systems,
capabilities are passed around by agents and policy changes are a direct
consequence of actions and the exchange of capabilities. That is why we use
a capability system to strengthen the usefulness of the developed theory of
dynamic noninterference and use it to show the absence of security flaws in
the conceptual design of this access control system.
6.3.1 Distributed Information Flow Control
In this section, we introduce the distributed information flow control system
Flume following the presentation of Krohn and Tromer [KT09]. This system
has been successfully implemented as an extension to the Linux kernel
[KYB+07] and provides a mechanism to control the access of processes to
files or system resources. The subjects in the Flume system are processes
and technically the objects are also implemented as processes, but they
cannot perform any actions by themselves. At this state of the description
of the Flume system, we keep the terminology of processes to have a clear
distinction to our translation of this system in our framework where we
will call the active components agents.
A distributed information flow control system is an access control system
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without a global access control mechanism. This distributed access control
mechanism organizes the rights of each subject by possessing of capabilities.
First, we explain the capability-based approach of the Flume system.
In Flume, capabilities are derived from tags. Tags are assigned to objects
and are opaque tokens which are used to track data when it flows through
the systems. They are taken from some set T and are associated with one
of the categories secrecy or integrity. A tag does not have any intended
meaning—one might see it as a randomly generated string, or in crypto-
graphic terminology, as a nonce. Any object gets from its generation a
new, unique tag. Any subset of T is denoted as a label. To any process p,
two labels are assigned Secp and Intp, the secrecy and the integrity set of p,
respectively. Intuitively, the set Secp is the collection of tags whose assigned
objects p is allowed to read from and Intp is the collection of tags whose
assigned objects p is allowed to write to. These labels are state dependent
and may change during a run of the system.
The rights of a process to modify its own secrecy or integrity set are
denoted as capabilities that are derived from tags. For each tag t, there
are two capabilities t+ and t−. The capability t+ allows the process that
possesses it to add the tag t to its secrecy or integrity set and t− allows
to remove this tag from one of these sets. If a process does not possess
the corresponding capability, it is not allowed to add or remove the tag
respectively. To refer to these sets of capabilities, we introduce some nota-
tion. Any of the following sets relate to a single state during some run of
the system, but for brevity, we omit a parameterization of these sets by a
state at this point of the description of the system. The set of all possible
capabilities is denoted as O = T × {+,−}. The set of all capabilities owned
by a process p is Op ⊆ O. One says a process p has dual privilege on a
tag t if it owns both t+ and t−. The set of all those tags is denoted with
Dp = {t ∈ T | t+ ∈ Op and t− ∈ Op}. For any set of capabilities O ⊆ T
define O+ = {t ∈ T | t+ ∈ O} and O− = {t ∈ T | t− ∈ O}.
One very special property of the Flume system is the use of global
capabilities. The set of global capabilities Oˆ can contain arbitrary capabilities
and every process is allowed to treat these capabilities as its own. However,
it is assumed that processes cannot enumerate the whole set Oˆ. We assume
that a process can only get a capability from Oˆ if it knows the name of
211
6. Application to Access Control
the associated tag which may also come from another capability derived
from the same tag. If a process does not know the name of a particular
tag, we assume that this process cannot gain any corresponding capability
even if it is in the global set of capabilities. As it is worked out in detail
in [KT09], processes have the possibility to guess tag names, but since the
probability is small for a sufficiently large set of possible tags, we neglect
the possibility of guessing tags in this work to keep the analysis of this
system more simple. The insertion of tags into Oˆ is only possible by tag
allocation. Every process has the possibility to create or allocate new tags.
If a process creates a new tag t, it owns the tag’s new capabilities t+ and
t− and in the same step as the creation, it also decides which of these
two capabilities are inserted into the set of global capabilities. After this
creation step, it is not possible to insert any capability into Oˆ. Since every
process is allowed to own all global capabilities, we define its effective set
of capabilities as Op = Op ∪ Oˆ. Similarly, the effective set of dual privileges
is Dp = {t ∈ T | t+ ∈ Op and t− ∈ Op}.
In the Flume system, processes can communicate with each other by
reading or writing to objects and by sending messages directly. These
messages can also contain capabilities. Every process can send any set of its
capabilities to any other process with which it is allowed to communicate
(restrictions on the communication are explained later).
The labels Secp and Intp of each process p are fundamental for the
security of the Flume system. These sets can only be changed explicitly by
particular actions of the process itself. Any process can only modify its own
secrecy and integrity set, but it is only allowed to do so if the process owns
the capability that allows it to do so. Such label changes are called safe label
changes. Formally, if L is one of the labels Secp or Intp and if L′ is the new
label after the change, then this change from L to L′ is safe if and only if
L′ \ L ⊆ (Op)+ and L \ L′ ⊆ (Op)− .
This condition just says that if p inserts a tag t into L, then it has to own
the capability t+ and if it removes a tag t from L, then it has to own the
capability t−. For instance, the capability t+ is the right to access an object
tagged with t, and the capability t− is the right to downgrade information
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of an object tagged with t.
The relation of the secrecy and integrity sets of the process induces a
policy between them. Classically, the policy between processes p and q
induced by this kind of secrecy and integrity sets is
p q iff Secp ⊆ Secq and Intq ⊆ Intp .
With p  q, we mean that p may communicate with q for example by
sending messages. The condition Secp ⊆ Secq says that q has read access
to all the objects p has read access to. Hence p cannot have access to any
information that q is not allowed to have access to and hence, it is safe that
p is allowed to communicate with q. The other condition Intq ⊆ Intp says
that p may write to all objects that q has write access to. Hence q cannot
modify any data that p is not allowed to have write access to and again, it
is safe that p is allowed to communicate with q.
The Flume system relaxes these rules by tags that could be in the secrecy
or integrity sets without changing these sets permanently. If a process p
has dual privileges on a tag, i. e., t ∈ Dp then p can add and remove the
tag t from one of its labels and transform the label into the previous state
afterwards. In Flume, these hypothetical label changes are used, what
slightly modifies the conditions for edges in a policy. This condition is
called a safe message exchange. A message from p to q is safe if and only if
Secp \ Dp ⊆ Secq ∪ Dq and Intq \ Dq ⊆ Intp ∪ Dp .
6.4 Information Flow Analysis of Flume
We proceed with a formalization and a translation of the Flume system in
our framework. This includes a careful translation of the processes into
security domains and a translation of the safe message exchange condition
of the Flume system into a dynamic policy. Furthermore, we need a
description of the state space including observations of the agents and a
transition function which incorporates the actions of the Flume system.
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6.4.1 System Model
First, we define the security domains of a system. A property of the
interpretation of policies in this thesis is that if an agent u performs an
action, then every agent with which u is allowed to interfere might learn
every action that u performs. A situation where u has two actions, say av
and aw and an agent v is allowed to see the action av and another agent
w is allowed to receive action aw but not vice versa, cannot be expressed
directly since any policy has an edge from u to v and from u to w and hence
v may also observe aw and w may observe av. To overcome this problem of
the modeling of the policy, one can split the agent u into two agents, (u, v)
and (u, w) as depicted in Figure 6.3. The agent (u, v) then is allowed to
interfere with v and (u, w) is allowed to interfere with w and the actions
are assigned to each of (u, v) and (u, w), respectively. The two parts of u
then are connected by a complete (directed) graph. Due to intransitivity, the
action av might influence w, but only if the action aw has been performed
afterwards.
u
v w
av
aw
(u, v) (u, w)
v w
av aw
Figure 6.3. Splitting of agents
The Flume system only allows communication between single processes.
To express this property in our policy, we use the exact construction as
above and “split” each process into several security domains. Let P be the
set of all processes. Every process is split into |P| security domains, each for
a possible interaction with any other process and one for internal actions.
The set of all security domains is then D = P× P. Every domain of the
form (p, q) belongs to the process p and we denote the set {(p, q) | q ∈ P}
as the components of process p. Intuitively, a security domain (p, q) is the
214
6.4. Information Flow Analysis of Flume
output interface of process p which might—depending on the dynamic
policy—send messages to process q. We denote the security domain (p, p)
as the internal part of the process p. This domain is never allowed to send
messages to any other process.
We assume that every process p has its own state space Sp. The need of
a global state space would only come from the use of the global capability
set. We will explain later how we can overcome this issue and how we can
express it as a part of the local capability sets.
6.4.2 Objects
According to Krohn’s thesis [Kro08], objects are modeled as processes with
an empty ownership set, immutable secrecy and integrity set, fixed at
creation. If a process p writes to an object o, then there is an information
flow from p to o which can easily be expressed in our framework by an
action of p’s output interface. If a process p reads an object o, then there
is an information flow from o to p. Since in our framework, information
can only flow by performing actions and the information flows from the
domain that performs the action, the read action of p has to be performed
by o. To avoid that if p reads object o, all other processes which have read
access are informed about this read action, we split the object o into |P|
components, each for a possible read action of every single process.
The components of each object are {(o, p) | p ∈ P}. If a process has
write access to o, then the policy allows the domain (q, o) to interfere with
all components of o. If a process p has read access, then the policy allows
only the domain (o, p) to interfere with all components of p.
In the Flume system, the objects are modeled as processes where the read
and write actions are send-message actions. Then the internal component
of an object has no action and hence cannot change any policy.
From now on, with P we denote all processes including those which
represent objects. We will not distinguish further between subjects and
objects or different kinds of processes.
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6.4.3 Tags, Capabilities, and Policies
In this thesis, we will only analyze the information flow by considering
secrecy sets. Due to the duality of integrity, an analysis using integrity sets
or both kinds of sets is expected to be analogue.
To refer to different states in a run, we parameterize the previously
introduced tag and capability sets with the state. For example, the set
Secp(s) denotes p’s secrecy set in the state s.
With a dynamic (or state-dependent) secrecy set, we define the induced
policy for all p, q, q′ ∈ P and all s ∈ S by:
(p, q)s (p, q′) and
(p, q)s (q, q′) iff Secp(s) \ Dp(s) ⊆ Secq(s) ∪ Dq(s)
In the second case, we also write ps q. The edges of the first line can be
seen as static since they exist in all states. This part of the policy relates to
the fact that we have split the process p into its components as described
above. All security domains, which relate to the same process, i. e., those
which have the same first entry in their pair, form a clique. The second
line of this policy definition are the policy edges induced by Flume’s safe
message condition restricted to secrecy sets. This line says that the outgoing
interface (p, q) of p for possibly sending messages to q is allowed to interfere
with q if and only if the safe message condition is satisfied. Note that (p, q)
is always allowed to interfere with every or with no component of q. From
this structure of the policy, it directly follows that every component of a
single process always receives the same actions. Inductively, the traces only
consist of their own and the received actions of each component of a single
process and are the same for each component. Hence, we can refer to traces
of processes rather than to traces of agents. Therefore, it is sufficient to
apply any trace-based operator to traces of a process rather to traces of one
of its components.
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6.4.4 Policy Locality and Global Capability Awareness
Before modeling the actions of the Flume system, we show that it is possible
to substitute the set of global capabilities by local capability sets for each
agent without affecting the safe message condition and hence without
affecting the policy.
For that, we show that in the Flume system the policy can equivalently
be defined as Oˆp ⊆ Oˆ instead of Oˆ for each agents. The set Oˆp is the set of
those capabilities from Oˆ which the process p is aware of. If the process
has seen a tag t or one of the derived capabilities t+ or t− then we assume
that the process knows the name of the tag t and hence can request any
of the capability from Oˆ corresponding to t. If a process p has received a
capability t+ or t−, then p is aware of all capabilities relating to t which
are in Oˆ, hence in every state we have {t+, t−} ∩ Oˆ(s) ⊆ Oˆp(s). Due to
the general assumption of perfect recall of the agents, we suppose that the
agents never forget any seen information about the capabilities and hence
Oˆp is monotonically increasing during every run of the system.
The set of tags where an agent has dual privileges for, based on the
capabilities it is aware of, is defined for every state s and every process p by
D˜p(s) = {t ∈ T | t+, t− ∈ Op(s) ∪ Oˆp(s)} .
The next result shows that the safe message condition can be equivalently
expressed with this set of tags instead of the original definition.
6.4.1 Lemma. For every process p and q and every state s, we have
Secp(s) \ Dp(s) ⊆ Secq(s) ∪ Dq(s) iff Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) ⊆ Secq(s) ∪ D˜q(s) .
Proof. First, we proof the implication from left to right. Assume that
Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) 6⊆ Secp(s) \ Dp(s). Then, there is some tag t ∈ Secp(s)
with t ∈ Dp(s), but t /∈ D˜p(s). This is not possible, since p is aware of
all capabilities in Oˆ(s) which correspond to one of its tags. Hence we
have Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) = Secp(s) \ Dp(s). Assume that still Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) 6⊆
Secq(s) ∪ D˜q(s) holds. Since Dp(s) \ D˜p(s) are tags t with t+ and t− in Oˆ(s),
the set Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) must contain tags with t+ and t− in Oˆ(s) but not
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in Oˆp(s). Again this is not possible, since p is aware of the capabilities
corresponding to tags of its secrecy set.
The other direction of the proof simply follows from
Secp(s) \ Dp(s) ⊆ Secp(s) \ D˜p(s) ⊆ Secq(s) ∪ D˜q(s) ⊆ Secq(s) ∪ Dq(s) .
The benefit of this result for our interpretation of the Flume system
is that we do not have to reason about a global state space which could
possibly be the reason for a covert channel. Instead, we have only local state
spaces for each process, which prevent these kinds of information channels.
6.4.5 Actions and Transitions
We will translate the actions of the Flume system into our framework and
will explain the behavior of the corresponding transitions. To indicate the
ownership of each action, we prefix every action with the name of the
process. We provide a brief description for each action and analyze their
effects to the policy. We implicitly assume that the structure of the state
space represents the traces and hence no state is visited twice. The following
actions are possible in our interpretation of the Flume system:
p.create_tag_c With this action, process p creates a new tag. The value c
can be either None, Remove, or Add and indicates whether none, the
capability t−, or the capability t+ is granted to the set of global capabili-
ties, where t is the created tag. This action is an internal action of the
process p, hence dom(p.create_tag_c) = (p, p). Let
s · p.add_tag_c = s′.
A new tag t has been created and p owns the corresponding capabilities:
Op(s′) = Op(s) ∪ {t+, t−}. Depending on the value of c, the set Oˆ
changes and also the set Oˆp. However, since no other agent is aware of
any of these privileges, the sets Oˆq do not change for agents q 6= p. In
the case of c = None, we have that Oˆ does not change, i. e., Oˆ(s′) = Oˆ(s).
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In the case of c = Remove, we have Oˆ(s′) = Oˆ(s) ∪ {t−} and in the case
of c = Add, we have Oˆ(s′) = Oˆ(s) ∪ {t+}. Only the local state space of
p is affected by this action. No local policy is changed by this action.
p.add_tag_t With this action, process p adds the tag t to its secrecy set if it
owns the corresponding capability t+. Again, this is an internal action
of the process p: dom(p.add_tag_t) = (p, p). For a transition of the form
s · p.add_tag_t = s′ ,
the state s′ might contain some information about the success of the
attempt to add the tag t to the secrecy set. We have Secp(s′) = Secp(s) ∪
{t} if t+ ∈ Op(s) and Secp(s′) = Secp(s) otherwise. Only the local state
space of p is affected by this action. This action might remove outgoing
edges from some domain (p, q) and might insert incoming edges to all
(p, q).
p.remove_tag_t This action is dual to the p.create_tag_c action and removes
the tag t from p’s secrecy set if p owns the capability t−. Again, this is
an internal action with dom(p.remove_tag_t) = (p, p). For a transition
s · p.remove_tag_t = s′ ,
the state s′ might include some information about the success of re-
moving the tag t. We have Secp(s′) = Secp(s) \ {t} if t− ∈ Op(s) and
Secp(s′) = Secp(s) otherwise. Only the local state space of p is affected
by this action. This action might remove outgoing edges from (p, q) for
some q and might insert incoming edges to all (p, q).
p.send_message_m_to_q With this action, process p sends a message with
content m which is addressed to q. This action can only be performed
by the corresponding interface for outgoing messages of p to q, i. e.,
dom(p.send_message_m_to_q) = (p, q). The delivery of this message to
q depends on weather the message is safe. In our formulation, q only
receives this message if ps q holds, where s is the state in which the
message was sent. Hence, a transition on q’s local state space is only
performed if ps q, assuming this was performed in the global state s.
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This action affects p’s local state space and possibly q’s local state space,
but only if the policy allows interference. This action has no effect to
the policies under the assumption that the message does not contain
information about tag names. Otherwise it may change Oˆq. However,
this would not affect security, since p is allowed to interfere with q.
p.send_cap_c_to_q With this action, p can send q one of its capabilities c if it
is a safe message. Similar to the p.send_message_m_to_q action, we have
dom(p.send_cap_c_to_q) = (p, q). This action has no effect on q if it is
performed in a state s with p 6s q or if c /∈ Op(s). If this action is a safe
message, then we have for the corresponding transition
s · p.send_cap_c_to_q = s′
that it holds Oq(s′) = Oq(s) ∪ {c}.
This action affects p’s local state space and possibly q’s local state space,
depending if it is a safe message. This action might remove outgoing
edges from some (q, q′) and might insert incoming edges to all (q, q′).
p.drop_cap_c With this action, agent p can remove the capability c from its
set Op(s). This is again an internal action of p: dom(p.drop_cap_c) =
(p, p). For a transition of the form
s · p.drop_cap_c = s′ ,
we have Op(s′) = Op(s) \ {c}. Only the local state space of p is affected
by this action. This action might add outgoing edges from some (p, q)
and might insert incoming edges to all (p, q).
Compared to the presentation in [KT09], there are several slight differences.
Most notably is that we do not consider the possibility of forking processes.
To formulate the creation of processes, we need to have a non fixed set of
security domains which is not part of our framework so far. Another change
is that we split the sending of messages and the sending of capabilities into
different actions. In the original paper, this can be done by a single action.
However, we do not believe that this would affect the security of the system.
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6.4.6 Security of the Flume System
In this section, we will analyze the security of the Flume system. Due to the
dynamically changing policies of the Flume system, it is clear that we need
a security definition which supports dynamic policies. It is also reasonable
that we have to take intransitive effects into account, since information may
flow through several domains. These assumptions restrict us to only two of
our security definitions: di-security and dta-security. Next, we will explain
why di-security is not an appropriate security for this setting and then we
will analyze the security of Flume with respect to dta-security.
The next example shows that the Flume system is not di-secure.
6.4.2 Example. The system in Figure 6.4 depicts a part of a state space that
may exist in an instance of the Flume system. The systems consists of
processes u, v, w, and x, which are split into their corresponding parts—
except x since it does not perform any action and one may see it as its
internal part. In this setting, we are only interested in the observations of
agent x and all observations of other agents are ignored. We suppose that
we have tags, just denoted as u, v, w, and x and each agent has the tag
which corresponds to its own name in its secrecy set. Hence each agent
needs the corresponding tag of another agent in order to interfere with it.
Initially, we suppose that u is allowed to interfere with w, w is allowed to
interfere with v, and v is allowed to interfere with x. To show that this is
a possible state of the Flume system, the tag sets of the agents are listed
in Figure 6.5. The set of global capabilities Oˆ is assumed to be empty and
hence the sets Dy and D˜y are the same for all agents y ∈ D.
Initially, it is supposed that the agent w has the tag u and the capability
u+, but v and x do not. Due to the safe message condition, agent v is
allowed to send a message to x in the initial state. Throughout this example,
the observation of x switches from 0 to 1 if it receives a message. Another
possible action in the initial state is an action w, which sends the capability
u+ to v. After that, in state s1, agent v can still send a message to x safely.
However, if v adds the tag u to its secrecy set, the safe message condition
w.r.t. x is no longer valid and the edge from v to x disappears, and in state s2
all messages sent are blocked by the system. In that case, x does not even
notice that a message has been sent.
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s0
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 0
s1
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 0
s2
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 0
s3
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 1
s4
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 1
s5
(w, v) (u, w)
(v, x) (v, v)
x
obsx : 1
(w, v).send_cap_u+_to_v
(v, v).add_tag_u
(v, x).send_message_m_to_x
(v, x).send_message_m_to_x
(v, v).add_tag_u
Figure 6.4. A part of a Flume state space
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state Secw Ow Secu Ou Secv Ov Secx Ox
s0 w, u u+, u− u − v, w w+, w− x, v −
s1 w, u u+, u− u − v, w w+, w−, u+ x, v −
s2 w, u u+, u− u − v, w, u w+, w−, u+ x, v −
s3 w, u u+, u− u − v, w w+, w− x, v −
s4 w, u u+, u− u − v, w w+, w−, u+ x, v −
s5 w, u u+, u− u − v, w, u w+, w−, u+ x, v −
Figure 6.5. The tags and capabilities of the agents
The states s0 and s3 are only in this example to make this scenario
plausible and to show that we have not constructed a setting which cannot
be instantiated. For analyzing security, we start in state s1 and consider the
following trace, consisting of two actions,
(v, v).add_tag_u (v, x).send_message_m_to_x ,
and the trace
(v, x).send_message_m_to_x
consisting of only a single action.
First, we apply di-security to this system and use the characterization of
Theorem 4.5.4. Both traces above have the same dipurge value:
dipurge((v, v).add_tag_u (v, x).send_message_m_to_x, s1, x)
= dipurge((v, x).send_message_m_to_x, s1, x)
= (v, x).send_message_m_to_x .
Since both traces lead to different observations for x, the system is insecure
with respect to di-security.
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Example 6.4.2 shows that the Flume system is insecure with respect to
di-security. There are two possible conclusions from this result. Either the
Flume system (or our modeling of it) is indeed insecure, or the security
definition of di-security is too restrictive. We will argue for the latter
case. The main reason is that it is hard to explain why the system of
Example 6.4.2 should be intuitively insecure. It seems to be reasonable that
if x receives a message from v, then x also gains the information that v
has not performed the (v, v).add_tag_u action, since otherwise, x has not
received any message from v. Therefore, x obtains information about things
that have not happened. Transmission of this kind of negative information
is not supported by the notion of di-security. This is the reason why we
believe that this is a shortcoming of di-security rather than a flaw in the
Flume system.
As we already have seen, this shortcoming has been corrected by the
notion of dta-security. We will show that the Flume system (or more
precisely, our interpretation of the Flume system) is dta-secure by showing
that it satisfies the pattern of an intransitively securely constructed system.
In a securely constructed system, it is supposed that every agent has
its own state space. However, if we let every component of a process have
the same copy of a local state space and the local transition functions are
exactly the same on each copy, then we have the same effect, we have with
a single local state space for each process, since from the construction of the
policy, a component of a process p is either interfering with all or with none
of some other process’s components. Hence, from now on, it is sufficient to
talk about the local state space of a process rather than of an agent.
As usual, we require that the observation function of each agent/process
depends only on its local state space. We have already seen, for the security
of the system, it is not necessary to specify it more precisely.
We have also seen that the actions of the Flume system only affect the
local state spaces of the agents, and that the tag and capability sets only
depend on the local state space of the corresponding agents. Hence, the
dynamic policy is intransitively local-state dependent. The global transition
function follows the construction pattern of the securely constructed system,
since local transitions are only performed if the local policy in that state
allows it. Hence by Corollary 4.6.13, the Flume system is dta-secure.
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6.4.7 Krohn and Tromer’s Noninterference Result
In their work [KT09], Krohn and Tromer provided a noninterference result
for the Flume system. However, their analysis does not take the dynamics
of the policy into account. They only examine export protection tags. An
export protection tag t is a tag with the property that t+ ∈ Oˆ, but t− /∈ Oˆ.
They show that a process p with such an export protection tag in its
secrecy set cannot interfere with any process q which does not have this
tag under the assumption that p does not own the capability t− and q does
not own any of the capabilities t+, t− initially. Such a result only shows
that data from a file, protected with an export protection tag, cannot be
leaked to an untrustworthy process. However, this is a very limited result
because protection of data by such tags should not be the only security
requirement of such a complex and powerful access control mechanism
like the Flume system provides. Moreover, their result completely ignores
possible information flows which could stem from policy changes.
6.4.8 Summary
We analyzed the security of the Flume system by applying our dynamic
noninterference security definition to it and improved the previous security
analysis of the authors. We have seen that our definition of di-security is
too strong, at least for this setting of a distributed access control system.
However, the notion of dta-security seems to be appropriate and we believe
that this is the right definition for analyzing information flows in access
control systems with dynamic security requirement. We did this analysis of
the Flume system to show that the developed theory of dynamic noninter-
ference has its applications and to provide evidence that this theory has the
right definitions.
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Chapter 7
Other Frameworks for
Noninterference
The term noninterference is loosely used for expressing the absence of causal
dependencies and information flows. Several syntactically and semantically
different frameworks have been developed to analyze noninterference-like
properties.
In this chapter, we only recall the most influential works and categorize
them in the following sections. Due to the intended simplicity of the basic
idea of noninterference, essentially every framework in that systems can be
expressed can be used to formulate noninterference properties. However,
due to the very restrictive nature of plain vanilla noninterference, many re-
laxations and variations have been developed. The different expressiveness
of diverse frameworks leads to many noninterference properties while their
relation between each other is not obvious. Many of these properties use
particular properties of the framework and cannot be directly adapted to
other frameworks.
For several frameworks such as process algebras and language-based
security, good surveys exist and we will cover these topics very briefly.
In contrast, we examine other frameworks, in particular computational
noninterference, in more detail, even though it does not reflect the amount
of work on this field.
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7.1 Deterministic Systems
The most classical works on noninterference are based on deterministic
systems. Starting with Goguen and Meseguer’s work [GM82], systems
consist on state spaces with deterministic transitions which are input en-
abled, i. e., every action can be performed in every state. Also all follow
up works, namely [HY87, Rus92, vdM07], used in this thesis as a basis, re-
quire deterministic state-based systems. However, van der Meyden [vdM07]
changed the used system from action-observed to state-observed. In an
action-observed system, observation results from performance of a par-
ticular action, while in a state-observed system, the observation function
is defined on the set of states. However, this is only a minor change
to the system model as these system models can be translated into each
other [vdMZ10]. Besides the extensions of noninterference in the directions
of intransitive and dynamic noninterference, Zhang gives a very general
approach of conditional noninterference [Zha11].
In [TW08], the authors use a weaker interpretation of noninterference,
called incident insensitive noninterference. In their semantics of a policy
H 6 L, the agent L is allowed to observe if H has performed an action but
not which of its actions. We will see in Section 7.6 that this interpretation of
policies is closer to the semantics of information flows in language-based
security.
7.2 Nondeterministic Systems
A natural generalization is to extend the setting to nondeterministic systems.
Nondeterministic systems usually arise from an underspecification or from
some probabilistic behavior which is needed in many systems with security
critical components. Another source of nondeterminism is the scheduling
of concurrent processes if the scheduler is not modeled explicitly. Nonde-
terminism is defined as that for a particular state s and a particular action a,
the transition relation leads to possibly more than one state if one performs
the action a in the state s.
Here, we survey the most influential works for state-based and trace-
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based frameworks—except those works based mainly on process algebras,
which are reviewed in the next section. For nondeterministic transition
systems, several semantic models have been developed, which makes a
comparison of the different notions of noninterference difficult. However,
van der Meyden and Zhang provide a comparison of several of them
in [vdMZ10].
In a nondeterministic setting, a simple purge-based definition, like
the one of Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] is not sufficient. Due to the
nondeterministic behavior, an action sequence describes several runs which
can lead to different observations. The general idea is that if an agent H
is not allowed to interfere with an agent L, then H’s behavior should not
influence L’s possible observations. Hence, the nondeterministic behavior
of the system can be essential for its security since it brings uncertainty into
the system which disguises H’s behavior.
The first notion of noninterference in this context is Sutherland’s non-
deducibility [Sut86] using a very general approach with a possible world
semantics. Wittbold and Johnson [WJ90] extended this definition to syn-
chronous systems and analyzed strategic properties called nondeducibility
on strategies. McCullough [McC88] introduced the notion of generalized
noninterference, but at the same time, they pointed out that this notion is not
composable. Their intuition of noninterference in nondeterministic systems
was:
The input of a high–level signal may not alter the possible future
sequences of low–level events.
To achieve composability, they introduced restrictiveness [McC88, McC90],
which is an unwinding-like definition for nondeterministic systems. A
weaker notion, which preserves composability, is Johnson and Thayer’s
forward correctability [JT88]. McLean introduced separability [McL94], which
requires that for every trace of high events and every trace of low events,
every possible interleaving of them is a valid trace of the system. The notion
of non-inference, introduced by O’Halloran [O’H90], requires that from L’s
point of view it is always possible that H has not interacted with the system.
Zakinthinos and Lee present a framework based on Low Level Equivalent
Sets which are sets of traces that have the same view for agent L.
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Mantel [Man00, Man03] proposes a framework of basic security predi-
cates (BSP), which are basic building blocks for other security properties.
They claim that all (transitive) noninterference properties in nondetermin-
istic state-based systems can be expressed as a conjunction of some of the
BSPs. Mantel also provides an extension to intransitive policies in [Man01].
In a more recent work, Engelhardt et al. [EvdMZ12] adapted the def-
inition of ta-security to nondeterministic systems and showed that it is
necessary to value coalitions. In [MZ08], van der Meyden and Zhang
worked out the role of a scheduler with respect to information flow. A
desired property for specifying systems is refinement. A system M refines
a system M′ if M contains less behavior then M′, or it is more concrete
than M′. The system M can also be seen as an implementation of M′.
As pointed out in [Jac88] and [McL94], in general, noninterference is not
preserved under refinement. That means that a system might be secure,
but a refinement of it is not. In the literature, this property is referred to
as refinement paradox. The deeper reason for this is that noninterference in
nondeterministic systems requires that, from its observations, L considers
every behavior of H possible. Hence, L never knows if different obser-
vations for the same sequence of its actions stem from the interaction of
H or the nondeterminism of the system. But if in a refined system some
nondeterministic choices have been removed from the system, then L may
deduce that some observations are influenced by H.
7.3 Process Algebras
Process algebras (or process calculi) are popular frameworks for specifying
noninterference properties. They are designed to reason about distributed
systems interacting via the exchange of messages or by shared actions.
However, the underlying semantic model is a labeled transition system and
hence, there is a strong connection to nondeterministic state-based systems.
The two most common process algebras are the calculus of Communicat-
ing Sequential Processes (CSP) invented by Hoare [Hoa78] and the Calculus of
communicating systems (CCS) developed by Milner [Mil89].
An introductory survey to noninterference in CSP is [Rya01] and to
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noninterference in CCS is [FG01]. We will briefly explain the basic adaption
of the Goguen and Meseguer’s definition of noninterference to CSP follow-
ing the presentation in [RS01]. The main differences between Goguen and
Meseguer’s setting and process algebra are that the latter is nondetermin-
istic, not input-total, and that there are no observations of agents. Instead
of observations, depending on the internal state, events of the systems
might be accepted or rejected. Usually, the events or external actions are
partitioned into the security domain. For brevity, we consider the simple
high/low setting, where high (H) is not allowed to interfere with low (L).
Intuitively, H must not influence L possible traces nor the set of possible
actions that L can perform after some trace. Formally, a process P satisfies
noninterference if for all tr, tr′ ∈ traces(P) it holds:
If trL = tr′L, then SF (P/tr)L = SF (P/tr′)L .
The set traces(P) is the set of all possible traces of the process P. The term
trL is the restriction of the trace tr to the events of L. Hence, it is essentially
the same as applying the classical purge function w.r.t. L to the trace tr.
The process P/tr denotes the process P after the trace tr. The stable failure
set SF (Q) of a process Q is the set of all pairs (t, X) where t is a trace of
the process Q and X is a subset of all events which are refused by Q after
the trace t. An event is refused by a process Q after a trace t if it is not a
possible event of Q after t. The restriction of L should be understood as the
restriction of the trace t to L and the intersection of X with L, i. e., the term
(t, X)L is (tX , X ∩ L).
In [Ros95], Roscoe argued for a security definition which required that
the system is deterministic from L’s view and showed that security is
preserved under refinement.
7.4 Computational Noninterference
In the last decade, formal frameworks based on interacting Turing machines
or equivalent models have become popular in the analysis of cryptographic
protocols. These frameworks take the limitations of the attacker’s compu-
tational power into account. They are used to reason on cryptographic
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protocols and primitives whose security relies on assumptions about the
computational resources of the parties and the attacker that are involved in
a concrete setting. The “striking feature” [CCH+11] of these frameworks
is their ability to handle and preserve security under composition. For
example, in a protocol where some encryption is used one would assume
that the attacker can only make polynomial-time computations with respect
to some security parameter, which can be roughly seen as the key length.
Such assumption would rule out the possibility of an exhaustive key search
for decrypting some message. Nonetheless, an overall theory of complexity
has not been settled for these frameworks.
The first work, which defines noninterference in a computational setting,
is from Backes and Pfitzmann [BP04] using a framework from Pfitzmann
and Waidner [PW01]. Instead of Turing machines, they use scheduled
machines, which communicate through ports that are connected by input
and output buffers.
The common idea of all definitions in the context of computational
noninterference can be described as follows: Given a system, its security
domains are the communication interfaces (tapes) or the users that interact
with the system. The assumption is that the users can only communicate
with the system and possibly with some environment, but not with each
other directly. Then, a user H noninterferes with some user L if it is
not possible for H to communicate any information that it got from the
environment to L.
In general, it is assumed that the users are machines, too. Formally, there
is some machine E, called the environment, which chooses a bit b randomly
and provides this bit as an input to H. Then the goal of H and L (in the
sense that H tries to interfere with L) is to transfer some information about
this bit from H to L. After a computational bounded run of all machines, the
user L is required to output its guess of the bit b to the environment. Then,
in this context, H noninterferes with L if the probability of L’s output only
differs in a negligible amount from the probability of H’s input. Otherwise,
there is some interference from H to L.
For the overall security of a system, this property has to hold for all
possible pairs H and L of agents with H 6 L. Note that this notion
corresponds to transitive noninterference, since paths of security domain
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are not considered.
The work of Halevi et al. [HKN05] and the work of Canetti and Vald [CV12]
follow similar idea. Both use, with some modifications, the framework of
Universally Composable Security (UC) introduced by Canetti [Can00]. In-
stead of noninterference, they denote their security property as confinement,
referring to Lampson’s work [Lam73].
To the best of our knowledge, the only work in the context of com-
putational noninterference, which deals with intransitive polices, is the
work of Backes and Pfitzmann [BP03]. In this work, two different notions
of intransitive noninterference are provided. The first definition is called
blocking non-interference. The idea is to take out a set of users forming a cut
between two agents H and L and to demand that there is no information
flow from H to L in a similar sense to the definition of the transitive case as
described above.
This is quite similar to our characterization of i-security by policy cuts.
However, in Backes and Pfitzmann’s work, it is required to consider every
possible cut for any pair of agents, instead of only taking the successors
of H.
The idea of their second definition is that if L can guess H’s input bit with
some non-negligible probability, then there is some cut of users between H
and L, which can also guess this bit. This is somehow related to the notion
of to-security, since only observable information can be transmitted.
The theorems which were shown in all of these works are that if a system
satisfies the corresponding noninterference definition, then any system,
which is indistinguishable to the environment, satisfies noninterference, too.
However, this is, despite some technical results or examples, the only result
which has been shown in this area of computational noninterference.
This is surprising, because these frameworks are developed to have built-
in compositional properties and in none of these works the composition
of systems and policies is considered. It even seems to be straightforward
that the composition of two systems, each satisfying a policy, satisfies the
composed policy (with some possible renaming or identification of different
security domains), or at least the transitive closure of the composed policy.
The main technique in the context of computational frameworks is
simulation. The idea is that two systems are equivalent if they are indis-
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tinguishable to the environment. Usually one of these systems, called the
ideal functionality, provides some desired functionality in a secure, but
possibly not realizable way. The other system is some real system, which is
designed to have this functionality. Then this real system is secure if it is
indistinguishable to the ideal system.
This approach of simulation-based security has not been adapted to
noninterference, in the sense of defining an ideal functionality for an arbi-
trary system and a given policy. Intuitively, the ideal functionality should
enforce noninterference by splitting the system into different parts and
allows communication between these parts only according to the policy.
A common property of all these frameworks is that the communication
between machines can only be done by predefined communication channels,
which rules out any covert channels since these machines have no common
resources.
However, both syntactically and semantically, these frameworks signifi-
cantly differ from ours. The main differences are that in these frameworks
only the input/output behavior of the systems is considered, rather than the
sequences of all actions. Additionally, these frameworks are probabilistic or
at least nondeterministic.
7.5 Probabilistic and Quantitative Information Flow
In many real systems, the existence of covert channels cannot be completely
avoided. Hence it might be sufficient that very little information is leaked
through a covert channel or that the information is only leaked with low
probability.
McLean [McL90] extended Sutherland’s nondeducibility to a probabilis-
tic setting. Gray [Gra92] generalized this work and compared it with an
information-theoretic approach. In [Gra90], Gray adopted McCullough’s
restrictiveness to probabilistic systems.
Instead of defining information flow or noninterference by a change of
the distribution or a conditional probability, a classic way is to quantify the
channel capacity, mostly, in terms of Shannon’s information theory. Quanti-
fying information flows provides the possibility to limit the transmission of
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information without forbidding it at all. It is concerned with the amount of
information which may flow from one part of a system to another, rather
than simply whether it flows. We refer to Mu [Mu08] for a recent survey on
this topic. One of the earliest works using this approach is Millen [Mil87],
where the input and output channels of a system are modeled as random
variables. According to their work, information flows from X to Y if the
mutual information between the input of X and the output of Y is not zero.
Other measures besides Shannon’s entropy and mutual information are
proposed in [Smi09] for quantifying the information flow in the execution
of probabilistic programs.
7.6 Language-based Information Flow Security
Language-based information flow security is about formulating information
flow or noninterference properties in programming languages. Despite
the common idea of noninterference, language-based information flow
security has very little in common with trace-based noninterference mainly
considered in this thesis.
The basic idea of language-based information flow security is to attach
security domains to variables and possibly to the input and output channels
of a program. This is done on a programming language level. Such a pro-
gramming language is denoted as security-typed language. A policy, mostly
forming a lattice, gives restriction from which variable information may flow
to which other variable. This induces an access control structure and the
aim is to preserve confidentiality and secrecy of particular values. Usually
this is achieved by an enforcement mechanism which over-approximates se-
curity or noninterference in order to avoid a precise security analysis, which
is in general an undecidable problem. The security is usually enforced
at compile-time by type-checking and therefore has nearly no run-time
overhead.
The challenging part is to avoid information leaks coming from different
program paths taken at run-time. Hence, branches and loops have to be
carefully considered.
A common distinction is between explicit and implicit flows. An explicit
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flow is understood as the assignment of a variable marked as high to a
value of a variable marked as low, as in Figure 7.1. We will always assume
that h is a high and l is a low variable and information flows from high to
low is forbidden.
h := l
Figure 7.1. An explicit information
flow
if (h) then
l := 0
else
l := 1
Figure 7.2. An implicit information
flow
Implicit information flows are not as obvious. In the example in Fig-
ure 7.2, the implicit information flow stems from a branch on a high variable,
which possibly influences the value of a low variable. Other implicit infor-
mation flows typically may arise from loops in a similar way.
The first work that addresses the problem of information flow is from
Denning and Denning [DD77]. From that on, a vast body of work has been
done on the topic of language-based information flow security.
Sabelfeld and Myers [SM03] provide a survey consisting of more than
a hundred works. A more introductory work on language-based infor-
mation flow security is [Smi07]. A more recent work from Sabelfeld and
Sands [SS09] has a stronger focus on downgrading and information release.
We only recall the most important directions of research in this area and
give a brief introduction to the basic concepts. We summarize the basics of
information flow security following the presentation in [SM03].
Information flow security in language-based systems is mostly defined
in two parts. The first part is a security-type system, which is a collection
of typing rules with the aim to enforce noninterference. The second part is
a semantic-based definition which defines what noninterference is, mostly
defined as a relation between the input and output values of a program
or the corresponding memories assigned to the security domains. Then
the soundness of a security-type system holds if any program following
the typing rules is noninterference secure according to the semantic-based
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definition. This is the typical result usually shown in works on language-
based noninterference.
First we will have a closer look at an example of a security-typed system.
We recall the example of a simple security-typed imperative while-language
from [SM03], which is equivalent to the type-system given by Volpano
et al. [VIS96].
` exp : high h /∈ Vars(exp)` exp : low (E1-2)
[pc] ` skip [pc] ` h := exp ` exp : low
[low] ` l := exp (C1-3)
[pc] ` C1 [pc] ` C2
[pc] ` C1; C2
` exp : pc [pc] ` C
[pc] ` while exp do C (C4-5)
` exp : pc [pc] ` C1 [pc] ` C2
[pc] ` if exp then C1else C2
[high] ` C
[low] ` C (C6-7)
Figure 7.3. A simple security-type system
To track implicit information flow correctly, a program-counter label (pc)
has been introduced. This label collects the label of the current context. In
the example of Figure 7.2, the label of pc is high after entering the if-branch.
An assignment is then considered secure, only if it is at least as restrictive
as pc. In this example, this is not the case since it is an assignment of a
low variable. Hence, this code snippet has to be rejected as insecure. Note
that this also would be treated as insecure if in both cases of the branch the
value of the low variable is set to the same value. This over-approximation
is needed for an efficient static analysis. The main advantage of a static
analysis is that it guarantees security for all possible runs. Alternatively, a
run-time analysis would only provide security for a single execution path.
The typing rules are summarized in Figure 7.3. For simplicity, only
two security domains, namely low and high, are used. According to each
security domain, there are variables h and l containing the initial values of
high and low, respectively.
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The statement ` exp : τ means that the expression exp has the type τ as
security type. A statement [τ] : C means that the program C can be typed
in the security context τ. The types of the variables containing the initial
values are l : low and h : high. Here, pc denotes the security context of the
program label which can be either high or low and the latter is also its initial
value.
In this simple setting, the security context and the security types can
only be low and high. The rules (E1-2) state that every arbitrary expression
can be typed as high and every expression that does not contain any variable
of type high can be typed as low.
The typing rule (C1) says that the skip command can by typed in any
context. Also any assignment of the h variable is allowed in any context
(rule (C2)). The rule (C3) states that the assignment to the low variable l is
only allowed if the assigned expression has the security type low. The rules
(C4-6) are compositional rules. For the loop and the branch rule, the the
security type of the condition (exp) has to match the types of the commands
executed within the loop or at each branch to avoid information leakage
from the condition. The last rule (C7) is a subsumption rule that allows
every command in high context to be also typed in low context. This is
needed to reset the program counter to low after it was high.
For verifying that a type system, as presented here, enforces noninter-
ference, a suitable definition of noninterference is needed. The intuition of
such a definition is that different high inputs have no effect on the outputs
of low. For any two input states s1 and s2, which have the same low input,
the output states s′1 and s
′
2 are indistinguishable for low after runs of the
program starting in s1 and s2, respectively. The used indistinguishability
relation depends on a used security definition. The simplest one is just to
require the same outputs on all of the low variables.
The first work which provides a complete secure type system is from
Volpano et al. [VIS96]. A lot of work has been done to adapt these ideas to
the syntactical richness of modern programming languages. To mention
only a few, these include functions, procedures, objects, exceptions, threads,
and network communication.
Secure type-systems have been successfully implemented as extensions
of existing programming languages. The JFlow language [Mye99] is an ex-
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tension of the Java language for tracking information flow and its successor
Jif has been implemented in the Jif compiler. The functional language ML
has been extended to Flow Caml in [PS03].
The use of secure type-systems, as described so far, can only rule out
covert channels stemming from the control path taken in a run and the
leakage of information from a high to a low context. However, covert
channels, lying outside of this consideration, may still exist. In general,
everything a low observer can observe about high’s inputs may result in
a covert channel. A possible information channel is termination. If a run
of a program terminates depending on high’s input value, then low gains
information about this value. In the example in Figure 7.4, the program does
not terminate if the high variable is equal to 1 and terminates immediately
in all other cases.
l = 0
while h == 1 do
skip
l = 1
Figure 7.4. A program with a termination channel
However, this requires the assumption that termination or non-termi-
nation of a program is observable. This assumption is quite strong, since
the problem whether a program terminates for a fixed input is undecidable.
This assumption implies that low can “decide” an undecidable problem by
its observation. In [AHSS08], it has been argued that termination channels
can leak more than one bit if the program has side-effects.
However, in practice, it is reasonable that low can distinguish runs
taking a long time from those taking a short time. In that case, an observer
may also approximately distinguish terminating from non-terminating runs
by observing whether the run terminates within a sufficiently large interval
of time.
This leads to the class of timing channels. A timing channel is an
information channel where low can deduce some information about in-
puts from the running time of a program. Hence, low can distinguish
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very time-consuming computations from those that terminate immediately.
Agat [Aga00] provides mechanisms for closing timing channels.
To address intransitive policies, in language-based noninterference, the
technique of downgrading or declassification has been introduced. Sabelfeld
and Sands [SS09] discuss different dimensions of declassification. Their four
dimensions are about what information is released, who releases the infor-
mation, where in a system the information is released, and when information
is released.
A common technique for information release in security type-systems is
an explicit declassification statement introduced into the language, which
changes the security labels. Zdancewic and Myers [ZM01, Zda03] intro-
duced robust declassification, a notion of downgrading which focuses on
the integrity of a downgrading decision. In [ML97], Myers and Liskov
introduced a decentralized label approach, in which each variable has a
security label. Dynamic changes of the label has been considered by Zheng
and Myers in [ZM04]. The label of a variable can change during a run of the
program which indirectly changes the induced policy. This approach has
been incorporated in an extension of the JIF language. In [BS06], Broberg
and Sands introduced Flow Locks to handle dynamic policies. These locks
are conditions whether an information flow from a particular high to a low
variable is allowed.
Askarov and Sabelfeld provide a knowledge-based definition of infor-
mation flow and information release with support of some cryptographic
primitives in [AS07]. In [AC12], Askarov and Chong define information
flows in terms of learning of an adversary for supporting dynamic policies.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we have discussed several noninterference definitions for
state-based systems. We started with the very simple and restrictive no-
tion of Goguen and Meseguer’s t-security and studied generalizations and
weakenings of it in two orthogonal directions: intransitive and dynamic non-
interference. Intransitive noninterference allows one to describe information
flows through several agents. It takes the transmission of information via
several security domains into account and allows one to specify more com-
plex security requirements. Dynamic noninterference allows one to specify
state-dependent policies and allows dynamic changes in the policy. Both
generalizations extend noninterference with conditions on the information
flow. We have seen in this thesis that the situation is more involved if these
two extensions are combined. This results in different reasonable security
definitions for dynamic intransitive noninterference.
For a better understanding of the theory of noninterference, we devel-
oped new techniques. With information sets, we got an elegant and simple
way of characterizing intransitive information flows. The decomposition
of systems into securely constructed systems provided new insights in the
intended structure of secure systems. A main focus of this thesis was the
characterization of security definitions in terms of a sound and complete un-
winding. We showed that it is worth to reason about both trace-based and
state-based unwinding. A trace-based unwinding is a powerful tool that
provides a very simple and direct definition of intransitive noninterference
in both the static and the dynamic setting. Characterizations in terms of a
state-based unwinding are mostly more complex, since the state space may
not contain enough information about traces, as needed for completeness.
We solved this problem by increasing the number of necessary relations.
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In particular, state-based unwinding relations are needed for verification
algorithms.
We applied several of our techniques to the classic notion of transitive
noninterference. Afterwards, we performed a deeper analysis of intransitive
noninterference, including the notions of i-security and ta-security. We
obtained new insights in the relation between them. For both, we provided
the first sound and complete characterization in terms of a state-based
unwinding. We also provided characterizations for the notions of to-security
and ito-security as needed for undecidability results.
In this thesis, we provided the first rigorous definitions of dynamic
noninterference. These include definitions for both a transitive and an
intransitive interpretation of a policy as well as a new notion between
them. The notion of dt-security is a very restrictive definition of dynamic
noninterference, which does not allow any intransitive effects. The security
definition of dot-secure allows the transmission of previously performed
actions, and di-security is a generalization into a fully dynamic intransitive
noninterference definition. For all of these noninterference definitions, we
provided several characterizations, using our developed techniques when
they seemed to be appropriate. These include sound and complete charac-
terizations in terms of a state-based unwinding for all of these notions. For
dynamic intransitive noninterference, we provided an alternative definition,
dta-security, which has advantages according to the transmission of infor-
mation about not performed actions and the applicability to asynchronous
systems.
For those security definitions, we have a characterization in a polynomial-
size unwinding, we provided efficient polynomial-time algorithms which
computed the unwinding relations. These noninterference definitions were t-
security, i-security, ta-security, dt-security, and dot-security. In contrast, we
showed that the verification problem for di-security is NP-complete. Beyond
these complexity results, we showed that the verification problem for to-
security and ito-security is undecidable. Furthermore, we gave a general
construction pattern which can be used to prove for several automata
models that the verification problem for t-security in the corresponding
system model lies in the same complexity class as the language-equivalence
problem for the automata model.
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In a case study, we analyzed the distributed dynamic access control
system Flume with respect to dynamic intransitive noninterference. We
proved this system secure according to dta-security using the technique
of securely constructed systems. It strengthened our proposition of new
dynamic noninterference definitions and showed their applicability.
In Chapter 7, we gave an overview about other semantic models for
formulating and analyzing noninterference properties. Due to the vast
amount of work in this area, we only outlined the main directions.
The research presented in this thesis leads to new open questions.
Mainly, in the quite new area of dynamic noninterference, there are several
directions for future projects. A general problem in the context of nonin-
terference is the large amount of theoretical works compared to only a few
applications of it. In particular, we would like to see more applications of
dynamic noninterference to obtain more evidences that our framework is an
adequate formalization of the desired security requirements. An analysis
of further discretionary access control systems, as well as an adaption to
role-based access control systems, could be a first step.
For representing dynamic information flow requirements, we used
dynamic policies defined on the states of the system. A clearer separation
between the system and the policy might be a desired property. One
approach in this direction is to define the local policies on the set of traces
instead of on the set of states. However, for the verification problem a finite
representation of the dynamic policy is necessary, which again possibly
leads to finite-state systems.
Another way of defining dynamic noninterference is by a static policy
and a dynamic assignment of actions to agents. It would be interesting to
see a formalization of this idea for a state-based setting and how it relates
to our framework.
Due to the successful application of dta-security to a dynamic access
control system, a further investigation of this notion is desired. In particular,
if possible, we would like to have a characterization in terms of a state-based
unwinding in order to derive an efficient verification algorithm for this
notion.
From an algorithmic perspective, the computation of information flow
and minimal policies is worth deeper investigation. We provided a starting
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point with algorithms for t-security and i-security and left all other notions
of noninterference open.
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